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ABSTRACT
Model-Driven Aspect-Oriented Software Security Hardening
Djedjiga Mouheb, Ph. D.
Concordia University, 2012
Security is of paramount importance in software engineering. Nevertheless, secu-
rity solutions are generally ﬁtted into existing software as an afterthought phase of the
development process. However, given the complexity and the pervasiveness of today’s
software systems, adding security as an afterthought leads to huge cost in retroﬁtting
security into the software and further can introduce additional vulnerabilities. Further-
more, security is a crosscutting concern that pervades the entire software. Consequently,
the manual addition of security solutions may result in the scattering and the tangling
of security features throughout the entire software design. Additionally, adding security
manually is tedious and generally may lead to other security ﬂaws. In this context, the
need for a systematic approach to integrate security practices into the early phases of the
software development process becomes crucial. In this thesis, we elaborate an aspect-
oriented modeling framework for software security hardening at the UML design level.
More precisely, the main contributions of our research are the following: (i) We deﬁne
a UML proﬁle for the speciﬁcation of security hardening mechanisms as aspects. (ii)
We design and implement a weaving framework for the systematic injection of security
aspects into UML design models. (iii) We explore the theoretical foundations for aspect
matching and weaving. (iv) We conduct real-life case studies to demonstrate the viability
and the scalability of the proposed framework.
iii
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Software-intensive systems have become an inseparable part of our today’s lives. Our
dependence on software systems is very high in several sectors of our daily activities, such
as, telecommunications, ﬁnancial services, electronics, home appliances, transportation,
etc. At the same time, software complexity is increasing drastically. Therefore, software
systems become more susceptible to defects and vulnerabilities. In fact, the statistics
provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) show that the
amount of software security vulnerabilities, collected and analyzed from different sources,
raises almost every year (Figure 1.1)1. In this setting, the security engineering of such
software-intensive systems has become a major concern. This is emphasized by the fact
that, in spite of signiﬁcant efforts on software security from academia and industry, the
scale and the severity of security breaches have been increasing with no complete victory
against attacks.
1.1 Motivations and Problem Statement
Nowadays, software security hardening is generally conducted as an afterthought phase of
the software development life cycle, usually during the maintenance and the deployment
1http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/statistics
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Figure 1.1: NIST Statistics: Software Vulnerabilities
phases, by applying security updates and patches. In fact, security mechanisms are usually
ﬁtted into pre-existing software without the consideration of whether this would jeopar-
dize the main functionality of the software and produce additional vulnerabilities [120].
However, given the complexity and the pervasiveness of modern software systems, adding
security mechanisms as an afterthought leads to a huge cost in retroﬁtting security into
the software and further can introduce additional vulnerabilities. Studies have shown
that considering security during the early stages of the software development life cycle
decreases signiﬁcantly the cost of the development [47, 84]. For example, a study con-
ducted in [47] estimates that a single security vulnerability costs around $7,000 if it is
ﬁxed during the testing phase and can even reach $14,000 if the vulnerability is ﬁxed at
the maintenance phase. However, this cost can be reduced to less than $500 if the vul-
nerability is repaired during the design phase [47]. Given the large number of security
vulnerabilities that a software can contain, it is clear that ﬁxing those vulnerabilities early
saves a substantial amount of money. As shown in Figure 1.2, the cost can be reduced by
$2.3M for 200 vulnerabilities [47]. Another research suggests that if the cost of solving
a vulnerability in the design phase is $1, this cost will increase to $60-$100 to solve the
same vulnerability during later phases [84]. Furthermore, approximately 60% of all vul-
nerabilities are usually introduced into software during the design phase [28]. Therefore,



























Figure 1.2: Cost of Fixing Vulnerabilities [47]
A promising approach to early security hardening is to adopt the emerging Model-
Driven Software Engineering (MDE) [39] paradigm and prominent modeling languages,
such as the Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) [128]. MDE is a software development
methodology that considers software modeling the primary focus of the development pro-
cess. UML is the de facto standard language for software speciﬁcation and design. In
addition, these paradigms are widely accepted by industry and academia due to their ex-
pressiveness, easiness, and tool support.
Furthermore, security is a crosscutting concern that pervades the entire software.
Indeed, a security solution is not conﬁned to one element in the software design but may
impact several elements. Moreover, one element of the design can integrate several se-
curity solutions ﬁxing different security vulnerabilities. Therefore, if the developers add
security solutions manually into a UML design, security features may remain tangled and
scattered throughout the whole UML design, especially in case of large scale software
(e.g., hundreds or thousands of classes). Consequently, the resulting UML design mod-
els may become more complex and difﬁcult to understand. Additionally, adding security
manually is tedious and generally may lead to other security ﬂaws.
In this respect, Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) [97] is an appropriate paradigm
for security hardening. AOP has received considerable attention from researchers and
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industrial practitioners alike. It allows a more advanced modularization by separating
crosscutting concerns, such as security, from the software functionalities by introduc-
ing new modules, called aspects, that capture generally one concern. The adoption of
AOP techniques for developing secure software has become the center of many research
activities [26, 38, 45, 109, 119, 143, 165, 170]. This could be justiﬁed by the following
observations: (i) Aspect-oriented techniques allow security solutions to be carefully and
precisely speciﬁed in isolation without altering the logic of the software. (ii) Developers
can systematically integrate the security solutions into the software without digging into
the inner working of those solutions.
In this research, we aim at leveraging this technique to perform security hardening
of software at the UML design level through Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM) [22, 30,
152]. AOM allows software developers to conceptualize and express concerns in the form
of aspects at the modeling stage, and integrate them into their UML diagrams using UML
composition techniques. The concepts of AOM are similar to the ones of AOP (pointcut-
advice model), namely, adaptations, join points, and pointcuts. An adaptation speciﬁes
the modiﬁcation to be performed on the base model. A join point is a location in the base
model where an adaptation should be applied. A pointcut is an expression that designates
a set of join points. The process of identifying join points is called matching and the
process of composing aspects with base models is called weaving.
Using AOM, security aspects can be precisely deﬁned at UML design level, and
systematically injected, at the right places, into UML design models. However, in spite of
the increasing interest, to date, there is neither a standard language for specifying UML
aspects, nor a standard mechanism for weaving aspects into UML design models. Accord-
ingly, the primary objective of this thesis is to elaborate an aspect-oriented modeling and
weaving framework, with the underlying theoretical foundations, for software security
hardening at the UML design level.
This thesis is conducted as part of an open source project (MOBS2)2, supported
2https://forge.ericsson.net/projects/mobstwo/
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by an NSERC Collaborative Research and Development grant in collaboration with Er-
icsson Canada, on the model-based engineering of secure software and systems. This
project aims at providing an end-to-end framework for secure software development. By
end-to-end, we mean a framework that starts from the speciﬁcation of the needed secu-
rity properties on UML models, veriﬁcation and validation of the UML models against
the speciﬁed properties, security hardening of UML models, and ends with secure code
generation. In this thesis, we focus on security hardening of UML design models. In
the following, we enumerate the objectives of this research work along with the achieved
contributions.
1.2 Objectives
The primary objective of this thesis is to elaborate an AOM framework for the speciﬁ-
cation and the systematic integration of security aspects into UML design models. More
precisely, the targeted objectives are to:
• Explore the relevance and the appropriateness of AOM as a paradigm for the spec-
iﬁcation and the execution of security hardening practices on UML design models.
• Elaborate a UML proﬁle for the speciﬁcation of security hardening practices on
both structural and behavioral UML diagrams.
• Elaborate a weaving framework for the automatic injection of security aspects into
actual UML models.
• Deﬁne semantics for aspect matching and weaving and investigate the completeness
and the correctness of these processes with respect to the semantic models.
• Conduct real-life case studies to validate the importance, the relevance, and the
practicality of the proposed framework.
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1.3 Contributions
To achieve our objectives, we have designed and implemented an AOM framework for the
speciﬁcation and the systematic injection of security aspects into UML design models.
In addition, we have elaborated a formal semantics for the matching and the weaving
processes. More precisely, our contributions are:
1.3.1 UML Proﬁle for Security Aspect Speciﬁcation
The main contribution of this work is the elaboration of a UML extension for security
aspects speciﬁcation. The related achievements are the following:
• We have elaborated an AOM approach for systematic security hardening of soft-
ware at the UML design level. The proposed approach allows security experts to
specify security solutions as aspects including the details on where and how to ap-
ply them in the software application. Afterwards, these solutions can be used by
developers with limited security knowledge.
• We have devised a UML proﬁle that assists security experts in specifying security
solutions as aspects. The proposed proﬁle supports both structural and behavioral
views of aspects. In addition, it covers the most prominent UML diagrams, i.e.,
class diagrams, state machine diagrams, sequence diagrams, and activity diagrams.
The proﬁle supports two types of adaptations: (i) Add adaptations, which add new
elements to a diagram before, after, or around speciﬁc join points, and (ii) remove
adaptations, which delete existing elements from a diagram.
• We have deﬁned a UML-speciﬁc and user-friendly pointcut language to designate
the locations where aspects should be injected into base models. Regarding the join
point model, the novelty of it is twofold. First, in activity diagrams, we consider not
only executable nodes, i.e., action nodes, but also various control nodes, e.g., fork,
join, decision, and merge nodes. Some of these join points cannot be captured at
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code level with existing pointcuts. Thus, capturing such control nodes at the design
level allows modeling the crosscutting concerns that are needed with alternatives,
loops, exceptions, and multithreaded applications. Second, in state machine dia-
grams, we consider not only static states as join points, but also we capture the
states that dynamically depend on the transitions that are triggered to reach them.
1.3.2 Security Weaving Framework
The main contribution of this work is the elaboration of a weaving framework to system-
atically inject security aspects into UML design models. It is important to mention here
that this framework is developed as part of MOBS2 project, and its implementation is
shared with a colleague in MOBS2 team. The related achievements are the following:
• We have designed and implemented a weaving framework, based on model-to-
model transformation [124], to systematically inject aspects into UML models. The
weaver is integrated as a plug-in within IBM-Rational Software Architect (RSA)
[87]. The advantages of this framework over the existing model weavers are the
portability and the expressiveness thanks to the standards Object Constraint Lan-
guage (OCL) [129] and Query/View/Transformation (QVT) language [126].
• We have proposed an instantiation mechanism, through a weaving interface, for
developers to specialize the generic aspects, provided by security experts, in order
to instantiate them to their application.
• We have developed several case studies, which demonstrate the usefulness and the
relevance of the proposed framework. We have experimented adding various secu-
rity mechanisms into large-scale applications, such as SIP-Communicator [2] and
OpenSAF [14].
7
1.3.3 Matching and Weaving Semantics
The main contribution of this work is the elaboration of theoretical foundations for the
proposed framework by formalizing the matching and the weaving processes. The related
achievements are the following:
• We have elaborated a formal semantics for aspect matching and weaving in UML
activity diagrams following an operational style. We have focused on activity di-
agrams since they contain various kinds of actions and control nodes that can be
captured as join points. In this respect, the syntax of activity diagrams and their cor-
responding adaptations have been deﬁned to express the matching and the weaving
semantic rules. Afterwards, we have derived, from these semantic rules, algorithms
for implementing the matching and the weaving processes. In addition, we have
explored the correctness and the completeness of these algorithms with respect to
the deﬁned semantics.
• We have elaborated dynamic semantics for aspect matching and weaving in Exe-
cutable UML (xUML) [113]. The latter captures complete and precise behaviors,
which allow handling more security-related primitives. We have focused on exe-
cutable activity diagrams and the standard Action Language for Foundational UML
(Alf) [132]. The semantics is based on the so-called Continuation-Passing Style
(CPS) [159] since this style of semantics provides a precise and elegant description
of aspect-oriented mechanisms [61]. To this end, a denotational semantics, a CPS
semantics, and a frame-based semantics of activity diagrams and Alf language have
been deﬁned. Afterwards, we have formalized matching and weaving for basic
pointcuts as well as ﬂow-based ones [96,109] since they are important and relevant
from a security perspective. I have also to mention that this contribution is shared
with another colleague in MOBS2 team.
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1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organized into 10 chapters as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background on
software modeling that is related to the research conducted in this thesis. We mainly intro-
duce Model-Driven Engineering (MDE), Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML), Executable
UML (xUML), Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM), and model transformations. Chapter 3
presents the current literature related to security at the modeling level. We ﬁrst review the
main mechanisms used to address security at the modeling level, namely security design
patterns, mechanism-directed meta-languages, and AOM. Then, we present the research
contributions proposed for security speciﬁcation and hardening at the design level. Chap-
ter 4 presents the proposed UML proﬁle for security aspects speciﬁcation. Moreover, we
present our pointcut language proposed to designate UML join points. Chapter 5 details
the design and the implementation of the security weaving framework. We ﬁrst provide a
high-level overview that summarizes the main steps of the weaving approach. Then, we
detail each weaving step, namely, aspect specialization, join point matching, and actual
weaving. Chapter 6 presents details about our prototype implementation. This includes
the authoring of the AOM proﬁle and the implementation of the weaving plug-in. In addi-
tion, we present several case studies to illustrate our approach and explore its usefulness
for security hardening. Chapter 7 explores the semantics of the matching and the weaving
processes in activity diagrams using deductive proof systems. In addition, we formalize
algorithms for matching and weaving and prove the correctness and the completeness of
these algorithms with respect to the proposed semantics. Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 are
dedicated for presenting dynamic semantics for aspect matching and weaving based on
CPS and defunctionalization. The purpose is to describe the semantics in a precise and
elegant way. For clarity and to facilitate understanding, we elaborate the semantics in two
steps. First, in Chapter 8, we present the CPS semantics for matching and weaving in λ -
calculus. Second, in Chapter 9, we present the CPS semantics in xUML models. Finally,
Chapter 10 brieﬂy summarizes our achievements. In addition, it provides an evaluation of





The primary objective of this thesis is to elaborate a framework for the systematic security
hardening of software at the modeling level. As such, we start in this chapter by presenting
the current literature on software modeling that is related to the research conducted in this
thesis. We ﬁrst present an overview of Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) [39] and its
main terms and concepts that are used in this thesis. Then, we provide the necessary
background on modeling languages, focusing on the Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML)
[128] since it is the de facto standard language for software speciﬁcation and design. In
addition, we introduce Executable UML (xUML) [113], which is used to precisely deﬁne
UML model behaviors. Afterwards, we introduce the aspect-oriented paradigm, with a
focus on Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM) [22, 30, 152]. Finally, we give an overview
about model transformations and the main transformation languages.
2.2 Model-Driven Engineering
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) [39] is a promising approach adopted for software de-
velopment. It aims to raise the level of abstraction in program speciﬁcation by considering
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models as the primary focus of development. Once designed, the software model is used
to direct all the different phases followed for development of the software. These include
code generation, veriﬁcation and testing, maintenance, etc. The main goal of MDE is to
increase productivity by automating the development process as much as possible. More-
over, it aims at maximizing compatibility between systems by using standardized models
and best practices in the application domain. We start in this section by introducing the
main concepts of MDE, which are used in the course of this thesis.
• Model: It is an abstract representation of a speciﬁcation, a design, or a system, from
a particular point of view [158]. A model usually focuses on a certain aspect of the
system and omits all other details.
• Executable model: It is a model that contains enough details that are required to
produce the desired functionality of a single problem domain.
• Modeling language: It is a speciﬁcation language, generally deﬁned by a syntax and
a semantics, for expressing models. It can be either graphical or textual. A graph-
ical modeling language uses diagrams to represent concepts and the relationships
between them. An example of such language is UML (Section 2.3). A textual mod-
eling language uses reserved keywords associated with parameters. An example of
such language is Alf language [132] (Section 2.4.2).
• Meta-model: It is a model of a modeling language. It describes the structure, the
semantics, and the constraints for a modeling language elements. By analogy, a
model should conform to its meta-model as a program conforms to the grammar
of a particular programming language. A meta-model itself should be expressed in
some language, such as Meta-Object Facility (MOF) [127].
• Meta-Object Facility (MOF): It is an OMG standard language for deﬁning meta-
models. It is also a meta-model and often called a meta-meta-model.
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• Abstract syntax: It deﬁnes the concepts of a language and their relationships. It is
often deﬁned using a meta-model.
• Concrete syntax: It deﬁnes how elements of a language should be formed. For
example, in the case of a graphical language, a concrete syntax deﬁnes the graphical
appearance of the language concepts and how they may be combined into a model.
• Semantics: In the context of MDE, a semantics for a model describes the effect of
executing that model.
• Model transformation: It is the process of converting one model into another model
of the same system based on some transformation rules [124]. More details about
this process are provided in Section 2.6.
In the following sections, we present prominent modeling languages that are adopted
in this thesis, i.e., Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) and Executable UML (xUML). We
also provide more details about model transformations and transformation languages.
2.3 Uniﬁed Modeling Language
The Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) [128] is a general-purpose modeling language
in the ﬁeld of software engineering. It was created and standardized by the Object Man-
agement Group (OMG) in 1997. The objective of UML is to provide system architects,
software engineers, and software developers with tools to specify, construct, visualize,
and document models of object-oriented software systems. It is now considered the
de facto language for software speciﬁcation and design. Currently, UML is at version
2.4.1 [128]. A major update has been done at version 2.0 compared to version 1.x.
UML 2.0 has been enhanced with signiﬁcantly more precise deﬁnitions of its abstract
syntax rules and semantics, a more modular language structure, and a greatly improved
capability for modeling large-scale systems [128]. In addition, UML now is deﬁned in
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terms of Meta-Object Facility (MOF) [127], which makes it compliant with other meta-
models deﬁned by OMG. In the following sub-sections, we present an overview of the
main UML diagrams, UML extension mechanisms, and the Object Constraint Language
(OCL) [129].
2.3.1 UML Diagrams
The visual notation of UML models is expressed in a rich set of diagrams. UML 2 consists
of fourteen diagram types describing different views of a software system. The OMG’s
UML speciﬁcation classiﬁes UML diagrams into two main categories: structural and be-
havioral diagrams (Figure 2.1). Structural diagrams describe the static structure of objects
in a system as well as the relationships and the dependencies between the objects. Behav-
ioral diagrams describe the dynamic behavior of objects in a system. Table 2.1 provides




































Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of UML Diagrams
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UML Diagram Speciﬁes
Class classes, entities, business domain, databases, etc.
Package the organization of packages, sub-systems
Object objects and their relationships at one point in time
Component software and hardware elements that make up a system
Composite Structure component of object behavior at run-time
Deployment the hardware architecture of a system
Proﬁle UML extensions
Activity a sequence of actions of a ﬂow within the system
Sequence object interactions over time and the exchanged messages
Interaction Overview interactions at a general high level
Communication exchange of messages between objects over time
Timing changes in the state or value of elements in a timeline
State Machine the behavior of an object at run-time
Use Case system functionality from the user’s viewpoint
Table 2.1: UML Diagrams
2.3.2 UML Extension Mechanisms
Even though UML is very expressive, there are situations where the language needs to be
extended to support speciﬁcations in a speciﬁc platform or domain. This is where UML
extension mechanisms come into play. They enable the addition of new features that are
not provided by the UML standard. There are two main standard extension mechanisms
in UML: (1) Stereotypes and tagged values, packaged in a so-called UML proﬁle, and (2)
constraints. In the following, we provide an overview of these extension mechanisms.
Stereotypes and Tagged Values
A stereotype deﬁnes how an existing meta-class may be extended [128]. Therefore, it is
considered as a user-deﬁned meta-class. Its structure matches the structure of an existing
UML meta-class, which is referred to as “base class”. In this respect, a stereotype repre-
sents a sub-class of the base class. A stereotype may have properties, which are referred
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to as “tags”. When a stereotype is applied to a model element, the values of the proper-
ties are referred to as “tagged values”. They are used to add the additional information
needed to specify the stereotype intent. A stereotype is denoted by StereotypeName
and can extend any kind of UML meta-class, such as, Class, Operation, Dependency, etc.
A tagged value consists of a name and one or many values.
Constraints
Constraints extend the semantics of UML by specifying rules and restrictions on model
elements. Certain kinds of constraints are predeﬁned in UML, while others may be user-
deﬁned [128]. A user-deﬁned constraint is described using a speciﬁc language. The
language used by UML to specify constraints is generally the Object Constraint Language
(OCL) [129], which is described in the next sub-section.
2.3.3 Object-Constraint Language
The Object Constraint Language (OCL) [129] is a formal language used to specify ex-
pressions on UML models. These expressions typically specify constraints that must hold
for the system being modeled or queries over objects described in a model. OCL is mainly
used to specify application-dependent constraints for UML models. In addition, it is used
to specify invariants of the UML meta-language. More precisely, the main purposes for
which OCL can be used are to: (1) query UML elements, (2) specify invariants on classes
and types in the class model, (3) specify type invariants for stereotypes, (4) describe pre
and post conditions on operations, and (5) describe guards [129]. OCL is a pure speciﬁ-
cation language; the evaluation of OCL expressions over UML elements cannot change
anything in the model. This means that when an OCL expression is evaluated, it simply
returns a value. It cannot have any effect on the state of the system even though an OCL
expression can be used to specify a state change (e.g., a post-condition) [129].
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2.4 Executable UML
UML provides software designers with graphical modeling notations to specify, construct,
visualize, and document the artifacts of a software system. However, the standard nota-
tions of UML are not always sufﬁcient to capture the detailed software behavior, such as
variable and attribute assignments, operation calls, transition effects, etc. As a result, the
models speciﬁed using UML notations remain abstract and high level. In addition, the
standard UML speciﬁcation does not offer precise and complete execution semantics for
UML elements. In fact, the semantics is deﬁned informally in English. Consequently, it
is not possible to deﬁne fully executable UML models that can be simulated and validated
before development. Furthermore, in the security context, some vulnerabilities, such as
the ones related to data ﬂow, cannot be easily detected on high-level models since these
vulnerabilities involve variables and their data values. Accordingly, it is important to have
detailed and executable speciﬁcations to be able to detect and ﬁx such vulnerabilities.
Fortunately, the Object Management Group (OMG) proposed a new standard called
Semantics of a Foundational Subset for Executable UML Models [133]. This standard
deﬁnes the precise execution semantics for a selected subset of UML, the so-called foun-
dational UML (fUML) [133]. However, fUML provides only the abstract syntax of ex-
ecutable UML and does not specify how executable models should be formed. Conse-
quently, the creation of executable models remains a difﬁcult task, especially for large-
size executable UML models. For these reasons, OMG deﬁned another standard, called
Action Language for Foundational UML (Alf) [132], to provide a concrete syntax for
fUML. In the following, we present the main elements of fUML. Afterwards, we provide
a brief introduction to Alf language.
2.4.1 Foundational UML
Foundational UML (fUML) [133] is an executable subset of the standard UML that can
be used to specify, in an operational style, the structural and the behavioral semantics of a
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system. The main elements of fUML are activities, actions, structures, and asynchronous
communications [133]. In the following, we present the basic features of activities and
actions as they are used in Chapter 9.
Activities are speciﬁcations of control ﬂow and data ﬂow dependencies between
functions or processes in a system. An activity is composed of nodes connected by edges
(control ﬂows and object ﬂows) in the form of a complete ﬂow graph. A control ﬂow
speciﬁes the sequencing of activity nodes. An object ﬂow provides a path for passing
objects or data between activity nodes. There are mainly three kinds of activity nodes:
action nodes, object nodes, and control nodes. Actions are fundamental units of exe-
cutable behaviors that represent single steps within activities. They operate on control
and data they receive through their incoming edges, and provide control and data to other
actions through their outgoing edges. Foundational UML supports various kinds of ac-
tions, which can be classiﬁed into four groups:
• Invocations actions: Include invocations of behaviors such as activities, invocations
of operations, and communication actions such as sending of signals and accepting
of events.
• Object actions: Include creating objects and destroying objects.
• Structural feature actions: Include reading structural features, adding, removing,
and clearing structural feature values.
• Link actions: Include reading links, creating new links, destroying existing links,
and clearing associations.
Object nodes are used to hold data temporarily as the data wait to move through the
control ﬂow graph. There are two main kinds of object nodes: activity parameter nodes
and input/output pins. Activity parameter nodes hold inputs and outputs to activities,
while pins hold inputs and outputs to actions. Control nodes are nodes that coordinate
ﬂows in an activity. The main control nodes are initial node, final node, fork node,
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join node, decision node, and merge node. The initial/final node starts/terminates
the activity execution. The fork and join nodes are used to model concurrency and
synchronization. The decision and merge nodes are used to model branching.
An activity execution can be described in terms of tokens’ ﬂow. A token is a locus
of control or a container for an object/data that may be present at an activity node. For
example, Figure 2.21 illustrates a simple activity, which is invoked with an argument of 1
for its input parameter. Consequently, a data token with a value of 1 is placed on the input
activity parameter node. Then, that data token ﬂows to the input pin of the action A along
the object ﬂow a. Consequently, the action A ﬁres and produces a result as a data token.
Then, this data token ﬂows to the output activity parameter node along the object ﬂow c.
In addition, the action A produces a control token, which ﬂows to the action B along the
control ﬂow b. Finally, the action B accepts the control token and ﬁres, producing a data
token that ﬂows to the output activity parameter node along the object ﬂow d.
	

Figure 2.2: Example of an Activity
1http://www.omg.org/news/meetings/tc/agendas/va/xUML_pdf/Seidewitz_Tutorial.pdf
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2.4.2 Action Language for Foundational UML
Action Language for Foundational UML (Alf) [132] is a textual representation for spec-
ifying executable fUML behaviors within a UML model. Such a text may specify only
parts of a UML model, or it may specify an entire UML model, at least within the limits
of the fUML subset [132]. The key components of Alf are: (1) An abstract syntax, which
is a MOF meta-model that deﬁnes the concepts of Alf and their relationships, (2) a con-
crete syntax, which is a BNF speciﬁcation for fUML model elements, (3) a semantics,
which is deﬁned by mapping Alf abstract syntax meta-model to fUML abstract syntax
meta-model, and (4) a standard model library, which consists of primitive types and be-
haviors from fUML model library, collection functions similar to OCL ones, and collec-
tion classes such as Set, List, etc. In addition of being a standard, Alf is highly expressive
and provides a compact representation for specifying precise and detailed behaviors. Alf
is composed of three main constructs:
• Expressions: An expression is a behavioral unit that evaluates to a (possibly empty)
collection of values. Expressions may also have side effects, such as changing the
value of an attribute of an object. Alf expressions may be used any place where a
UML value speciﬁcation may be deﬁned. For example, they may be used as the
body of a UML opaque expression or may be compiled into an equivalent UML
activity to act as the speciﬁcation of such an expression.
• Statements: A statement is a behavior that is executed for its effect and does not
have values. Statements are the primary units of sequencing and control in Alf.
Alf statements may be used to deﬁne the detailed behavior of a UML action or a
complete UML behavior within a UML model.
• Units: A unit is a namespace deﬁned using Alf notation. Units are lexically inde-
pendent segments of Alf text that provide a level of granularity similar to typical
programming language text ﬁles [132]. Alf units may be used to represent a model
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element, e.g., class and activity, within a UML model, or may be used to represent
an entire UML model.
The execution semantics of Alf is given by mapping Alf abstract syntax to fUML.
The result of executing an Alf code is thus given by the semantics of the fUML model to
which it is mapped [132]. Figure 2.32 shows an example of Alf code, which has the same





Figure 2.3: Example of Alf Code
In this thesis, we address the security hardening of UML and xUML models ex-
pressed using Alf language. To perform this task in a systematic way, we resort to aspect-
oriented techniques [30, 97], which will be introduced in the following section.
2.5 Aspect-Oriented Modeling
Aspect-orientation emerged as a paradigm that allows advanced modularization of cross-
cutting concerns. A crosscutting concern is a concern that cannot be easily and efﬁciently
modularized into a single entity using object-oriented techniques. Thus, such a concern
remains scattered and tangled throughout various places in the application. Scattering
means that one concern is located in different modules whereas tangling means that one
module contains many concerns. These concerns may vary depending on the application
domain; they can be functional or non-functional, high-level or low-level features. Se-
curity, logging, and synchronization are some examples of such concerns. The objective
2http://www.omg.org/news/meetings/tc/agendas/va/xUML_pdf/Seidewitz_Tutorial.pdf
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of aspect-orientation is to encapsulate those concerns that cross-cut an application into
single units of modularization called aspects. Then, deﬁne a mechanism to compose the
different aspects into a coherent program.
The aspect-oriented paradigm originally emerged at the programming level. Var-
ious Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) [97] models were proposed to achieve the
aforementioned goals. The most important models are: Pointcut-Advice [110], Multi-
Dimensional Separation of Concerns [135], and Adaptive Programming [134]. In addi-
tion, many AOP languages have been developed, such as, AspectJ [96] and HyperJ [136],
built on top of the Java programming language, AspectC [50] and AspectC++ [156], built
on top of the C and C++ programming languages, etc. However, due to the rise of MDE,
aspect-oriented techniques are no longer restricted to the programming stage, but are in-
creasingly adopted at prior stages of the software development life cycle. In this context,
Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM) aims at applying AOP mechanisms at the modeling
level, which encompasses requirements engineering, analysis, and design stages [22].
An appropriateness analysis study of the different AOP models from a security
point of view has been conducted in [24]. As a result of this study, the pointcut-advice
model was identiﬁed as the most appropriate approach for security hardening. Indeed, the
pointcut-advice model allows capturing subtle points in the control ﬂow of applications
that are important from a security point of view, such as method calls, method executions,
getting and setting of attributes, etc. In addition, security behavior can be automatically
injected at these points. Hence, in the following, we present the main concepts of the
pointcut-advice model, as it is the one adopted in this research.
Aspect: As mentioned previously, an aspect is a unit of modularization that encapsu-
lates a cross-cutting concern of an application. Typically, an aspect contains a set of adap-
tations, specifying in what way a concern’s structure and behavior should be adapted, i.e.,
enhanced, replaced, or deleted [152].
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Advice and Introduction: Advice is a piece of code specifying how the behavior of an
application should be adapted at speciﬁc points. Whereas, an introduction speciﬁes how
the structure of an application should be adapted. In AOM, we use the term adaptation to
refer to both structural and behavioral modiﬁcations.
Join Point and Pointcut: A join point is an event during the execution of a program
such as a method call or a method execution. At the modeling level, a join point represents
a location in a model where an event happens, such as, a call message in a sequence
diagram or an action in an activity diagram. A pointcut is an expression that designates a
set of join points.
Matching and Weaving: Matching is the process of selecting the join points that sat-
isfy a given pointcut expression. Whereas, weaving is the process of composing aspects
with the base modules. In other words, weaving is the process of applying the aspect
adaptations at the matched join points. Figure 2.4 shows a high-level representation of
an aspect and the result of the weaving process. As mentioned in the introduction of this
thesis, one of our objectives is to elaborate a weaving framework for the automatic in-
tegration of security aspects into design models. To achieve this goal, the technology of
model transformation can be of a great value. Indeed, model weaving can be seen as the
process of transforming a base model into a woven model according to a set of transfor-
mation rules given by the aspect. Thus, in the following section, we present the necessary
background about model transformations and the main transformation languages.
2.6 Model Transformations
Model transformation is the process of converting one model to another model of the same
system [124]. This process takes, as input, one or more models that conform to speciﬁc
meta-models, and produces, as output, one or more models that conform to speciﬁc meta-

































Figure 2.4: Example of the Weaving Process
and reduce errors by automating the modiﬁcation of models as much as possible. Model
transformation is an essential part of Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) [124], an OMG
initiative to MDE. In this context, model transformations are mainly used to convert a
model of a certain layer into another layer, such as transforming a platform-independent
model into a platform-speciﬁc model. However, model transformations are also useful for
transforming models within the same layer, such as to perform model weaving as we will
see in Chapter 5. A model transformation is speciﬁed as a set of mappings. Each mapping
consists of a set of reﬁnements of model elements, addition of further details to a model,
or conversion between different kinds of models. There are four different transformation
approaches [124]: (1) Manual transformation, (2) transformation using a UML proﬁle,
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(3) transformation using patterns and markings, and (4) automatic transformation using
tools and transformation languages. In this research, we are interested in the automatic
transformation. Thus, we describe in the following the main transformation languages
and tools.
2.6.1 Model Transformation Languages and Tools
There are several languages and frameworks for specifying model transformations, such
as, Query/View/Transformation (QVT) language [126], Atlas Transformation Language
(ATL) [1], IBM-Model Transformation Framework (MTF) [58], open Architecture Ware
(oAW) [6], Kermeta [16], etc. We have studied these transformation languages in order to
select the most appropriate one(s) for our needs. In the following, we provide an overview
of each language together with a comparative study.
Query/View/Transformation Language
Query/View/Transformation (QVT) [126] is an OMG standard language for model trans-
formation. It consists of three components: two declarative (QVT-Relations and QVT-
Core) and one imperative (QVT-Operational):
• QVT-Relations: It implements the transformation by providing links that identify
relations between elements in the source model and elements in the target model.
Traces between elements that are involved in a transformation are created implicitly.
• QVT-Core: It is a small language that only supports pattern matching. Thus, its
semantics can be deﬁned in a simple way. However, QVT-Core does not have a full
implementation and it is not as expressive as QVT-Relations.
• QVT-Operational: It is an imperative language that is designed for writing unidi-
rectional transformations.
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QVT-Relations and QVT-Core languages are good for simple transformations where
the source model and the target model have a similar structure. However, when it comes
to more sophisticated transformations where elements in the target model are built with
no direct correspondence with elements in the source model, declarative languages can
be a limitation. Thus, the need for an imperative language becomes a must. Therefore,
QVT proposed the third language, which is QVT-Operational [91]. QVT integrates also
OCL language that it extends with imperative features. The Eclipse modeling framework
provides an implementation of QVT-Operational through its M2M open source project3.
Unlike other tools and languages that only support some concepts of the QVT standard,
Eclipse QVT-Operational (QVTO) implements the ﬁnal adopted speciﬁcation.
Atlas Transformation Language
The Atlas Transformation Language (ATL) [1] is a hybrid language that is a mix of declar-
ative and imperative constructs. It consists of three components: Atlas Model Weaver
(AMW) [66], ATL, and ATL Virtual Machine. AMW creates links between model ele-
ments and saves them in a separate model, commonly referred to as the weaving model.
ATL is the transformation language; it supports unidirectional transformations and it is
used to write ATL programs, which are executed by the ATL virtual machine. ATL is not
compliant with QVT, although, it implements similar concepts and functionalities.
Open Architecture Ware
Open Architecture Ware (oAW) [6] is a framework that supports model transformations
using a language called Xtend4. The latter supports transformation of models by running
a sequence of statements. These statements are called within a workﬂow and executed by
a workﬂow engine. Moreover, oAW provides special support for aspect-orientation [97]




IBM Model Transformation Framework
IBM Model Transformation Framework (MTF) [58] allows the speciﬁcation of model
transformations as a set of relations between models. These relations are expressed using
a language called Relation Deﬁnition Language (RDL) [58]. For example, a relation can
be established between classes that have a matching attribute. These relations are then
parsed and evaluated by a transformation engine. MTF supports bi-directional transfor-
mations, i.e., transforming the source model to the target model and vice versa.
Kermeta
Kermeta [16] is a modeling and programming language for meta-model engineering. It
is considered the ﬁrst executable meta-language that can be used for different purposes,
such as model and meta-model prototyping and simulation, veriﬁcation and validation of
models against meta-models, model transformations, and aspect weaving [16].
2.6.2 Comparative Study of Model Transformation Languages
One of the biggest challenges we faced was to select the appropriate transformation lan-
guage, from the pool of available languages, that best suits our needs. To do so, we iden-
tify some characteristics that are desirable in transformation languages. The following is
a description of these characteristics:
• Transformation Approach: A transformation language is either declarative, imper-
ative, or hybrid. A declarative language is good for simple transformations that
are based on establishing relations between the input and the output models. An
imperative language is more suited for complex transformations as it describes the
different steps of the transformations. A hybrid language combines both declarative
and imperative features. Indeed, the process of weaving aspects into base models is
not always based on establishing direct relations between the models. In fact, it may
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require complex operations that declarative languages fail to achieve. Thus, imper-
ative or hybrid approaches will give us more expressiveness in terms of language
constructs when dealing with aspect weaving.
• Rule Scheduling: It is the order in which transformation rules are applied on the
models while executing the transformations. There are two kinds of rule schedul-
ing [52]: (1) Implicit scheduling, which is based on the implicit relations between
rules, and (2) Explicit scheduling, which is based on explicit speciﬁcations of rule
ordering. Additionally, explicit scheduling can be either explicit internal, which
is deﬁned using explicit rule invocations, or explicit external, which deﬁnes the
scheduling logic outside the transformation rules by the means of some special lan-
guage. In the context of aspect weaving, it is necessary to have full control over the
order in which the rules are applied. Such control will help us in handling different
issues, such as conﬂicting advices where the application of one advice depends on
the application of the other.
• Traceability: It maintains links between elements in the source model and elements
in the target model. In the context of model weaving, traceability is important since
it allows to track aspect modiﬁcations on the base model. In addition, it is of high
value for documentation purposes.
• Standardization: The OMG deﬁned QVT as a standard language for model transfor-
mations. It is important to choose a transformation language/tool that implements
the QVT standard. This will provide portability for the weaver through UML case
tools, which provide support for OMG standards.
Table 2.2 summarizes the different transformation languages. By comparing the
different languages/tools with regards to the aforementioned characteristics, we conclude
that QVTO is the best language to use as it meets our needs for model weaving.
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Language/Tool Approach Rule Scheduling Traceability Standardiza-
tion
QVTO Imperative Explicit internal yes yes
ATL Hybrid Explicit internal yes no
oAW Imperative Explicit external no no
MTF Declarative Implicit yes no
Kermeta Imperative Explicit internal no no
Graph-based Declarative Explicit external no no
language
General-purpose Imperative Explicit internal no no
programming language
Table 2.2: Comparison of Model Transformation Languages and Tools
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented an overview of the software modeling topics that are
relevant to our research. We have presented the basic terms and concepts of MDE, a
promising approach that focuses on models for the engineering of software. We have also
provided an overview of UML, the de facto standard language for software speciﬁcation
and design. In addition, we have introduced executable UML and its related standards
fUML and Alf. Moreover, we have provided the basic concepts of the aspect-oriented
paradigm, with a focus on AOM since it inspires the approach proposed in this thesis. Fi-
nally, we have described model transformations, focusing on the standard QVT language.
In the following chapter, we will address security at the modeling level and present the





This chapter presents the background related to security at the modeling level. We ﬁrst re-
call some important concepts about software security and the main security requirements.
Then, we overview the main design mechanisms that are typically adopted to handle
security at the modeling level. These are security design patterns, mechanism-directed
meta-languages, and aspect-oriented modeling. We also highlight the challenges related
to the use of these mechanisms in UML design. Afterwards, we present the research con-
tributions that address security speciﬁcation and hardening during the design phase of the
software development life cycle. Finally, we conclude this chapter by a discussion on the
relevance of these mechanisms for security hardening.
3.2 Software Security
Software security is the process of designing, building, and testing software, such that it
becomes resilient against attacks and threats. It gets to the heart of computer security by
identifying and expunging problems in the software itself [112]. Secure software should
be as vulnerability and defect free as possible. In addition, it should limit the damage
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resulting from any failure and recover as quickly as possible from this failure. Moreover,
it should continue functioning correctly under malicious attacks [28]. In the following,
we brieﬂy recall some important concepts and security requirements, which will be con-
sidered in the course of this thesis.
• Security Policy: A security policy is a set of rules and guidelines that specify how to
achieve the needed security requirements for a system or an organization. It might
include rules for virus detection and prevention, granting and revoking access to
system resources, protecting critical information from unauthorized users, etc.
• Security Flaw: A security ﬂaw is a defect in a program that can cause a system
to violate its security requirements. A software defect is the result of encoding of
human errors into the software.
• Security Vulnerability: A security vulnerability is a weakness in a system that could
be exploited to violate the system’s security policy. It is the result of exploiting a
security ﬂaw by an attacker. Examples of ﬂaws that usually lead to vulnerabilities
include: memory management errors (e.g., buffer overﬂow [73]) and input valida-
tion errors (e.g., format string, SQL injection, and cross-site scripting [72]).
• Attack: An attack or exploit is a technique that takes advantage of a security vul-
nerability to violate a security policy.
• Security Hardening: Security hardening can be deﬁned as any process, methodol-
ogy, product, or combination that is used to add security functionalities, remove
vulnerabilities, and/or prevent their exploitation in a software [118].
• Security Mechanism: A security mechanism is a software/hardware solution target-
ing the enforcement of security policies. Examples of such mechanisms include
access control mechanisms such as Role-Based Access Control [69].
Security requirements can be classiﬁed into high-level and low-level requirements.
High-level security covers requirements such as, conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication,
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authorization, availability, etc. Low-level security deals with safety vulnerabilities that
can be introduced in the software source code during the implementation phase. Those
vulnerabilities depend on the platform and the programming language used for the de-
velopment of a software system. The most common low-level security vulnerabilities
include: buffer and integer overﬂows, format string errors, memory and ﬁle management
errors, SQL and command injection, cross-site scripting, directory traversal, clear and set
interrupts, TOCTTOU (Time-of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use) errors [35, 173], etc. Since we
are dealing with security hardening at design level, we are more interested in high-level
security than low-level security. In the following, we provide an overview of the main
high-level security requirements that are usually speciﬁed and veriﬁed on software.
• Conﬁdentiality: The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) deﬁnes
conﬁdentiality as “ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized
to have access” [88]. Enforcing conﬁdentiality is one of the main security services
provided by many cryptographic protocols. When properly enforced, it ensures that
the data that is sent between participants in a communication session reaches only
the intended receivers but unintended parties cannot determine what was sent.
• Integrity: It requires that data should not be accidentally or maliciously altered
or destroyed. In other words, the data received by the receiver should be exactly
the same as the data sent by the sender. The objective of integrity is to ensure
the correctness and the accuracy of data. Integrity can be compromised through
malicious altering, such as an attacker modifying a message in a communication
network, or accidental altering, such as a transmission error or a system crash.
• Authentication: The objective of an authentication requirement is to ensure that
users are who they claim to be. In other words, authentication provides assurance
that an entity is not pretending to have the identity of another entity without being
detected. To ensure the authentication property, a system must provide a mechanism
to verify the identity of its users before interacting with them.
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• Authorization: It stipulates which user is allowed to access one or more resources
in a system. After a user is authenticated, the authorization process determines
whether that user has access to a speciﬁed resource. Legal users are granted au-
thorization to the required resources while illegal ones are denied access to the
resources. The authorization requirement prevents unauthorized users from obtain-
ing access to inappropriate or conﬁdential data. Authorization and authentication
are closely related because any meaningful authorization policy requires authenti-
cated users. Authorization requires that accessing critical information should be
controlled. Accordingly, different models of access control have been proposed.
The most known models are Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [69], Mandatory
Access Control (MAC) [34], and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [122]:
– In the RBAC model, access decisions are based on the roles and the respon-
sibilities of users within an organization. Users and permissions to perform
operations on objects are assigned to roles.
– In the MAC model, security levels (e.g., unclassiﬁed, conﬁdential, secret and
top secret) are assigned to each object (classiﬁcation) and each subject (clear-
ance). The permission for a subject to access an object depends on the relation
between the object’s classiﬁcation and the subject’s clearance.
– In the DAC model, access restriction to objects is based on the identity of
subjects and/or groups to which they belong. In this model, every object has
an owner that controls the permissions to access the object. The owner of an
object can make decisions of who else in the system can access that object. In
addition, the owner is able to delegate his/her permissions to other users.
There are many mechanisms that are used in the literature to enforce security re-
quirements. In the next section, we introduce the main mechanisms that are followed for
security speciﬁcation and hardening at the UML design level. Afterwards, in Section 3.4,
we present the existing contributions that have adopted these mechanisms.
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3.3 Model-Based Security Speciﬁcation and Hardening
Mechanisms
Three main approaches are usually followed for the speciﬁcation of security requirements
and hardening mechanisms at the UML design level. These approaches are design pat-
terns, mechanism-directed meta-languages, and aspect-oriented modeling. In the follow-
ing, we introduce these approaches and then highlight the challenges related to their use
in UML design.
3.3.1 Security Design Patterns
Design patterns are deﬁned as generic reusable solutions to solve recurring problems in
software design. The idea of a pattern was ﬁrst introduced as an architectural concept
by Christopher Alexander et al. [21] and was later adopted in the software engineering
community. One of the main goals of design patterns is to help designers in applying
good practices in software development. Indeed, design patterns capture the knowledge
of experts in a well-structured form that facilitates its reuse by designers. In recent years,
the application of the pattern concept in the ﬁeld of information security has been widely
investigated. In this context, a security design pattern describes a particular recurring
security problem that arises in a speciﬁc context. In addition, it presents a well-proven
generic scheme for a security solution [154]. Like design patterns, security patterns en-
capsulate the knowledge of security experts in the form of proven solutions to common




Following the same intuition of design patterns, many contributions have proposed exten-
sions of the UML meta-model, each of which is dedicated to the design of a speciﬁc se-
curity hardening solution. UML extension mechanisms that are adopted are mainly UML
proﬁles (stereotypes and tagged values). The adoption of these extension mechanisms is
motivated by their expressiveness to specify a wide range of security requirements. In ad-
dition, UML standard extension mechanisms beneﬁt from a good tool support since any
UML modeling framework supports the standard proﬁle speciﬁcation. Accordingly, many
UML extensions have been proposed in the literature for specifying security requirements.
The majority of these languages target RBAC security policies [18,23,60,107,145]. Other
security requirements, such as authentication, have been also addressed [115].
3.3.3 Aspect-Oriented Modeling
The applicability of aspect-oriented techniques to specify security requirements and hard-
ening mechanisms has been heavily studied in the literature both at the implementation
and design levels [26, 38, 45, 78, 94, 119, 139, 143, 144, 165, 170, 174]. Indeed, aspect-
oriented techniques support the idea of separating crosscutting concerns from the appli-
cation core functionality. Since security is a crosscutting concern that pervades the entire
software, it is natural to consider AOM as a mechanism for security hardening at the
modeling level. In fact, a security hardening solution consists of specifying the needed
security functionalities and the locations where these functionalities should be applied.
In addition, these security functionalities should be systematically injected into the base
models at speciﬁed locations, which could be achieved using AOM.
3.3.4 Challenges
The designer of security hardening mechanisms, using UML, has to deal with the follow-
ing challenges:
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• Non-Standardization: There is a lack of standardization efforts regarding the design
of security hardening mechanisms. Consequently, for the same security policy,
different security experts can adopt different designs (e.g., pattern, aspect). As
a result, this will limit the adoption of these solutions and may confuse the end-
designer when having to choose between different solutions.
• Adaptability to Users’ Design: The security mechanism design provided by the se-
curity expert is sometimes application-independent. This way, it will be generic
enough to be adapted to the design of the end-user. However, since this adapta-
tion/specialization will be performed by a non-security expert designer, it should
be as systematic and as easy as possible. It may be required that a well-detailed
procedure should accompany the security solution.
• Maintainability of Design and Security Mechanisms: During the development pro-
cess, the design models as well as the security solution may be in continuous mod-
iﬁcation. Consequently, the security hardening solution should take into consider-
ation the appearance of new elements and the disappearance of others. Indeed, the
appearance of some elements necessitates applying the security solution to these
elements without reapplying it to the existing elements that are already covered by
the solution. If some elements will be dropped from the design while they have
been covered by the solution, then the corresponding security elements should be,
in turn, dropped from the design. Similar maintenance modiﬁcations should be
applied when the security solution itself is updated.
• Validation: Security mechanisms are supposed to enforce the security policies they
are designed for. However, validating this claim is far from being a straightforward
task. Thus, rigorous veriﬁcation and validation techniques should be applied on the
proposed security mechanism design.
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3.4 Related Work on Model-Based Security
In this section, we present the state-of-the-art initiatives on security speciﬁcation and
hardening at the design level. We classify the related work according to the adopted
mechanisms into three main categories: (1) Security design patterns, (2) mechanism-
directed meta-languages, and (3) aspect-oriented modeling.
3.4.1 Security Design Patterns
Several security design patterns have been proposed in order to guide software engineers
in designing security models at different levels of the software development life cycle. A
detailed study of different security patterns can be found in [31, 98, 103, 155, 172]. We
present in the following an overview of the existing patterns. Kienzle et al. [98] present
29 security patterns for web applications. The patterns are classiﬁed into two categories:
structural and procedural patterns. The structural patterns include diagrams that describe
both the structure and the interaction of the design pattern. On the other hand, the proce-
dural patterns are used to improve the development process of security-critical software.
Romanosky [149] presents eight security design patterns that represent a collection of
security practices. The proposed patterns address high-level security concerns, such as,
how to provide secure communication in the presence of untrusted third-party, how to
make a system fails securely, etc. The discussion however has focused on architectural
and procedural guidelines more than on security patterns. Brown et al. [92] introduce the
authenticator pattern, which describes a general mechanism to provide identiﬁcation and
authentication from a client to a server. This pattern has been later extended by Fernandez
and Warrier [68] for authentication and authorization.
The Open Group [37] presents a catalog of thirteen architectural-level and design-
level security patterns that are based on architectural framework standards. It also presents
a systematic methodology for using those security patterns to design a system, which
has good availability and protection properties. Fernandez [67] provides a methodology
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to build secure systems using patterns. The main idea of this approach is that security
principles should be applied through the use of security patterns at every stage of the
software development process, i.e., requirements, analysis, design, and implementation.
At the end of each stage, audits are performed to verify that the security policies are being
followed. Chan and Kwok [43] propose an object-oriented design pattern that models the
main entities of security design, such as, vulnerabilities, threats, risks, impact of loss and
countermeasures for different parts of an e-commerce system.
Schumacher et al. [154] present a list of forty-six patterns for integrating security
in systems engineering. The proposed patterns are at different levels of abstraction. They
range from high-level patterns targeting the development of secure applications, to low-
level patterns addressing the security of operating systems. An IP telephony case study is
provided to illustrate the application of the patterns. Dougherty et al. [42] propose security
patterns that are categorized according to their level of abstraction into: architectural-
level, design-level, and implementation-level patterns. The security design patterns are
proposed as extensions to the existing design patterns (e.g., factory and strategy design
patterns) by adding security-speciﬁc functionalities.
Yoshioka et al. [172] provide a survey of security patterns according to the different
phases of the software development life cycle. During the requirement phase, the different
assets of the system are identiﬁed as well as the purpose of protecting them. Additionally,
the security requirements are speciﬁed alongside the system requirements. During the de-
sign phase, various security functions are designed as patterns to protect the assets that are
identiﬁed in the requirement phase. For instance, such patterns may cover functions such
as authentication, authorization, and access control. Finally, implementation-level secu-
rity patterns are needed to guide programmers while writing programs with guidelines
illustrating the required techniques to write secure programs.
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3.4.2 Mechanism-Directed Meta-Languages
Considerable work has been done in the literature to provide UML meta-model extensions
for the integration of security into various stages of the software development life cycle. In
the following, we present a brief summary of those contributions. The UMLSec approach
[93] is among the ﬁrst efforts in extending UML for the development of security-critical
systems. It provides a UML proﬁle where general security requirements, e.g., secrecy,
integrity, fair exchange, are encapsulated using UML stereotypes and tagged values. It
also deﬁnes a formal semantics to evaluate UML diagrams against weaknesses. In order
to analyze security speciﬁcations, the behavior of a potential adversary, that can attack
various parts of a system, is formally modeled.
Basin et al. [107] propose an approach to model RBAC policies for model-driven
systems. This approach proposes a general schema, in which systems modeling languages
are combined with security modeling languages by deﬁning dialects. These dialects iden-
tify the protected resources from elements of the system modeling language. This ap-
proach deﬁnes a general meta-model for generating security modeling languages. Se-
cureUML [106] is one instance of these languages deﬁned for modeling RBAC policies.
It has an abstract syntax that is independent of any modeling language and a concrete
syntax that is deﬁned as a UML extension using stereotypes and tagged values. From
models in the combined languages, access control infrastructures are automatically gen-
erated using MDA-based transformation mechanisms [124]. However, SecureUML only
focuses on specifying the RBAC model.
The approach of Doan et al. [60] incorporates RBAC, MAC, and lifetimes into
UML for time-sensitive application design. The main focus of this approach is that the
process of designing and integrating security in a software application captures not only
the current design state, but allows tracking the entire design evolution process via the
creation and the maintenance of a set of design instances over time. The design tracking
allows a software/security engineer to recover to an earlier design version that satisﬁes
speciﬁc security constraints.
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Zisman [177] proposes a framework to support the design and the veriﬁcation of
secure peer-to-peer applications. Design models and security requirements are speciﬁed
using the UMLSec approach [93]. The modeling of abuse cases to represent possible
attack scenarios and potential threats helps designers to identify the security properties to
be veriﬁed in the system. In addition, this approach facilitates expressing the properties
to be veriﬁed by deﬁning a graphical template language. It also allows the veriﬁcation of
the models against the speciﬁed properties and visualization of the veriﬁcation results.
Montangero et al. (For-LySa, DEGAS project) [115] present two UML proﬁles to
model authentication protocols: (1) the Static For-LySa proﬁle, which describes how the
authentication protocol concepts (e.g., principals, keys, messages) can be modeled using
UML class diagrams, and (2) the For-LySa proﬁle, which models the dynamic aspects of
the protocol in sequence diagrams, as well as the information needed to analyze the pro-
tocol. In order to validate a protocol, For-LySa deﬁnes a speciﬁcation language together
with its semantics to write pre/post conditions and invariant constraints.
Ray et al. [145] address the issue of integrating different access control policies,
such as RBAC and MAC, into a single hybrid model. This approach uses parameterized
UML diagrams to model RBAC and MAC frameworks and then compose them manually
to produce a hybrid access control policy. It is the ﬁrst approach that attempts to combine
different access control policies. However, it focuses only on how to model these policies
in UML without considering how they can be used to design a secure software system.
Painchaud et al. (SOCLe project) [137] provide a framework that integrates security
into the design of software applications. It also includes the veriﬁcation of UML speciﬁ-
cations and a graphical user interface that allows the designer to visualize the veriﬁcation
results. In this approach, security policies are speciﬁed using the OCL language.
Alghathbar and Wijesekera [23] propose a framework, called AuthUML, to incor-
porate access control policies into use case diagrams. The aim of AuthUML is analyzing
access control policies during the early stages of the development life cycle before pro-
ceeding to the design to ensure consistent, conﬂict-free, and complete requirements.
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Popp et al. [140] propose an extension to the conventional process of developing
use case oriented processes. In addition to modeling security properties with UML, this
approach provides a method to incorporate these security aspects into a use case oriented
development process.
Ledru et al. (EDEMOI project) [104] aim at modeling and analyzing airport se-
curity. Security properties are ﬁrst extracted from natural language standards and docu-
ments, then integrated into UML diagrams as stereotypes in a UML proﬁle. The UML
speciﬁcations are then translated into formal models for veriﬁcation purposes. This ap-
proach is not general enough to be used for software development.
Ahn and Shin [18] propose a technique to describe the RBAC model with three
views using UML diagrams: static view, functional view, and dynamic view. This ap-
proach focuses only on the way that UML elements can be used to model RBAC policies
rather than taking a larger view of examining secure software design. It does not provide a
systematic modeling approach that can be used by developers to create applications with
RBAC models.
Epstein and Sandhu’s work [64] is one of the ﬁrst approaches that investigate the
possibility of using UML to model RBAC policies. However, it is limited to only one spe-
ciﬁc RBAC model, which is the RBAC Framework for Network Enterprises (FNE) [162].
The FNE model contains seven abstract layers that are divided in two different groups.
This approach allows to present each of the FNE model’s layers using UML notation by
deﬁning new stereotypes. This approach can assist the role engineering process, however,
it does not include subtle properties of RBAC, such as separation of duty constraints, and
it does not provide a method for deriving roles.
Brose et al. [40] extend UML models to support the automatic generation of access
control policies for CORBA-based systems. They specify both permissions and prohibi-
tions on accessing system’s objects since the analysis phase in use case diagrams. The
UML design models are used to generate the speciﬁcation of access control policies in
VPL (View Policy Language) that is deployed together with the CORBA application.
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Vivas et al. [166] propose a UML-based approach for the development of busi-
ness process-driven systems where security requirements are integrated into the business
model. Security requirements are ﬁrst stated at a high level of abstraction within a func-
tional representation of the system using tagged values. Next, the UML speciﬁcation is
translated into XMI representation. Finally, the resulting speciﬁcation is translated into a
formal notation for consistency checking, veriﬁcation, validation, and simulation.
3.4.3 Aspect-Oriented Modeling
The application of AOM to security has generated a lot of research interest in the last
few years. Various contributions that aim at modeling security concerns as aspects have
been published recently. In the following, we present a brief overview of these contri-
butions. Pavlich-Mariscal et al. [138] propose a new UML artifact called Role Slice to
capture RBAC [69] policies within UML class models. A role slice diagram contains
information on a role’s permissions that cut across all classes in an application. RBAC
constraints are represented within a role slice diagram using UML stereotypes. More-
over, this approach proposes algorithms that map access control policies, provided in role
slice diagrams, to AOP security enforcement code implemented in AspectJ. In another
effort [139], Pavlich-Mariscal et al. propose an aspect-oriented approach to model access
control policies. They augment the UML meta-model with new diagrams that are sepa-
rated from the main UML design to represent Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [69],
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [34] and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [122]
models. The separated security diagrams are then composed with the main design us-
ing UML composition techniques. However, this approach is limited to access control
and speciﬁes only the structural part of the access control policy without considering its
behavior.
Ray et al. [144] propose an AOM approach for enforcing access control policies.
An access control aspect is represented as a pattern using UML diagram templates. Other
functional design concerns are speciﬁed in a separate model referred to as a primary
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model. A composition mechanism is used to integrate access control features within the
primary model. The composition mechanism involves the instantiation of the aspect to
obtain a context-speciﬁc aspect, then composing context-speciﬁc aspects with the primary
model. This approach also is limited to access control and speciﬁes only the structural part
of the access control policy. In another work [75], the authors propose Aspect-oriented
Architecture Models (AAMs) that show how different concerns can be described indepen-
dently of any underlying technology. AAM models consist of: (1) A set of aspect models,
(2) a primary architecture model, and (3) composition directives that deﬁne how aspect
models are composed with the primary model. Aspect models are deﬁned as general
patterns represented using UML diagram templates. These patterns are instantiated by
binding the template parameters to actual application values to produce context-speciﬁc
aspects before composing them with the primary model.
Zhang et al. [174] propose an aspect-oriented modeling of access control in Web
applications. The approach extends the UML-based Web Engineering (UWE) method by
specifying the detailed behavior of each navigation node using a state machine. Access
control to navigation nodes is speciﬁed by reﬁning the default state machines by a state
machine modeling the access control rules. This approach extends the UWE meta-model
to support aspects. In their AOM approach, an aspect contains navigation nodes that are
associated with the same access control rules. Access control rules are deﬁned in the
aspect containing those navigation nodes.
Gao et al. [78] propose an aspect-oriented design approach for CORBA AC, a ref-
erence model for enforcing access control in middleware applications. The RBAC model
is used to implement a functional CORBA AC mechanism. In this approach, the RBAC
core model is speciﬁed as the base model and each RBAC concern is speciﬁed as an as-
pect. Thus, the approach presents four aspects: role hierarchy aspect, static constraints
aspect, temporal constraints aspect, and spatial constraints aspect. This approach uses
AspectJ [96] and its weaving rules for the implementation of the CORBA AC model.
Georg et al. [79] propose an aspect-oriented approach for modeling access control.
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In this approach, aspects are patterns specifying structures and behaviors. An aspect
is deﬁned in terms of structures of meta-roles called (meta-) Role Models [79]. Two
views are supported by an aspect: static and interaction views. These views are described
using two types of role models: Static Role Models (SRMs) and Interaction Role Models
(IRMs). Weaving is considered as a special case of UML model transformation using
design patterns. In another contribution, Georg et al. [80] propose an aspect-oriented
risk-driven methodology for designing secure applications. The proposed methodology
starts by identifying the assets of the application that need to be protected. Then, typical
attack scenarios are deﬁned and modeled as aspects. The attack model is composed with
the application base model to produce the misuse model. After evaluating the application
against the deﬁned attacks, and if the application presents a security risk, then a security
mechanism, speciﬁed also as an aspect, is incorporated into the application. Finally, the
resulting system is analyzed to give assurance that it is indeed resilient to the attack.
Jürjens and Houmb [94] present an AOM approach for developing and analyzing
security-critical systems at both modeling and implementation levels. In this approach,
security aspects are speciﬁed as UMLSec [93] stereotypes that are woven into base mod-
els. The resulting UML models and the generated code are veriﬁed against the speciﬁed
security requirements using automated theorem provers [86].
Dai et al. [53] propose an aspect-oriented framework called the Formal Design
Analysis Framework (FDAF). The latter supports the design and the analysis of non-
functional requirements deﬁned as reusable aspects for distributed real-time systems using
UML and formal methods. The FDAF approach presents a UML extension to capture
performance aspect information in UML models as stereotypes. Then, it automatically
transforms the UML design into formal models to be able to analyze the response time.
3.4.4 Comparative Study
We have conducted a comparative study (Table 3.1) of the aforementioned approaches
according to a set of deﬁned criteria, such as, the supported security requirements, the
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mechanisms used for the speciﬁcation of those requirements, formalization of the ap-
proach, existence of a tool support, etc. From this study, we have observed the following:
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• The focus of many surveyed projects is on the speciﬁcation of security policies, and
sometimes analyzing UML models against the speciﬁed policies. There is a lack of
approaches for the enforcement of such policies in software systems.
• Most of the approaches adopt Role Based Access Control (RBAC), with an addition
of different ﬂavors of access control based on labels, that is, Mandatory Access
Control (MAC). However, with the growing complexity of software, UML models
must embed more complex security policies.
• The OCL language is employed in many of the surveyed projects for expressing
formal constraints in the speciﬁcation of security policies. Tagged values are also
used for expressing access control properties.
• We have noticed the absence of expressiveness, applicability, and learning curve
in the majority of approaches. These criteria are important and must be taken into
account in future methodologies. As the ﬁnal users of these methods will be human
developers, these criteria can decide whether this approach is realistic or not.
• The approach [139] uses UML stereotypes to represent security policies and then
uses AOP to enforce those policies at execution time. The approach transparently
enforces access control in software components by implementing/weaving the ac-
cess control aspect based on roles deﬁned at the UML design step. In our opinion,
this approach provides the right trade-off between security needs and ease of use
through demanding relatively smaller effort from the developers and providing high
level of abstraction of the security policies. However, further extension of this work
is still necessary for better expressing more security policies.
• In regards to secure code generation, further efforts are needed for reducing the
performance overhead of deploying these mechanisms in code. To the best of our




We have presented in this chapter existing approaches for specifying and enforcing secu-
rity mechanisms at the design level. These approaches have adopted one of these three
mechanisms: security design patterns, mechanism-directed meta-languages, and aspect-
oriented modeling. We have seen that security design patterns mainly provide textual de-
scriptions for solving a given security problem. Although this approach provides reusable
solutions to integrate security best practices early during the software development pro-
cess, it has some shortcomings. In fact, security design patterns are provided as high-level
and abstract solutions; information about the behavior of security solutions is generally
missing in these patterns. In addition, they generally lack the structure and the method-
ologies needed for their application. Moreover, although they are meant to be applied at
the design stage, some of the patterns are provided as directions written in English, which
makes them hard to implement by designers and limits their adoption by industry.
Furthermore, we observed that existing contributions that adopt the use of dedicated
meta-models mainly focus on specifying security requirements and sometimes analyzing
UML models against the speciﬁed requirements. How to systematically enforce the spec-
iﬁed requirements is not their main concern. In addition, the majority of these approaches
target mainly RBAC model. However, with the growing complexity of software, UML
models must embed more complex security policies as well. Furthermore, this approach
seems to be ineffective for non-security experts as it requires continuous interaction with
security experts during software design in order to ensure the appropriate enforcement of
security requirements.
The adoption of AOM for security speciﬁcation and enforcement overcomes the
limitations observed in the previous approaches. Indeed, using AOM, security experts
independently specify security enforcement mechanisms as aspects. Moreover, this ap-
proach provides a way to automate the process of integrating those security mechanisms
within the application base models. However, this approach suffers from the lack of stan-
dardization for aspects speciﬁcation and weaving. In addition, the adoption of AOM for
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security hardening requires a well-deﬁned procedure for the specialization of the generic
aspects designed by security experts. Moreover, from the state-of-the-art related to AOM
and security, we noticed that the majority of existing approaches are limited to mainly
specifying access control policies. Additionally, they are limited in the supported UML
diagrams; sometimes, only the structural part of a security solution is speciﬁed without
considering its behavior. In the following chapters, we will address these issues by pro-
viding a more expressive and generic AOM approach for specifying and systematically





As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, security should be addressed during the
early phases of the software development life cycle. From the state-of-the-art survey pre-
sented in Chapter 3, we have concluded that AOM is the most appropriate approach to
achieve this objective. In this context, we propose, in this chapter, an AOM approach
for specifying and systematically integrating security solutions into UML design mod-
els, and therefore enabling secure code generation. The targeted security concerns are
those high-level requirements that are usually speciﬁed and veriﬁed on software, and
for which a security solution can be provided as an aspect. Examples of such require-
ments are: conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication, authorization, access control, etc.
In the proposed approach, the security expert speciﬁes the needed security solutions as
application-independent aspects. In addition, he/she speciﬁes how these aspects should
be integrated into the design models. The developer then specializes the application-
independent aspects to his/her design. Finally, our framework automatically injects the
application-dependent aspects at the appropriate locations in the design models.
In this chapter, we focus on the speciﬁcation of security aspects. To this end, we de-
vise a UML proﬁle that assists security experts in specifying security solutions as aspects.
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The proposed proﬁle covers the main UML diagrams that are used in software design,
i.e., class diagrams, state machine diagrams, sequence diagrams, and activity diagrams.
In addition, it covers most common AOP adaptations, i.e., adding new elements before,
after, or around speciﬁc points, and removing existing elements. Moreover, we deﬁne
a high-level and user-friendly pointcut language to designate the locations where aspect
adaptations should be injected into base models.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 summarizes our
approach for specifying and weaving aspects into UML design models. Before presenting
the proﬁle speciﬁcation, we provide, in Section 4.3, an overview of the main approaches
that are adopted in the literature for UML security speciﬁcation. Afterwards, we present
our AOM proﬁle in Section 4.4. Finally, the related work on AOM is given in Section 4.5.
4.2 Proposed AOM Approach for Security Hardening
In this section, we present an overview of our proposed AOM approach for security hard-
ening of software. The proposed approach assists security experts in designing security
solutions in a precise way without altering the software functionalities. In addition, the
proposed approach allows developers with limited security knowledge to reuse those so-
lutions with minimal intervention. The approach architecture is depicted in Figure 4.1.
The main steps of the proposed approach are the following:
• Security Aspect Speciﬁcation: A security expert designs security solutions as applica-
tion-independent aspects. By analogy, these aspects are generic templates repre-
senting the security features independently of the application speciﬁcities and pre-
sented in a security aspects library. This design decision is useful in order to support
reusability of aspects in different application domains. Since there is no standard
language to specify aspects in UML, a UML proﬁle is developed as part of our
framework in order to assist security experts in designing security aspects. This




















Figure 4.1: Speciﬁcation and Weaving of UML Security Aspects
capabilities include the common modiﬁcation capabilities characterizing the most
prominent AOP languages (AspectJ [96] and AspectC++ [156]). As part of this
UML proﬁle, we have developed a high-level language to specify the pointcuts that
designate the locations in the base model where the aspect adaptations should be
performed. The details about the design of this proﬁle are provided in Section 4.4.
• Security Aspect Specialization: The developer has the possibility to specialize the
application-independent aspects provided by the security expert according to the
application-dependent security requirements and needs. To specialize the aspects,
we provide a weaving interface, in which only the generic pointcuts are exposed
to the developers. By doing so, the complexity of the security solutions is kept
hidden from the developers. More details about security aspects specialization are
presented in Section 5.3.
• Join Point Matching: A security aspect mainly consists of a set of adaptations that
should be performed at some speciﬁc points (called join points in AOP) of UML
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design. Based on the pointcuts speciﬁed in the aspect by the security expert and
specialized by the developer, our framework identiﬁes, without any developer in-
teraction, the join points from the base model where the aspect adaptations should
be performed. More details about join point matching are presented in Section 5.4.
• Security Aspect Weaving: This represents the automatic injection of the security
solutions into the design models at the identiﬁed join points. To provide a portable
solution, we adopt a model-to-model transformation language; the QVT language
[126]. QVT is an OMG standard compatible with UML and supports a large set of
modiﬁcations on UML models. For each aspect adaptation and the corresponding
base model elements, a set of QVT transformation rules are generated. The details
about the aspect weaving step are provided in Section 5.5.
This chapter focuses on describing the security aspect speciﬁcation step. The re-
maining steps of our security hardening approach, i.e., security aspect specialization, join
point matching, and security aspect weaving are detailed in Chapter 5. Before presenting
our contribution on security aspects speciﬁcation, we summarize, in the next section, the
main approaches that are adopted in the literature for security speciﬁcation at the UML
design level.
4.3 Security Speciﬁcation Approaches for UML Design
This section presents the main approaches that can be adopted for UML security speciﬁca-
tion. From our study of the state-of-the-art, we have identiﬁed three main approaches that
have been followed for UML security speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst approach is based on using
the standard UML extension mechanisms, i.e., UML proﬁles. In the second approach, the
UML meta-model is augmented by new meta-model constructs for the speciﬁcation of se-
curity requirements. The third approach consists in deﬁning a new meta-model to specify
security on UML diagrams. In the following, we present each of these approaches:
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• UML Proﬁle: A proﬁle represents a standard and light-weight extension of UML.
It allows extending UML meta-model elements, by means of user-deﬁned meta-
elements called stereotypes, without changing UML meta-model. Security aspects
can be speciﬁed by attaching stereotypes, along with their associated tagged values,
to selected elements of the design. Thus, a proﬁle for security aspects speciﬁcation
should be created by some expert for the speciﬁcation of these stereotypes.
• Extending UML Meta-Model: In this approach, UML meta-model is directly ex-
tended, through inheritance and redeﬁnition of meta-model elements, by a meta-
model speciﬁcation language such as Meta-Object Facility (MOF) [127]. The latter
deﬁnes a simple meta-meta-model, and the associated semantics, allowing the de-
scription of meta-models in various domains. Extending UML meta-model is usu-
ally needed when the extension mechanisms provided by UML are not appropriate
for the target extension or when the resulting complexity is not tolerated.
• Creating New Meta-Models: In this approach, a new meta-model is deﬁned using a
meta-model speciﬁcation language such as MOF. The motivations of creating new
meta-models for security speciﬁcation are the same as those of extending UML
meta-model for security speciﬁcation. Indeed, this approach is used for the same
objectives and allows the speciﬁcation of almost the same security requirements.
However, the vocabulary used by the meta-elements of the new meta-model is
domain-speciﬁc and much more precise than the one used for UML meta-elements.
We have studied the usability of the aforementioned approaches for security speci-
ﬁcation in the light of our survey of the state-of-the-art [161]. Each approach is evaluated
in terms of a set of deﬁned criteria, namely, expressiveness, tool support, veriﬁability, and
complexity. In the following, we present a summary of this evaluation:
• Expressiveness: UML proﬁles are the most used for security speciﬁcation by the
majority of the contributions. Among these contributions, we can cite [78,138,144,
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174], which provide UML stereotypes for the speciﬁcation of aspects that enforce
access control policies within UML models. Jürjens and Houmb [94] have proposed
an AOM approach where security aspects are speciﬁed as UMLSec [93] stereo-
types, which are used to specify various security requirements, such as, secrecy,
integrity, authentication, fair exchange, role-based access control, secure communi-
cation links, and secure information ﬂow. Stereotypes are also used by Montangero
et al. [115] for modeling authentication protocols. These contributions show that
various security requirements have been speciﬁed using stereotypes and tagged val-
ues. Regarding the extension of UML meta-model, only few contributions [139]
have investigated this approach for security speciﬁcation. This is due to the fact
that this kind of modiﬁcation requires a high expertise and knowledge of UML
meta-model and its objectives. Indeed, the extension may require the modiﬁcation
of the whole meta-model, which is too complex. As for creating a new meta-model,
only [107] has investigated this approach to model access control policies. This is
due to the same reasons as extending UML meta-model.
• Tool support: UML proﬁles beneﬁt from an excellent tool support since any UML
modeling framework supports proﬁle speciﬁcation. Extending UML meta-model is
a heavyweight extension as it “may require one to extend the CASE tool itself, in
particular the storage components, i.e., the repository, and the visualization com-
ponents” [106]. This negatively impacts the portability of any extension since any
UML modeling framework is heavily modiﬁed to allow the use of the new meta-
elements and their interpretation. Creating a new meta-model is better than extend-
ing UML meta-model in terms of tool support. In addition, the compiler needed to
parse the speciﬁcation can be easily plugged into a UML modeling framework.
• Veriﬁability: Regarding UML proﬁles and UML meta-model extension, a lot of
work should be done to generate a formal semantics for the UML design, formally
specify the security property, verify the design against the property, and show the
53
veriﬁcation result. The latter usually consists in displaying counter examples and
providing advice to ﬁx the vulnerabilities. As for creating new meta-models, the
veriﬁability is better than the other approaches since security speciﬁcation is exclu-
sively based on the new meta-elements and thus is easier to parse and translate.
• Complexity: The complexity of the information related to stereotypes and tagged
values added for security speciﬁcation depends on the number of stereotypes and
tagged values used in each UML element. Thus, the designer of the proﬁle has the
responsibility of compacting as possible the architecture of the proﬁle. The com-
plexity of extending UML meta-model and creating new meta-models is relatively
acceptable since the new meta-elements specifying security aspects are separated
from those specifying the system behavior and are easily distinguishable from them.
In summary, proﬁles are the most usable technique for security speciﬁcation since
they are the extension mechanism provided by UML. They allow the speciﬁcation of
almost all security requirements that are usually speciﬁed and enforced on software. In
addition, they are easy to learn and use and beneﬁt from high portability and excellent
tool support. Extending UML meta-model is a too constraining approach, though it has
its motivation. Creating a new meta-model should be then an appropriate alternative. For
these reasons, we have chosen to provide a UML proﬁle for security aspects speciﬁcation.
In the next section, we present the details of this proﬁle.
4.4 A UML Proﬁle for Aspect-Oriented Modeling
This section presents our AOM proﬁle that extends UML for security aspects speciﬁca-
tion. An aspect represents a non-functional requirement. It contains a set of adaptations
and pointcuts. An adaptation speciﬁes the modiﬁcation that an aspect performs on the
base model. A pointcut speciﬁes the locations in the base model where an adaptation
should be performed. The elements of this proﬁle will be used by security experts to spec-
ify security solutions for well-known security problems. However, the proﬁle is generic
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enough to be used for specifying non-security aspects. In our AOM proﬁle, an aspect
is represented as a stereotyped package (Figure 4.2). For example, Figure 4.3 shows a
partial speciﬁcation of an aspect designed to enforce RBAC mechanisms1. The RBAC
aspect is modeled as a package stereotyped aspect. In the following subsections, we
























































Figure 4.3: Partial View of the RBAC Aspect
1The full speciﬁcation of the RBAC aspect is presented in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.1)
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4.4.1 Aspect Adaptations
As mentioned earlier, an adaptation speciﬁes the modiﬁcation that an aspect performs
on the base model. We classify adaptations according to the covered diagrams and the
modiﬁcation rules that specify the effect of adaptations on the base model. UML allows
the speciﬁcation of a software from multiple points of view using different types of dia-
grams, such as, class diagrams, activity diagrams, sequence diagrams, etc. Unfortunately,
most of existing AOM approaches specify aspects within the same modeling view (e.g.,
structural, behavioral). In this research, we propose an AOM approach that covers both
structural and behavioral views of a system. Notice that this does not mean that we cover
all existing UML diagrams. Instead, we focus on those diagrams that are the most used
by developers: class diagrams, sequence diagrams, state machine diagrams, and activity
diagrams. Figure 4.2 presents our speciﬁcation of adaptations. We deﬁne two types of
adaptations: structural and behavioral adaptations.
Structural Adaptations
Structural adaptations specify the modiﬁcations that affect structural diagrams. We focus
on class diagrams since they are the most used structural diagrams in software design. A
class diagram adaptation is similar to an introduction in AOP languages (e.g., AspectJ).
A structural adaptation is modeled as an abstract meta-element named StructuralAdapta-
tion. It is specialized by the meta-element ClassAdaptation used to specify class diagram
adaptations, which contain adaptation rules for class diagram elements (See Sub-section
4.4.2). Notice that the meta-element StructuralAdaptation can be specialized to model
adaptations for other structural diagrams, such as, component diagrams, deployment dia-
grams, etc. As an example of a structural adaptation, RoleAddition in Figure 4.3 is a class
adaptation (stereotype ClassAdaptation) used for the integration of a class named
Role into a package, designated by the pointcut SubscriberPackagePointcut, as well as
the adaptation rules that are required to the adoption of an RBAC solution. The deﬁnition
and the speciﬁcation of adaptation rules will be presented later in this section.
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Behavioral Adaptations
Behavioral adaptations specify the modiﬁcations that affect behavioral diagrams. In our
approach, we support the behavioral diagrams that are the most used for the speciﬁcation
of a system behavior, mainly, state machine diagrams, sequence diagrams, and activ-
ity diagrams. A behavioral adaptation is similar to an advice in AOP languages (e.g.,
AspectJ). A behavioral adaptation is modeled as an abstract meta-element named Behav-
ioralAdaptation. We specialize the meta-element BehavioralAdaptation by three meta-
elements: StateMachineAdaptation, SequenceAdaptation, and ActivityAdaptation that are
used to specify adaptations for state machine diagrams, sequence diagrams, and activity
diagrams respectively. As for the meta-element StructuralAdaptation, the meta-element
BehavioralAdaptation can also be extended to model adaptations for other behavioral di-
agrams, such as, communication diagrams, interaction overview diagrams, etc. As an
example of a behavioral adaptation, CheckAccess in Figure 4.3 is a sequence adaptation
(stereotype SequenceAdaptation) deﬁning the adaptation rules required to inject the
behavior needed to check user permissions before any call to a sensitive method.
4.4.2 Aspect Adaptation Rules
An adaptation rule speciﬁes the effect that an aspect performs on the base model elements.
We support two types of adaptation rules: Adding a new element to the base model and
removing an existing element from the base model. Figure 4.4 depicts our speciﬁed meta-
model for adaptation rules.
Adding a New Element
The addition of a new diagram element to the base model is modeled as a special kind of
operation, to which a stereotype Add is applied. We use the same speciﬁcation for
adding any kind of UML element, either structural or behavioral. Three tagged values are




























































Figure 4.4: Meta-model for Specifying Adaptation Rules
• Name: The name of the element to be added to the base model.
• Type: The type of the element to be added to the base model. The values of
this tag are provided in the enumerations ClassElementType, StateMachineElement-
Type, SequenceElementType, and ActivityElementType.
• Position: The position where the new element needs to be added. The values of
this tag are given in the enumeration PositionType. This tag is needed for some
elements (e.g., a message, an action) to state where exactly the new element should
be added (e.g., before/after a join point). For some other elements (e.g., a class,
an operation), this tag is optional since these kinds of elements are always added
inside a join point.
The location where the new element should be added is speciﬁed by the meta-
element Pointcut (See Sub-section 4.4.3). For example, in Figure 4.3, the operation
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AddRole() stereotyped Add is an adaptation rule belonging to the class adaptation
RoleAddition. It adds a new class, named Role, to the package SubscriberPackage, matched
by the pointcut SubsriberPackagePointcut. The class Role is deﬁned inside the RBAC as-
pect.
Removing an Existing Element
The deletion of an existing element from the base model is modeled as a special kind of
operation stereotypedRemove. The set of elements that should be removed are given
by a pointcut expression speciﬁed by the meta-element Pointcut (See Sub-section 4.4.3).
The same speciﬁcation is used for removing any kind of UML element, either structural
or behavioral. No tagged value is required for the speciﬁcation of a Remove adaptation
rule; the pointcut speciﬁcation is enough to select the elements that should be removed.
The proposed proﬁle for the speciﬁcation of adaptations and their adaptation rules
is expressive enough to cover the common AOP adaptations; i.e., introductions and be-
fore/after/around advices. For example, the proﬁle allows to specify the addition of a new
class to an existing package, a new attribute or an operation to an existing class, or a new
association between two existing classes. In addition, we can remove an existing class,
an attribute or an operation from an existing class, or an association between two exist-
ing classes. As for behavioral modiﬁcations, the proﬁle allows to specify the injection of
any UML behavior before, after, or around any behavioral UML element matched by the
concerned pointcut. For example, the proﬁle allows to specify the addition of an interac-
tion fragment before/after/around a speciﬁc message in a sequence diagram, or an action
before/after/around a speciﬁc action in an activity diagram. Moreover, the proposed adap-
tation rules are generic; they can be used to specify any security solution for any design.
Table 4.1 summarizes the main adaptation rules that are supported by our approach.
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Table 4.1: Supported Adaptation Rules
UML Diagram Supported Adaptation Rules
Adding/Removing a class
Class Adding/Removing an attribute
Diagram Adding/Removing an operation
Adding/Removing an association
Adding/Removing a package
State Adding/Removing a state machine
Machine Adding/Removing a state
Diagram Adding/Removing a transition
Adding/Removing a region
Adding/Removing an interaction
Sequence Adding/Removing an interaction use
Diagram Adding/Removing a lifeline
Adding/Removing a message
Adding/Removing an activity
Activity Adding/Removing an action
Diagram Adding/Removing a structured activity node
Adding/Removing a control ﬂow
4.4.3 Pointcuts
A pointcut is an expression that designates a set of join points. To specify pointcuts, we
propose a pointcut language in a textual representation rather than using UML notations.
This choice is motivated by the expressiveness and the easiness of the textual represen-
tation comparing to UML. For example, expressing logical pointcuts in a textual way is
more readable than expressing them in UML. In our approach, a pointcut is modeled as a
meta-element stereotyped Pointcut with two tagged values (Figure 4.4):
• TextExpression: The pointcut expression speciﬁed in our proposed textual pointcut
language.
• OCLExpression: An OCL expression equivalent to the textual one, which will be
automatically generated during the weaving process as we will see in Chapter 5.
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The textual pointcuts are high-level and easy to write and understand. However,
they cannot be directly used to query UML elements and select the appropriate join points.
Thus, in our framework, we translate the textual pointcut expressions into OCL expres-
sions to query UML elements. By doing so, we beneﬁt from the expressiveness of the
OCL language and, at the same time, we eliminate the overhead of writing such complex
expressions from the developers. More details about the generation of OCL expressions
from the textual ones are provided in Chapter 5.
Since the targeted join points are UML elements, pointcuts should be deﬁned based
on designators that are speciﬁc to UML. To this end, we deﬁne a pointcut language that
provides UML-speciﬁc pointcut designators needed to select UML join points. The pro-
posed pointcut language covers all the kinds of join points where our supported adapta-
tions are performed. In the following, we present the primitive pointcut designators for
the main UML diagrams that are supported by our approach, i.e., class diagrams, state
machine diagrams, sequence diagrams, and activity diagrams. Those primitives can be
composed with logical operators (AND, OR, and NOT) to build other pointcuts.
Class Diagram Pointcuts
Table 4.2 presents the pointcut primitives that are proposed to designate class diagram el-
ements. We choose the main elements that are usually used in class diagrams, i.e., class,
attribute, operation, association, and package. Class diagram elements are designated ei-
ther by their main properties, e.g., name, type, visibility, container, and owned elements,
or by other associated elements. For example, the following pointcut expression desig-
nates a class, named c1, that is inside a package p1, and contains an operation op1:
Class(c1) && Inside_Package(p1) && Contains_Operation(op1)
Moreover, if we want to designate all classes that contain either private attributes or private
operations, then the following pointcut is an example of such expression:
Class(∗) && (Contains_Attribute(Of_Visibility(Private)) ||
Contains_Operation(Of_Visibility(Private)))
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Note that the symbol “∗” is used to designate all the elements of a particular type regard-
less of their names, as it is used in AspectJ [96].
Table 4.2: Class Diagram Pointcuts
Join Point Pointcut Designator Description
Class
Class(NamePattern) Selects a class based on its name.
Inside_Package(Package-
Pointcut)
Selects a class that belongs to a speciﬁc pack-
age matched by PackagePointcut.
Contains_Attribute(Attribute-
Pointcut)




Selects a class that contains a speciﬁc opera-
tion matched by OperationPointcut.
Associated_With(ClassPointcut) Selects a class that is associated with a speciﬁc
class matched by ClassPointcut.
Attribute
Attribute(NamePattern) Selects an attribute based on its name.
Inside_Class(ClassPointcut) Selects an attribute that belongs to a speciﬁc
class matched by ClassPointcut.
Of_Type(TypePattern) Selects an attribute that is of a certain type.
Of_Visibility(VisibilityKind) Selects an attribute that is of a certain visibil-
ity (e.g., public, private).
Operation
Operation(NamePattern) Selects an operation based on its name.
Inside_Class(ClassPointcut) Selects an operation that belongs to a speciﬁc
class matched by ClassPointcut.
Args(TypePattern1, TypePat-
tern2, ...)
Selects an operation based on the type of its
arguments.
Of_Visibility(VisibilityKind) Selects an operation that is of a certain visibil-
ity (e.g., public, private).
Association
Association(NamePattern) Selects an association based on its name.
Between(ClassPointcut, Class-
Pointcut)








Selects an association based on its aggregation
kind (e.g., composite).
Package
Package(NamePattern) Selects a package based on its name.
Inside_Package(Package-
Pointcut)
Selects a package that belongs to a speciﬁc
package matched by PackagePointcut.
Contains_Class(ClassPointcut) Selects a package that contains a speciﬁc class
matched by ClassPointcut.
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State Machine Diagram Pointcuts
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 present the pointcut primitives proposed to designate the ele-
ments of state machine diagrams. We choose the main elements that are usually used in
state machine diagrams, i.e., state machine, region, state, and transition. A state machine
diagram element is designated either by its name, container, owned elements, speciﬁed
elements (in case of a state machine), incoming/outgoing transitions (in case of a state),
or source/target states (in case of a transition). For example, the following pointcut ex-
pression designates a state, named s1, with an incoming transition t1, and that belongs to
a state machine sm1:
State(s1) && Incoming(t1) && Inside_State_Machine(sm1).










Selects a state machine that contains a speciﬁc
region matched by RegionPointcut.
Contains_State(StatePointcut) Selects a state machine that contains a speciﬁc
state matched by StatePointcut.
Contains_Transition(Transition-
Pointcut)
Selects a state machine that contains a speciﬁc
transition matched by TransitionPointcut.
Speciﬁes_Class(ClassPointcut) Selects a state machine that speciﬁes a speciﬁc
class matched by ClassPointcut.
Region
Region(NamePattern) Selects a region based on its name.
Inside_State_Machine(State-
MachinePointcut)
Selects a region that belongs to a speciﬁc state
machine matched by StateMachinePointcut.
Inside_State(StatePointcut) Selects a region that belongs to a speciﬁc state
matched by StatePointcut.




Selects a region that contains a speciﬁc transi-
tion matched by TransitionPointcut.
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State(NamePattern) Selects a state based on its name.
Inside_Region(RegionPointcut) Selects a state that belongs to a speciﬁc region
matched by RegionPointcut.




Selects a state that belongs to a speciﬁc state ma-
chine matched by StateMachinePointcut.
Incoming(TransitionPointcut) Selects a state that has a speciﬁc incoming tran-
sition matched by TransitionPointcut.
Outgoing(TransitionPointcut) Selects a state that has a speciﬁc outgoing transi-
tion matched by TransitionPointcut.




Selects a state that contains a speciﬁc transition
matched by TransitionPointcut.
Transition
Transition(NamePattern) Selects a transition based on its name.
Inside_Region(RegionPointcut) Selects a transition that belongs to a speciﬁc re-
gion matched by RegionPointcut.




Selects a transition that belongs to a speciﬁc state
machine matched by StateMachinePointcut.
Source_State(StatePointcut) Selects a transition that has a speciﬁc source state
matched by StatePointcut.
Target_State(StatePointcut) Selects a transition that has a speciﬁc target state
matched by StatePointcut.
Sequence Diagram Pointcuts
Table 4.5 presents the primitives proposed to designate sequence diagram elements. We
choose the main elements that are commonly used in sequence diagrams, i.e., interaction,
message, and lifeline. A sequence diagram element is designated either by its name, type,
container, owned elements, speciﬁed elements (in case of an interaction), or source/target
lifelines (in case of a message). For example, the pointcut SensitiveMethodPointcut in
Figure 4.3 is a conjunction of three pointcuts: (1) Message_Call(SensitiveMethod) selects
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any message that calls SensitiveMethod(), (2) Message_Source(User) selects any message
whose source is of type User, and (3) Message_Target(Resource) selects any message
whose target is of type Resource. The conjunction of these three pointcuts allows the
selection of all message calls to SensitiveMethod() from a User instance to a Resource
instance.





Interaction(NamePattern) Selects an interaction based on its name.
Contains_Message(Message-
Pointcut)
Selects an interaction that contains a speciﬁc
message matched by MessagePointcut.
Contains_Lifeline(Lifeline-
Pointcut)
Selects an interaction that contains a speciﬁc
lifeline matched by LifelinePointcut.
Speciﬁes_Operation(Operation-
Pointcut)
Selects an interaction that speciﬁes the behav-
ior of a speciﬁc operation matched by Opera-
tionPointcut.
Message
Message_Call(NamePattern) Selects a message call, either synchronous or
asynchronous, based on its name.




Selects a message that speciﬁes an asyn-
chronous call.
Reply_Message(NamePattern) Selects a reply message based on its name.
Create_Message(NamePattern) Selects a message that creates an object.
Destroy_Message(NamePattern) Selects a message that destroys an object.
Message_Source(TypePattern) Selects a message whose source is of a certain
type.




Selects a message that belongs to a speciﬁc in-
teraction matched by InteractionPointcut.
Lifeline
Lifeline(NamePattern) Selects a lifeline based on its name.
Inside_Interaction(Interaction-
Pointcut)
Selects a lifeline that belongs to a speciﬁc in-
teraction matched by InteractionPointcut.
Covered_By_Fragment(Name-
Pattern)








Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 present the primitives proposed to designate the elements of activ-
ity diagrams. We choose the main elements that are commonly used in activity diagrams,
i.e., activity, action, and edge. An activity diagram element is designated either by its
name, type, container, owned elements, speciﬁed elements (in case of an activity), incom-
ing/outgoing edges (in case of an action), or source/target actions (in case of an edge). For
example, the following pointcut expression designates a call operation action, named a1,
that belongs to an activity act1: Call_Operation_Action(a1) && Inside_Activity(act1).
Table 4.6: Activity Diagram Pointcuts - Part 1
Join Point Pointcut Designator Description
Activity
Activity(NamePattern) Selects an activity based on its name.
Contains_Action(Action-
Pointcut)
Selects an activity that contains a speciﬁc ac-
tion matched by ActionPointcut.
Contains_Edge(EdgePointcut) Selects an activity that contains a speciﬁc ac-
tivity edge matched by EdgePointcut.
Speciﬁes_Operation(Operation-
Pointcut)
Selects an activity that speciﬁes the behavior
of a speciﬁc operation matched by Operation-
Pointcut.
Action
Action(NamePattern) Selects an action based on its name.
Call_Operation_Action(Name-
Pattern)




Selects an action that performs a behavior call.
Create_Action(NamePattern) Selects an action that creates an object.
Destroy_Action(NamePattern) Selects an action that destroys an object.
Read_Action(NamePattern) Selects an action that reads the value(s) of a
structural feature.




Selects an action that belongs to a speciﬁc ac-
tivity.
Input(TypePattern, ...) Selects an action based on the type of its input
pins.
Output(TypePattern, ...) Selects an action based on the type of its out-
put pins.
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Table 4.7: Activity Diagram Pointcuts - Part 2
Join Point Pointcut Designator Description
Control Node
Initial(NamePattern) Selects an initial node based on its name.
Final(NamePattern) Selects an activity ﬁnal node based on its
name.
Flowﬁnal(NamePattern) Selects a ﬂow ﬁnal node based on its name.
Fork(NamePattern) Selects a fork node based on its name.
Join(NamePattern) Selects a join node based on its name.
Decision(NamePattern) Selects a decision node based on its name.
Merge(NamePattern) Selects a merge node based on its name.
Activity Edge
Edge(NamePattern) Selects an edge based on its name.
Inside_Activity(Activity-
Pointcut)
Selects an edge that belongs to a speciﬁc ac-
tivity.
Source_Action(ActionPointcut) Selects an edge that has a speciﬁc source.
Target_Action(ActionPointcut) Selects an edge that has a speciﬁc target.
4.5 Related Work on AOM
During the last decade, AOM has become the center of many research activities. Follow-
ing the success of AOP techniques in modularizing crosscutting concerns at the imple-
mentation level, considerable number of contributions worked on abstracting AOP con-
cepts and adopting them at different levels of abstraction. An overview and a comparison
of the existing approaches are presented in [22, 141, 152]. In the following, we provide a
summary of the main approaches.
Kienzle et al. [99, 100] have proposed Reusable Aspect Models (RAM); an AOM
approach that speciﬁes a concern using class, state machine, and sequence diagrams. One
of the goals of the RAM approach is to support aspect reusability, i.e., build aspects with
complex functionalities by reusing simple ones, by means of aspect dependency chains. A
weaver is implemented using Kompose [71] for weaving class diagrams and Geko [116]
for weaving state machine diagrams and sequence diagrams.
The High-Level Aspects (HiLA) approach [175] extends UML state machines for
specifying history-dependent and concurrent behaviors. Join points in HiLA capture
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points when a transition is being ﬁred. Pointcuts may also contain constraints, i.e., ad-
vices are only executed when the constraints are satisﬁed. To increase reusability, aspects
are speciﬁed as UML templates, which are then specialized to the designer’s application.
HiLA also allows transformational aspects, i.e., aspects that can match a sub-structure of
the base state machine and replace them by the advice.
Klein et al. [101] have proposed various formal deﬁnitions of join points in se-
quence diagrams. Aspects are speciﬁed as pairs of UML 2.0 sequence diagrams: One
sequence diagram for pointcuts and the other one for advice speciﬁcation. Join points
can be either a single element or a collection of elements. This approach also provides a
formal deﬁnition of a new composition operator for sequence diagrams, called an amal-
gamated sum, and describes its implementation using Kermeta2.
Tkatchenko and Kiczales [163] have added a join point model (JPM) to UML meta-
model. They have covered three UML diagrams, namely, class diagrams, state machine
diagrams, and sequence diagrams. For class diagrams, the considered join points are
class and operation elements. For sequence diagrams, they have considered messages
and lifelines as join points. For state machine diagrams, states and call triggers have
been considered as join points. Comparing with our approach, we cover a wider range
of diagrams and UML elements as join points. In addition, the matching process in this
approach is based only on direct name matching or on signature comparison.
Clark et al. [48] have proposed an AOM approach called Theme/UML. This ap-
proach is a symmetric one, i.e., there is no distinction between the base model and the
crosscutting concerns. It is a general-purpose AOM language. Aspects are modeled as
templates that are bound to base elements through binding relationships. Package and
class diagrams are used for modeling structural adaptations and sequence diagrams are
used for modeling behavioral adaptations. This approach is possibly the most mature and
the most well-engineered approach to AOM. However, its main intent is the identiﬁcation
of aspects in the requirements analysis phase and mapping those aspects to the design.
2http://www.kermeta.org/
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Some contributions have focused on abstracting AspectJ [96] into the modeling
level [65,157,171]. Evermann [65] has proposed a UML proﬁle for AspectJ based on the
existing UML meta-model. An aspect is speciﬁed as a stereotyped class. Pointcuts are
modeled as stereotyped attributes, while advices are modeled as stereotyped operations.
In contrast to previous work on AspectJ proﬁles, this is possibly the most complete spec-
iﬁcation so far. Stein et al. [157] have proposed one of the earlier proﬁles for AspectJ.
Pointcuts and advices are speciﬁed as stereotyped operations. Join points are consid-
ered as messages in collaboration diagrams. The introduction of new class elements or
associations is speciﬁed using UML diagram templates. Weaving of advices and intro-
ductions into base models is modeled as relationships in collaboration diagrams denoting
the crosscutting effects of aspects on their base classes.
Yan et al. [171] have adopted the extension of UML meta-model by introducing an
AspectJ meta-model in order to support AspectJ software modeling. First, a meta-model
for Java was designed by tailoring UML meta-classes to Java. Then, the Java meta-model
was extended into AspectJ meta-model. This work aims at narrowing the gap between
conceptual modeling of aspects and their concrete implementation in AspectJ. The same
approach of extending UML meta-model for aspect speciﬁcation was also proposed by
Chavez et al. [44]. However, the main limitation of such an approach is the fact that
extending UML meta-model requires either modifying existing UML case tools, or im-
plementing new ones in order to provide support for the newly deﬁned meta-classes.
One of the initial proposals in this ﬁeld is the one of Aldawud et al. [19]. It provides
a UML proﬁle for aspect speciﬁcation by applying stereotypes on classes. Later, it has
been extended to support pointcut and advice speciﬁcation [20]. Crosscutting associations
are used to show how aspect elements relate to base model elements. This proﬁle is very
generic and captures only few concepts of AOP. Other contributions in this area [32, 33,
76, 95, 117, 142] have provided extensions of the UML language for modeling aspects
using standard UML extension mechanisms. However, the majority of these approaches
are programming language dependent and specify only few concepts of AOP.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented an AOM approach for specifying and weaving security
aspects into UML design models. This approach is well suited for job separation: security
experts provide high-level security solutions including the details on how to apply them
in UML diagrams and the designers apply them in their design by adapting them to the
design context. With our approach, even the designers with limited security knowledge
can use the security solutions to enforce the needed security requirements in a systematic
way in their design. As another result of our contribution, security solutions can be in-
tegrated into software from the early phases of the development life cycle. This in turn
helps accelerating the development of secure applications and reducing errors and costs.
We have seen from the literature review of AOM that there exist different mecha-
nisms to specify aspects at the model level. Some contributions suggest extending UML
meta-model by adding new meta-classes or creating new meta-models to specify aspect-
oriented concepts. These techniques suffer from implementation and interoperability is-
sues, as UML case tools need to be extended to support the newly speciﬁed meta-classes.
The other technique, i.e., using standard UML extension mechanisms, is a better solution
as it overcomes the limitations identiﬁed in the previous approaches.
In this setting, we have developed a UML proﬁle for the speciﬁcation of aspects at
the design level. The proposed proﬁle allows the speciﬁcation of common aspect-oriented
primitives, i.e., adding new elements before/after/around join points and removing exist-
ing elements. In addition, the proposed proﬁle supports both structural and behavioral
adaptations and covers the main diagrams that are used in UML design. Furthermore, we
have deﬁned a high-level and user-friendly pointcut language that can be used by security
experts to designate UML elements. We have seen that the proposed pointcut language
is expressive enough to designate the main elements that are used in a software design.
In the next chapter, we will present our approach for systematically weaving the security





This chapter presents our aspect weaving framework for security hardening. The pro-
posed framework allows software developers to systematically integrate security aspects,
speciﬁed using our AOM proﬁle, into UML design models. More precisely, we provide
the design and the implementation of the weaving capabilities corresponding to the aspect
adaptations that are supported by our AOM proﬁle.
We start by providing a high-level overview that summarizes the main steps and
the technologies that are followed to implement the weaving framework. Afterwards,
we present the details of each weaving step. The proposed weaver is implemented as a
model-to-model (M2M) transformation approach since the latter is deﬁned following the
OMG’s standard recommendations. In addition, it provides many languages and tools that
can help in automating the weaving process. As a transformation language, we adopt the
OMG standard Query/View/Transformation (QVT) language [126] since it is compatible
with UML and supports a large set of modiﬁcations on UML models. As for join points
matching, we instrument the standard OCL language to query UML elements due to its
expressiveness and conformance to UML. The proposed weaver covers all the diagrams
that are supported by our approach, i.e., class diagrams, state machine diagrams, activity
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diagrams, and sequence diagrams. For each diagram, we provide algorithms that imple-
ment its corresponding weaving adaptations, i.e., before adaptation, after adaptation, and
around adaptation. In addition, we present the transformation rules that implement aspect
adaptation rules, i.e., add and remove adaptation rules.
The main advantages of our weaving framework are the portability and the expres-
siveness thanks to the use of OMG standards, namely, OCL and QVT. Using OCL, we
were able to match a large and variant set of join points. Using QVT allowed us to
support a wide variety of modiﬁcations on different UML diagrams. In addition, QVT
extends portability of the designed weaver to all tools supporting QVT language.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 gives an overview
of our security weaving approach. Section 5.3 presents the specialization of security
aspects. The matching process is presented in Section 5.4. Afterwards, we provide details
about the actual weaving process in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6, we discuss the related
work on model weaving. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 5.7.
5.2 Approach Overview
In this section, we present an overview of our security weaving approach. The proposed
approach allows software developers to systematically integrate security aspects, speciﬁed
by a security expert using our AOM proﬁle, into UML design models. As we mentioned
previously, the weaving is based on model-to-model transformation technology. The main
steps and the technologies that are followed to implement the weaving capabilities are
presented in Figure 5.1. In the following, we provide a brief description of each step:
• Aspect Specialization: The developer specializes the application-independent as-
pect, provided by the security expert in a security aspects library, to his/her appli-
cation. An application-dependent aspect is automatically generated after this step.




































Figure 5.1: Overview of the Proposed Security Weaving Approach
• Pointcut Translation: The textual pointcut expressions speciﬁed in the aspect using
our proposed pointcut language are automatically translated into equivalent OCL
expressions. The aspect will then be updated with the new OCL expressions. This
step and the previous one are preliminary steps before the actual weaving begins.
• Join Point Matching: The OCL expressions generated from the previous step are
evaluated on the base model to identify the locations where the weaving should
be performed. More details about pointcut translation and join point matching are
presented in Section 5.4.
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• QVT Transformation Rules Generation: Using the aspect adaptations and the loca-
tions identiﬁed from the previous step, we generate the equivalent QVT transforma-
tion rules. These rules, in turn, will be given as input to the transformation engine
along with the base model, which will result in a secure woven model.
In the following sections, we explain each step of the weaving approach starting
from specializing the application-independent aspects, to identifying the join point ele-
ments of the base model, where different kinds of adaptations need to be injected, all the
way through the process of the actual weaving.
5.3 Security Aspect Specialization
For the purpose of reuse, security aspects can be designed, by security experts, as generic
solutions that can be applied to any design model. More precisely, the pointcuts speci-
ﬁed by security experts are chosen to match speciﬁc points of the design where security
methods should be added. Since security solutions are provided in a library of aspects,
pointcuts are speciﬁed as generic patterns that should match all possible join points that
can be targeted by security solutions. Thus, before being able to weave aspects into base
models, the developer needs to specialize the generic aspects to his/her application by
choosing the elements of his/her model that are targeted by the security solutions.
To specialize the aspects, we provide a graphical weaving interface that hides the
complexity of the security solutions and only exposes the generic pointcuts to the devel-
opers (Figure 6.5). Indeed, the developer does not need to understand the inner working of
the security solution. From this weaving interface and based on his/her understanding of
the application, the developer has the possibility of mapping each generic element of the
aspect to its corresponding element(s) in the base model. After mapping all the generic
elements, the application-dependent aspect will be automatically generated.
Notice here that this mapping operation has a one-to-many relationship. In other
words, one generic element in the pointcut expression can be mapped to multiple elements
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in the base model. For example, consider the following pointcut expression that aims at
capturing any call to a sensitive method: Message_Call(sensitiveMethod). In order to
specialize this expression, the developer maps the abstract element sensitiveMethod to
the corresponding operation(s) in his/her application (e.g., op1, op2). This will result in
an expanded expression, where all the selected elements are combined together with the
logical operator OR (||) as follows: Message_Call(op1) || Message_Call(op2).
Figure 5.2: Security Aspects Specialization
5.4 Join Point Matching
During this step, the actual join points where the aspect adaptations should be performed
are selected from the base model. To select the targeted join points, the textual pointcuts,
speciﬁed using our proposed pointcut language (Section 4.4.3), need to be translated to
a language that can navigate the base model and query its elements. In our approach,
we choose to translate the textual pointcut expressions into the standard OCL language
[129]. This is due to the high expressiveness of the OCL language and its conformance to
UML. In fact, OCL is deﬁned as part of the UML standard and is typically used to write
constraints on UML elements. However, since OCL 2.0 [125], it has been extended to
include support for queries. Therefore, using OCL, we can match a large and variant set
of join points using matching criteria that take into consideration different properties of
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UML elements such as names, types, arguments, and locations.
We translate textual pointcuts to OCL constraints, which serve as predicates to se-
lect the considered join points. This translation is done by producing a parser that is
capable of parsing and translating any textual pointcut expression, that conforms to a
deﬁned grammar, to its equivalent OCL expression. Indeed, this process is executed
automatically and in a total transparent way from the user. Once the OCL expression
is generated, it will be evaluated on the base model to select the targeted join points.
For example, the textual pointcut expression: “Message_Call(SensitiveMethod) && Mes-
sage_Source(User) && Message_Target(Resource)” will be tokenized into three tokens
connected with the logical operator && as follows: (1) Message_Call(SensitiveMethod),
(2) Message_Source(User), and (3) Message_Target(Resource). The parser will parse the
textual expression and will translate it into the following OCL expression:
“self.oclIsTypeOf(Message) and self.name=‘SensitiveMethod ’ and
self.connector. end-> at(1).role.name=‘User ’ and
self.connector. end-> at(2).role.name=‘Resource”’
This expression will then be evaluated on the elements of the base model and the matched
elements, which correspond to all message calls to SensitiveMethod from a User instance
to a Resource instance, will be selected as join points.
5.5 Security Aspect Weaving
During this step, the aspect adaptations are automatically woven into the base model at
the identiﬁed join points according to the speciﬁcation of the security solution. In our
framework, the process of weaving aspects into UML models is considered as a model-
to-model transformation process, where the base model is being transformed into a new
model that has been enhanced with some new features deﬁned by the aspect. As a trans-
formation language, we adopt QVT (Query/View/Transformation) language since it is an
OMG standard compatible with UML and supports a large set of modiﬁcations on UML
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models. The proposed model weaver is implemented using well-known standards, which
makes it a portable solution as it is independent of any speciﬁc UML tool. In the follow-
ing subsections, we present the details of the weaver design and implementation, starting
by a high-level description of the weaver architecture.
5.5.1 Weaver Architecture
The weaver is designed to manipulate both structural and behavioral UML diagrams. It
is capable of weaving different types of UML diagrams that are used to model different
views of a system. Figure 5.3 presents the general architecture of our model weaver. It
consists of two main components: (1) Join point matching module and (2) Transformation
module. The join point matching module is deﬁned by extending the QVT engine through
the QVT Black-Box mechanism [126]. On the other hand, the transformation module is
composed of four different transformation deﬁnitions, each of which corresponds to a

























Figure 5.3: General Architecture of the Weaver
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Join Point Matching Module
The join point matching module allows evaluating pointcut expressions, speciﬁed in OCL,
on UML base model elements and identifying the appropriate join points that satisfy the
given expressions. In our framework, this module is deﬁned as an extension to the QVT
main functionalities using the QVT Black-Box mechanism, which is an important feature
of the QVT language. QVT Black-Box mechanism facilitates the integration of external
programs, expressed in other transformation languages or programming languages, in
order to perform a given task that is un-realizable by the QVT language. Algorithm 5.1
presents the pseudo-code of our join point matching algorithm. It takes as input an OCL
expression along with the base model elements and returns as output a set of join point
elements that satisfy the given expression.




for all el in BaseModelElements do
result = validate(query,el);





This algorithm is executed for each pointcut expression speciﬁed in the aspect.
However, when dealing with big models with a large set of elements, this process may
become a signiﬁcant overhead on the system. Therefore, some optimizations are needed.
Since each pointcut expression belongs to a speciﬁc adaptation, we optimize this process
by applying a ﬁltering mechanism, such that we only evaluate the pointcut expression on
those elements that conform to the given adaptation instead of evaluating it on all base
model elements. For example, in the case of a pointcut expression deﬁned in a class
adaptation, the ﬁltering mechanism will select from the base model only class diagram
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elements, and then pass them to the join point matching module. This optimization in-
creases the efﬁciency and the performance of the matching module.
Transformation Tool
The transformation tool consists of a set of transformation deﬁnitions, each of which tar-
gets a particular UML diagram. In addition, each transformation deﬁnition contains a
set of mapping rules that deﬁne how each element in the corresponding diagram should
be transformed. In our weaver, we classify the transformation deﬁnitions according to
the supported UML diagrams. Thus, we provide four types of transformation deﬁnitions:
class transformation deﬁnition, state machine transformation deﬁnition, activity transfor-
mation deﬁnition, and sequence transformation deﬁnition (Figure 5.3). For instance, the
class transformation deﬁnition consists of a set of mapping rules, which specify how each
element of the class diagram can be transformed or woven into the base model. A detailed
description of each transformation deﬁnition is provided in Sub-section 5.5.2.
When the transformation tool receives the base model as input, each transformation
deﬁnition applies some ﬁltering operations on the input model to select the corresponding
set of diagrams. Then, each transformation deﬁnition executes the appropriate mapping
rules, using the underlying QVT engine, and produces the woven model as output. This
architecture facilitates the extension of the transformation tool to support a wider range
of UML diagrams since new components can be easily plugged-in without going through
the hassle of modifying the existing architecture. Moreover, since the deﬁnition of the
mapping rules is based on UML meta-model, the transformations can be used with any
UML model and are not dependent on a particular speciﬁcation or implementation.
5.5.2 Transformation Deﬁnitions
The transformation deﬁnitions describe how each element in the source model (the base
model) is transformed in the target model (the woven model). This is achieved by using
mapping rules that describe a certain behavior. For each aspect adaptation (e.g., class
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adaptation), we specify a corresponding transformation deﬁnition (e.g., class transfor-
mation deﬁnition). By analogy, the aspect adaptations are program source code and the
transformation deﬁnitions are its execution semantics. In other words, a transformation
deﬁnition deﬁnes how and when each construct in the aspect adaptation should produce a
given behavior. In the following, the four kinds of transformation deﬁnitions are detailed.
Class Transformation Deﬁnition
The class transformation deﬁnition handles transformations of class diagrams. It contains
a set of mapping rules that specify how each class diagram element should be transformed.
To do so, the class transformation deﬁnition iterates through the different adaptations of
an aspect and selects the adaptation that is stereotyped ClassAdaptation. Then, for each
adaptation rule speciﬁed in the class adaptation, an equivalent mapping rule is applied.
The main difference between the class transformation deﬁnition and the other transfor-
mation deﬁnitions of behavioral diagrams is that class diagrams are structural in nature;
they are considered as a static view. For example, the class transformation deﬁnition
consists of adding/removing structural elements inside/between class diagram elements,
such as adding an attribute/operation inside a given class or an association between two
given classes. Whereas, the transformation deﬁnition of a behavioral diagram consists
of adding/removing elements before/after/around behavioral diagram elements, such as
adding a new interaction fragment before sending a message in a sequence diagram.
Figure 5.4 shows an example of a class transformation deﬁnition. The aspect de-
picted in this ﬁgure contains a class adaptation named RoleAddition. This class adaptation
speciﬁes an add adaptation rule (addAssignRole) that adds an operation, named assign-
Role, to a class designated by the pointcut UserPointcut. Having a class adaptation and an
adaptation rule that adds an element of type Operation, the class transformation deﬁnition
is going to be selected and the mapping rule addOperation will be executed. The result
of this transformation will be the addition of the new operation assignRole() to the class



































Figure 5.4: Example of Class Transformation Deﬁnition
State Machine Transformation Deﬁnition
The state machine transformation deﬁnition handles transformations of state machine dia-
grams. It corresponds to an aspect adaptation that is stereotyped StateMachineAdaptation.
In our approach, when handling transformations of state machine diagrams, we identify
two kinds of pointcut designators: (1) State-based pointcut that designates a set of states
without any consideration of the transitions/events that were triggered to reach them, and
(2) Path-based pointcut that designates a set of states depending on the transitions that
triggered them. For example, consider the state machine diagram, depicted in Figure 5.5
(Part a), where we want to add a new state (State4) before the state State3 when triggered
by transition Tr1, as it is speciﬁed by the pointcut expression shown in Figure 5.6.
During the matching process, the OCL expression is evaluated on the base model





















Figure 5.6: Example of Path-Based Pointcut
inject the new state (State4) before the identiﬁed join point. However, if the state State3
has more than one incoming transition, which is the case in our example, the weaver will
add the new state before all incoming transitions, which is not what we aim for. To solve
this problem, the OCL expression is used not only as a query expression to identify the
join points, but is also used to put further constraints on the identiﬁed join points during
the weaving. Thus, our identiﬁed join point is the state State3 under the constraint of being
triggered by the transition Tr1. The result of the weaving is shown in Figure 5.5 (Part b).
In our approach, join points in state machine diagrams can be either states or transitions.
Furthermore, three weaving adaptations: before, after, and around are supported. In the
following, we provide the implementation details of each weaving adaptation.
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Weaving Before Adaptation
This adaptation adds a new node in a state machine diagram before an identiﬁed join
point. Hence, it requires not only identifying the targeted join point, but also its direct
predecessors should be identiﬁed. Algorithm 5.2 summarizes the steps needed to perform
this adaptation. As shown in the algorithm, the two kinds of join points, State and Tran-
sition, are considered. In addition, both kinds of pointcuts, State-based and Path-based
pointcuts, are matched. The algorithm takes as input a set of join points, an OCL expres-
sion, the new node to add, and a base model. It returns as output the woven model, where
the new node has been added before each of the identiﬁed join points.
Algorithm 5.2: State Machine Diagram: Weaving Before Adaptation
Input: JoinPointElem-set,OCLExp,newNode,BaseModel
edgeSet: Edge-set;
for nextJoinPoint in JoinPointElem-set do
if nextJoinPoint is of type STATE then
if isPathBased(OCLExp) then
oclConstraint = extractConstraint(OCLExp);




for all edge in edgeSet do
edge.setTarget(newNode);
end for
BaseModel = CreateEdge(newNode, nextJoinPoint);
else
if nextJoinPoint is of type TRANSITION then
temp = getSource(nextJoinPoint);
nextJoinPoint.setSource(newNode);





This adaptation adds a new node in a state machine diagram after an identiﬁed join point.
Hence, it requires not only identifying the targeted join point, but also its direct successors.
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Algorithm 5.3 summarizes the steps needed to perform this adaptation. The algorithm
takes as input a set of join points, an OCL expression, the new node to add, and a base
model. It returns as output the woven model, where the new node has been added after
each of the identiﬁed join points. Similar to the before adaptation, we consider both kinds
of join points and pointcuts.
Algorithm 5.3: State Machine Diagram: Weaving After Adaptation
Input: JoinPointElem-set,OCLExp,newNode,BaseModel
edgeSet: Edge-set;
for nextJoinPoint in JoinPointElem-set do
if nextJoinPoint is of type STATE then
if isPathBased(OCLExp) then
oclConstraint = extractConstraint(OCLExp);




for all edge in edgeSet do
edge.setSource(newNode);
end for
BaseModel = CreateEdge(nextJoinPoint, newNode);
else
if nextJoinPoint is of type TRANSITION then
temp = getTarget(nextJoinPoint);
nextJoinPoint.setTarget(newNode);





Around adaptations are performed in place of the join points they operate over, rather
than before or after. Additionally, inspired by AspectJ [96], the original join point can
be invoked, within the behavior of the around adaptation, using a special element named
proceed. Around adaptations can have one of two effects:
• In case there is no proceed element in the adaptation, then the join point is replaced
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by the adaptation behavior.
• In case the adaptation contains a proceed element, then all the elements that appear
before the proceed element are injected before the join point, and similarly, all the
elements appearing after the proceed element are injected after the join point.
Algorithm 5.4 summarizes the steps needed to perform an around adaptation in a
state machine diagram. The algorithm takes as input a set of join points, an OCL ex-
pression, the new state machine element to add, and a base model. The algorithm then
replaces the current join point with the new state machine element. In addition, it checks
whether the new state machine element contains a proceed element or not. If the pro-
ceed element exists, then it will be identiﬁed and replaced with the current join point.
Algorithm 5.4: State Machine Diagram: Weaving Around Adaptation
Input: JoinPointElem-set,OCLExp,newSMElem,BaseModel























The activity transformation deﬁnition handles transformations of activity diagrams. It cor-
responds to an aspect adaptation that is stereotyped ActivityAdaptation. In our approach,
join points in activity diagrams can be either nodes or edges. A node can be either an ac-
tion or a control node (e.g., fork, join, decision, merge). Since an activity diagram models
the ﬂow of actions in a business process, then ordering must be taken into consideration
when weaving a new behavior into such a ﬂow. Weaving adaptations in activity diagrams
are very similar to those of state machine diagrams, as both diagrams are constructed from
nodes and edges. In the following, we describe each weaving adaptation.
Weaving Before Adaptation
This adaptation adds a new node in an activity diagram before a join point. It requires
identifying the join point kind, whether it is an action, a control node, or an edge, and its
direct predecessor(s). In case of an action, all incoming edges are redirected to the new
node. As such, a new edge is created between the new node and the join point. However,
if the join point is a join or a merge node, where there is more than one incoming edge,
then the new node is duplicated for each edge. Thus, each incoming edge to the join or
the merge nodes is redirected to the new nodes. Moreover, two new edges are created
between the new nodes and the join point (Figure 5.7). Algorithm 5.5 summarizes the
steps of the before weaving adaptation in activity diagrams. The algorithm takes as input
a set of join points, the new node to add, and a base model. It returns as output the woven





























Figure 5.7: Example of Join Node as Join Point
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Algorithm 5.5: Activity Diagram: Weaving Before Adaptation
Input: JoinPointElem-set,newNode,BaseModel
edgeSet: ActivityEdge-set;
for nextJoinPoint in JoinPointElem-set do
if nextJoinPoint is of type ActivityNode then
edgeSet = getInComingEdges(nextJoinPoint);
if nextJoinPoint is of type JoinNode or MergeNode then
for all edge in edgeSet do
copy newNode;
edge.setTarget(newNode);
BaseModel = CreateEdge(newNode, nextJoinPoint);
end for
else
for all edge in edgeSet do
edge.setTarget(newNode);
end for
BaseModel = CreateEdge(newNode, nextJoinPoint);
end if
else
if nextJoinPoint is of type ActivityEdge then
temp = getSource(nextJoinPoint);
nextJoinPoint.setSource(newNode);





This adaptation adds a new node in an activity diagram after a join point. In case the join
point is an action, all outgoing edges are redirected to the new node. Accordingly, a new
edge is created between the join point and the new node. However, if the join point is
a fork or a decision node, where there is more than one outgoing edge, then a new node
is created for each edge. Moreover, two new edges are created between the new nodes
and the original join point successors (Figure 5.8). Algorithm 5.6 summarizes the steps
of weaving an after adaptation in activity diagrams. It takes, as input, a set of join points,
the new node to add, and a base model. It returns, as output, the woven model, with the




























Figure 5.8: Example of Fork Node as Join Point
Algorithm 5.6: Activity Diagram: Weaving After Adaptation
Input: JoinPointElem-set,newNode,BaseModel
edgeSet: ActivityEdge-set;
for nextJoinPoint in JoinPointElem-set do
if nextJoinPoint is of type ActivityNode then
edgeSet = getOutgoingEdges(nextJoinPoint);
if nextJoinPoint is of type ForkNode or DecisionNode then
for all edge in edgeSet do
copy newNode;
edge.setSource(newNode);
BaseModel = CreateEdge(nextJoinPoint, newNode);
end for
else
for all edge in edgeSet do
edge.setSource(newNode);
end for
BaseModel = CreateEdge(nextJoinPoint, newNode);
end if
else
if nextJoinPoint is of type ActivityEdge then
temp = getTarget(nextJoinPoint);
nextJoinPoint.setTarget(newNode);





This adaptation replaces a join point in an activity diagram with a new behavior. In
addition, the original join point may be invoked using the proceed element. The corre-
sponding algorithm is similar to the one described previously for state machine diagrams.
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Sequence Transformation Deﬁnition
The sequence transformation deﬁnition handles transformations of sequence diagrams. It
corresponds to an aspect adaptation that is stereotyped SequenceAdaptation. A sequence
diagram is used to describe the interactions between different entities in a system. Order-
ing in sequence diagrams is realized by a trace of events (e.g., send and receive events),
each of which is speciﬁed by an element called Occurrence Speciﬁcation (Figure 5.9). In
our approach, we consider messages as join points, where a new behavior may be added
before, after, or around the occurrence of send/recieve message events. In the following,






Figure 5.9: Send/Recieve Events in a Sequence Diagram
Weaving Before Adaptation
This adaptation adds a new element in a sequence diagram before a join point. As men-
tioned previously, the order in sequence diagrams is represented by a trace of events.
Here, we are particularly interested in the send and the receive events of the exchanged
messages. Weaving an adaptation before a join point message means that the adapta-
tion should be performed before the “send event” of the message is ﬁred. Algorithm 5.7
describes the steps needed to weave a new element before a join point message. The al-
gorithm takes, as input, a set of join point messages, the new element to add, and a base
model. It returns, as output, the woven model, where the new element has been added
before each join point. The algorithm extracts the trace of events from the base model
and identiﬁes the send event of the join point message. Then, it inserts the send and the
receive events of the new element before the identiﬁed send event of the message.
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for all nextJoinPointMessage in JoinPointMessage-set do













This adaptation adds a new element in a sequence diagram after a join point. In contrast
with a before weaving adaptation, here we are interested in the receive event of the join
point message. In this case, the send/recieve events of the new element are inserted after
the receive event of the join point message. Algorithm 5.8 summarizes the steps needed
to weave a new element after a join point message. The algorithm takes, as input, a set of
join point messages, the new element to add, and a base model. It returns, as output, the
woven model, where the new element has been added after each join point.
Weaving Around Adaptation
Weaving around adaptation in a sequence diagram is simply a replace operation. Both
send and receive events of the join point message are replaced with the new element.
Algorithm 5.9 presents the steps needed to weave a new element around an identiﬁed join
point message. The algorithm takes as input a set of join point elements, the new element
to add, and a base model. It returns as output the woven model, where the new element
has been added around each of the identiﬁed join points.
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for all nextJoinPointMessage in JoinPointMessage-set do












Algorithm 5.9: Sequence Diagram: Weaving Around Adaptation
Input: JoinPointElem-set,newElem,BaseModel





















In this section, we present the transformation rules, also called mapping rules, that spec-
ify how elements of the base model should be transformed into the woven model. These
mapping rules conform to the adaptation rules presented in Chapter 4. Two adaptation
rules are supported in our approach: add and remove. We classify UML elements tar-
geted by the adaptations into three main categories: (1) Simple elements, (2) Composite
elements, and (3) Two-end elements. Simple elements are those that are compact, i.e.,
they are single atomic elements. Examples of simple elements are attributes, operations,
simple states, and actions. Composite elements are those that are composed of other UML
elements or contain references to other UML elements. Examples of composite elements
are classes, sub-machine states, and structured activity nodes. Two-end elements are those
that connect two UML elements together, such as associations, transitions, massages, and
edges. Table 5.1 summarizes all the supported elements according to their categories.
Table 5.1: Classiﬁcation of the Supported UML Elements

















Diagram Structured Activity Node Composite
Edge Two-end
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Before describing the deﬁned mapping rules, we ﬁrst introduce the main operators
that are deﬁned by QVT language:
• “map” operator: It is used to apply a mapping rule to a single element or a set of
elements.
• “→” operator: It is used to iterate on a collection of elements. When combined
with the map operator, it facilitates the access to each element of a collection in
order to apply the mapping rule to it.
• “·” operator: It is used to access properties or operations of single elements.
For instance, the following QVT expression shows how to apply a mapping rule addAt-
tribute, which adds an attribute attr to a given set of Class elements Set{classElem}, using
the map and → operators:
Set{classElem} → map addAttribute(attr);
The → operator iterates through the set classElem and, for each element in that set, it
applies the mapping rule addAttribute to it. The result of executing this expression is a
new set of classes, where each class has the new attribute attr added to it. In the following,
we detail the deﬁned mapping rules.
Add Mapping Rule
Add mapping rule is called on all adaptation rules in the aspect that have the stereotype
add. It is important to mention here that the order of adaptation rules, as speciﬁed
in the aspect, is preserved during the weaving. The following QVT expression illustrates
how the add mapping rule is applied to each add adaptation rule extracted from the aspect.
OrderedSet{addAdaptationRules} → map addMappingRule();
For each add adaptation rule, the associated tagged values determine the appropriate map-
ping rule to be invoked. In fact, the tagged value type determines the appropriate add
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sub-rule to be performed. In addition, the name of the new added element is identiﬁed by
the tagged value name. The tagged value position of the add adaptation rule references
the position where to add the new element in contrast with other existing elements in the
base model. For instance, it indicates whether to add the new element before, after, or
around the identiﬁed join point. In the case of a class adaptation, the value of the position
property is set to its default value (inside) because of the nature of class diagrams, and
therefore it is not taken into consideration during the weaving. Finally, the value of the
tagged value pointcut is passed to the join point matching module to identify the set of
join point elements. Depending on the type of the added element, one of the following
add sub-rules is applied to the matched join points:
1. Add Simple Element(elemName, position)
This mapping rule adds a simple element to the base model. It takes two parameters:
the name of the element that should be added (elemName), and the position where
to add the element (position). This mapping rule creates the appropriate meta-
element object and sets its name to elemName. Depending on the position value,
the newly created element is placed in the base model accordingly.
object simple-meta-element {name := elemName};
2. Add Composite Element(elemName, position)
This mapping rule adds a composite element to the base model. It is similar to
the add simple element rule. In addition, it adds a reference to the behavior of the
composite element provided in the aspect. For example, in the case of an interaction
use, a reference to the corresponding interaction is required. Thus, this mapping
rule iterates through the elements of the aspect and selects the behavior that matches
the element to add. Finally, the composite element is created.
behElem := Set{aspectElem} → Select(el where el.name = elemName);
object composite-meta-element{name := elemName; refersTo := behElem};
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3. Add Two-End Element(elemName, position, sourceExp, targetExp)
Dealing with a two-end element is different from simple and composite elements
because it requires the speciﬁcation of the source and the target of that element.
Therefore, two additional pointcuts are needed: one to select the source element,
and one to select the target element. These two pointcuts are speciﬁed as parameters
for the add adaptation, such that the ﬁrst parameter represents the source pointcut
whereas the second parameter represents the target pointcut.
Set{sourceElem} := Set{baseModelElem} → joinPointMatching(sourceExp);
Set{targetElem} := Set{baseModelElem} → joinPointMatching(targetExp);
object two-end-meta-element{name := elemName; source := sourceElem;
target := targetElem;}
Remove Mapping Rule
The remove mapping rule is applied to each adaptation rule in the aspect that has the
stereotype remove. It reads the value of the tagged value pointcut and passes it to
the join point matching module to identify the set of elements to be removed. Unlike the
additive rules, the type of the element to be removed is not important. Thus, there is only
one general rule to remove any kind of UML element. Each identiﬁed join point element
is removed using the destroy method provided by QVT.
Set{elemToRemove} := Set{baseModelElem} → joinPointMatching(pointcut);
Set{elemToRemove} → destroy();
Indeed, the remove operation is very sensitive and should be dealt with cautiously, other-
wise it may result in an incorrect woven model. For instance, removing a state in a state
machine diagram without reconnecting its predecessor with its successor may result in
two disconnected state machines. Therefore, we assume that in case of any remove oper-
ation, it should be followed by an add operation that either replaces the removed element
or corrects any arising problematic issues.
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Tagging Mapping Rule
Tagging mapping rules are used to trace the modiﬁcations that are performed on the base
model. Each element that has been added or modiﬁed by the transformation needs to
be easily identiﬁed in the woven model. To this end, we deﬁne special keywords, e.g.,
AddedElement and ModiﬁedElement, and apply them to the affected elements.
When the woven model is generated, the affected elements can be easily distinguished
using these keywords. Note that keywords are properties of UML elements [128]. Some
keywords are predeﬁned in UML. Moreover, user-speciﬁc keywords can be deﬁned as it
is the case here. Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 summarize all the supported mapping rules.



















































5.6 Related Work on Model Weaving
Various approaches have been proposed for weaving aspects into UML design models.
Some of them adopt a symmetric approach [71,85], where there is no distinction between
aspects and base models, while others follow an asymmetric approach [51, 82, 101, 116,
146, 169], where there is a clear distinction between aspects and base models. In the
following, we present a discussion of the main contributions.
Cui et al. [51] have presented an approach for modeling and integrating aspects into
UML activity diagrams. Base models are modeled as activity diagrams while aspect mod-
els, consisting of pointcut and advice models, are depicted as activity diagrams extended
by a set of stereotypes and tagged values. Compared to this contribution that supports
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only adding new elements before and after the matched join points, our framework con-
siders also replacing existing elements by new ones and removing elements. In addition,
control nodes are also considered as join points in our approach. Algorithms for matching
and weaving are provided in [51]. However, the implementation strategies have not been
detailed. Additionally, there is no formal semantics for these processes.
MATA [169] is a tool for weaving UML models based on graph transformations. It
supports weaving aspects into class, sequence, and state machine diagrams. In contrast to
our approach, in MATA there are no explicit join points; any model element can be a join
point. The UML base model is transformed into an instance of type graph. Similarly, the
aspect model is transformed into a graph rule that is automatically executed on the base
graph. After the weaving, the result is transformed back to a UML model. Graph the-
ory and tools allow MATA to perform some analysis such as aspect/feature interactions.
MATA is one of the few tools that support both structural and behavioral composition.
However, the weaving is not done on UML models directly, but rather is executed as a
graph rule using graph transformation tools.
GeKo (Generic Composition with Kermeta) [116] is a generic AOM approach that
can be applied to any well-deﬁned meta-model. It supports both structural and behavioral
composition. The weaving is implemented as model transformations using Kermeta [16],
while the matching is performed using a Prolog-based pattern matching engine. GeKo is
one of the few approaches that provide a clear semantics for the different operators used in
the weaving. It supports adding, removing, and updating elements of the base model. The
graphical representation of the woven model is supported. However, there is no support
for traceability, meaning that the effect of an aspect on the base model is not visualized.
Fleury et al. [71] have presented a generic tool, called Kompose, for model compo-
sition based on Kermeta [16]. Kompose focuses only on the structural composition of any
modeling language described by a meta-model and does not support behavioral compo-
sition. In addition, it adopts a signature comparison mechanism for the matching of join
points, which makes the speciﬁed aspects speciﬁc rather than generic.
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Groher and Voelter [82] have presented XWeave; a weaver that supports the weav-
ing of models and meta-models. This weaver is implemented following a model-to-model
transformation approach using the openArchitectureWare framework1. The main limita-
tion of XWeave is the fact that it only supports the addition of new elements to the base
model. It does not support removing or replacing existing elements. In addition, there are
no supported theoretical foundations for this weaver.
Hovsepyan et al. [85] have proposed an approach, called Generic Reusable Concern
Compositions (GReCCo), for composing concern models. It supports composition of
class and sequence diagrams. To support reusability, concerns are speciﬁed in a generic
way. In order to compose two concerns, a composition model is speciﬁed, which provides
directions to the transformation engine on how to compose the two models. The GReCCo
tool is implemented using ATL language [1]. Since concerns are speciﬁed as generic
models, their specialization to a particular context is needed in the composition model.
However, this suggests that for each composition operation, a separate composition model
needs to be speciﬁed, which may be a costly task in terms of effort and complexity.
Klein et al. [101] have proposed a semantic-based weaving algorithm for sequence
diagrams. Similar to our approach, they support adding, replacing, and removing behav-
iors. The weaving algorithm is implemented as a set of transformations. The matching
process consists of transforming the original model in such a way that pointcuts only
match a ﬁnite number of paths, which is a limitation of this approach.
ATLAS Model Weaver (AMW) [66] has been developed for establishing links be-
tween models. These links are stored in the weaving model. The latter is created con-
forming to a speciﬁc weaving meta-model, which enables creating links between model
elements and associations between links. AMW is based on ATL language, which sup-
ports automatic creation of traceability links between the source and the target models.
However, AMW requires continuous interaction with the developer to build the weaving
model. Additionally, AMW deals only with the XMI representation of the models.
1http://www.eclipse.org/workinggroups/oaw/
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Reddy et al. [146] have presented an approach for composing aspect-oriented class
models. The authors have described a composition approach that utilizes a composition
algorithm and composition directives. Composition directives are used when the default
composition algorithm is known or expected to yield incorrect models. The prototype tool
is based on Kermeta [16]. However, it supports only the default composition algorithm but
not the composition directives. Other model weaving approaches [77,89,176] that handle
executable UML (xUML) models are presented in the related work section of Chapter 9.
Table 5.4 summarizes the existing model weavers. It also compares the weavers
according to the supported diagrams, formalization of the weaving, tool support, aspect
reusability, weaver extensibility, and whether the approach adopts any standards for the
implementation of the tool. The terms “CD”, “SMD”, “SD”, and “AD” in the table refer
respectively to class diagrams, state machine diagrams, sequence diagrams, and activity
diagrams. The term “Generic” means that the approach supports any kind of models with
a well-deﬁned meta-model. From this table, we conclude that our approach is the only
one that handles UML diagrams in a comprehensive way in terms of the deﬁned criteria.
Table 5.4: Existing Model Weavers - Summary and Comparison





Cui et al. (Jasmine-AOI)
[51]
AD Algorithms 
Fuentes and Sánchez [77] AD
Zhang et al. (Motorola
WEAVR) [176]




Morin et al. (GeKo) [116] Generic    
Whittle et al. (MATA) [169] Generic  Partially  
Klein et al. [101] SD   
Kienzle et al. (RAM) [99] CD, SMD,
SD
Partially 
Reddy et al. [146] CD Partially 
Hovsepyan et al. [85] CD, SD   
Our Approach CD, SMD,
SD, AD
    
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5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented our weaving framework for integrating security as-
pects into UML design models. We have detailed the main steps of the proposed weaving
approach. Additionally, we have presented the weaving algorithms that implement the
weaving capabilities for each of the supported UML diagrams. The different transforma-
tion deﬁnitions and the mapping rules used to perform the weaving were also detailed.
The main advantages of our weaving approach are the portability and the expressiveness
thanks to the use of OMG standards, namely, OCL and QVT languages. By adopting
OCL for evaluating the pointcuts, we were able to match a rich join point model with
a large and variant set of join points. For instance, in activity diagrams, we consider
not only executable nodes, i.e., action nodes, but also various control nodes, e.g., fork,
decision, etc. Some of these join points cannot be captured at the code level with ex-
isting pointcuts. Thus, capturing such control nodes, at the design level, allows modeling
crosscutting concerns needed with alternatives, loops, exceptions, and multithreaded ap-
plications. Also, in state machine diagrams, we consider not only static states as join
points, but also, we capture states that dynamically depend on the transitions that are trig-
gered to reach them. The adoption of QVT for implementing the weaving allowed us to
support a wide variety of modiﬁcations on different UML diagrams. In addition, QVT ex-
tends portability of the designed weaver to all tools supporting QVT language. Moreover,
traceability of the performed weaving operations is also supported through the tagging
rules for the added and the modiﬁed elements. After weaving the needed security aspects,
the developer can validate the hardening of the models by making use of veriﬁcation and
validation tools [57, 105]. In our approach, these tools take, as inputs, the woven model
and the corresponding security properties, and provide, as output, whether the security
properties are satisﬁed or not. It is important to mention here that the veriﬁcation and
the validation task has been performed as another thread in MOBS2 project. In the next
chapter, we will present a prototype implementation of our weaving framework together
with case studies that illustrate the usefulness of the proposed framework.
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Chapter 6
Tool Support and Case Studies
6.1 Introduction
To demonstrate the feasibility of our security hardening approach, we have designed and
implemented a prototype to support the speciﬁcation and the systematic integration of
security aspects into UML design models. The prototype is developed as a plug-in to
IBM-Rational Software Architect (RSA) [87]. RSA is an advanced model-driven devel-
opment tool. It contains a very powerful UML modeler that is compliant with UML 2
standard. In addition, it supports many important functionalities such as model manipu-
lation, code generation, reverse engineering from Java and C++, etc. Moreover, as RSA
is built on top of Eclipse1, our tool can be easily integrated with any IDE that is based
on the Eclipse platform. This plug-in is part of an open source project on model-based
engineering of secure software and systems2. In this chapter, we provide details about the
authoring of our AOM proﬁle and the weaving plug-in. In addition, we develop several





This section provides details about the authoring of our AOM proﬁle, presented in Chapter
4, in IBM-RSA tool. In RSA, UML Proﬁles are ﬁles with “.epx” extension. The modeling
perspective of RSA provides creating and editing capabilities of UML proﬁles using the
UML extensibility feature. Figure 6.1 depicts a screenshot of the AOM proﬁle editor.
The two main views that are used in proﬁle authoring are the Model Explorer and the
Properties View. The Model Explorer is used to create the stereotypes of the proﬁle, e.g.,
classAdaptation, pointcut, add, and remove. The Properties View is used to create and
set the tagged values that are associated with each stereotype, e.g., name, type, position,
and pointcut that are associated with the stereotype add. In addition, the Properties View
shows the proﬁle properties, such as, the proﬁle name, the ﬁle location and size, the time
when the ﬁle was last modiﬁed, and whether or not the ﬁle is editable.
Figure 6.1: AOM Proﬁle Editor
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6.3 Weaving Framework
This section presents the design and the implementation details of our weaving tool. As
mentioned previously, this tool has been implemented as a plug-in on top of IBM-RSA
since it contains a very powerful UML modeler. In addition, RSA can be augmented with
Eclipse plug-ins, which allows our weaving tool to be embedded into any Eclipse-based




Figure 6.2: Weaving Plug-in Integrated to IBM-RSA
The weaving plug-in consists of 253 Java classes, 51 QVT mappings with a total
of around 21300 lines of code. This plug-in provides the weaving capabilities needed
to weave the security aspects, speciﬁed using our AOM proﬁle, into UML base models.
Figure 6.3 highlights the different components that have been implemented as part of this























Figure 6.3: Weaving Plug-in
6.3.1 Security Property Editor
The developer should be able to specify the security requirement that he/she wants to
enforce on his/her design. To this end, we have implemented a security property editor,
where the developer can select the model that he/she wants to harden, and on the other
hand the needed security requirement. Afterwards, the security aspect that provides the
security solutions for the needed requirement is automatically selected from the security
aspects library. The covered security requirements are those commonly speciﬁed and
veriﬁed on software, and for which a security solution can be provided as an aspect.
Examples of these security requirements are secrecy, authentication, authorization, etc.
Figure 6.4 depicts a screenshot of the security property editor.
Figure 6.4: Security Property Editor
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6.3.2 Aspect Specialization through a Weaving Interface
Since security aspects are provided as generic solutions, the developer should be able to
specialize those aspects to his/her application before weaving them into base models. To
this end, we have implemented a graphical weaving interface to ease the specialization
of aspects and their weaving in a systematic way. As shown in Figure 6.5, the weaving
interface presents, on the left hand side, all the generic elements of the aspect, and on the
right hand side, all the elements of the base model. From this weaving interface and based
on his/her understanding of the application, the developer maps each generic element of
the aspect to its corresponding element(s) in the base model. Using this weaving interface,
the developer does not need to understand how the security solution is speciﬁed. Indeed,
all the details of the security solution are kept hidden from the developer and only the
generic elements of the aspect are exposed to him/her. After mapping all the generic
elements, the application-dependent aspect is automatically generated.
Figure 6.5: Weaving Interface
6.3.3 Aspect and Pointcut Parsers
The aspect parser is responsible for parsing the selected aspect, and identifying the dif-
ferent kinds of adaptations that are contained in the aspect. Then, for each adaptation
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kind, it will invoke the corresponding transformation deﬁnition. Furthermore, before ex-
ecuting the transformation rules, the textual pointcut expressions, speciﬁed in the aspect,
should be translated into OCL expressions. This is done by another component, the Point-
cut Parser, that is responsible of parsing and translating textual pointcut expressions into
OCL. In this context, we use CUP Parser Generator for Java3. This parser generator
takes as input: (1) The grammar of the pointcut language along with the actions required
to translate each primitive pointcut designator to its corresponding OCL primitive, and
(2) a scanner used to break the textual pointcut expression into meaningful tokens. It pro-
vides as output a Java parser that is capable of parsing and translating any textual pointcut
expression into its equivalent OCL one. It is important to mention here that this process
is executed automatically and in a total transparency to the developer.
6.3.4 Weaving Process
This component is responsible for performing the actual weaving of the aspect and the
base model. It includes two main sub-components: Join Point Matching Module and
Transformation Rules. The join point matching module is responsible for querying the
base model elements using the generated OCL expressions, and returning those elements
that satisfy the OCL expressions. This module is implemented as a Java program and inte-
grated to the weaving framework by extending the QVT engine through the QVT/Black-
Box mechanism [126]. This QVT feature allows the integration of external programs, ex-
pressed in other transformation languages or programming languages, to the QVT rules.
The transformation rules implement the aspect adaptation rules. They are executed on the
identiﬁed join points to produce the woven model. These rules are expressed using the




In this section, we detail the experiments that demonstrate the feasibility and the relevance
of our security hardening framework. We conduct case studies to add security mecha-
nisms and ﬁx various security vulnerabilities in different applications. These conducted
case studies can be summarized as follows:
• Adding input validation and access control to a service provider application.
• Adding authorization, blocking spam, and handling maximum size of instant mes-
sages in SIP-Communicator [2].
• Replacing deprecated functions in OpenSAF [14].
In the following, we detail these case studies to show how our deﬁned approach can
be applied to detect vulnerable points in UML design models, and afterwards inject the
needed solutions at these points.
6.4.1 Service Provider Application
In this case study, we show how to automatically integrate different security mechanisms
into a service provider application. The class diagram of the service provider application
is depicted in Figure 6.6. The class Client represents the application’s users (e.g., admin-
istrator, subscribers, managers). Each type of users has speciﬁc privileges. A client can
login to the database of subscribers (ResourceDB) through an interface Provision, which
is implemented by the classes SubscriberManager and ServiceManager for manipulat-
ing subscribers and services respectively. Before clients can access a particular service,
they must ﬁrst authenticate by providing username and password as their credentials. The
authentication process is modeled as an activity diagram (Figure 6.7).
Furthermore, when a client issues a request to delete a subscriber, the method
delete() of the SubscriberManager class is invoked. Then, this method executes the com-









































Figure 6.7: Activity Diagram Specifying the Authentication Process
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respective instance of the subscriber by sending the destroy message. To guarantee the
deletion of the subscriber instance, the SubscriberManager asks for the conﬁrmation and
sends the results to the client. The client’s permissions must be veriﬁed before deleting
a subscriber (i.e., only the administrator can delete a subscriber). Figure 6.8 represents a
sequence diagram specifying the behavior of the method SubscriberManager.delete().










Figure 6.8: Behavior of the Method SubscriberManager.delete()
In the sequel, we show how our framework can be used to specify and integrate
two security aspects to the service provider application: (1) Input Validation to check
user input, and (2) Role-Based Access Control to check user permissions before deleting
a subscriber.
Input Validation
The authentication process, as speciﬁed in Figure 6.7, might be vulnerable to various se-
curity attacks such as SQL injection and Cross-site Scripting (XSS) [72] due to malicious
inputs from the user. To ﬁx such vulnerabilities, a security solution can be provided as
an aspect that validates user input as shown in Figure 6.9. The input validation aspect is
speciﬁed using our proposed AOM proﬁle presented in Chapter 4. The aspect contains an
activity adaptation specifying the addition of an input validation behavior that sanitizes
user input before being processed. In other words, it checks the user input for special
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characters. If any special character exists then the aspect sanitizes the input to remove its
effect. This behavior will be injected as a structured activity node after any action that
gets user input. In the following, we show how our framework can be used to weave this

















Figure 6.9: Input Validation Aspect
The ﬁrst step of the weaving is to specialize the input validation aspect to the au-
thentication scenario (Figure 6.7). To this end, the developer uses the weaving interface,
depicted in Figure 6.10, where he/she maps the abstract action GetUserInput to the actions
getUserName and getPassword. After this step, the application-dependent aspect is auto-
matically generated. Its speciﬁcation is similar to the application-independent one except
for InputPointcut that will have the value: action(getUserName) or action(getPassword).
Figure 6.10: Weaving Interface: Specializing the Input Validation Aspect
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The next step of the weaving is the automatic identiﬁcation of the join points where
the input validation behavior should be injected. To achieve this, we ﬁrst translate the
textual expression of InputPointcut to OCL. The resulting OCL expression is as follows:
“(self.oclIsKindOf(Action) and self.name=‘getUserName’) or
(self.oclIsKindOf(Action) and self.name=‘getPassword ’)”
This expression is evaluated by the join point matching module on the base model. Ac-
cordingly, the actions getUserName and getPassword are selected as matched join points.
The last step of the weaving is the automatic injection of the input validation behavior into
the authentication scenario at the identiﬁed join points. This is achieved by executing the
QVT mapping rule that corresponds to the adaptation SanitizeInput (Figure 6.9). Finally,
the resulting woven model is generated as shown in Figure 6.11.
Figure 6.11: Authentication Scenario - Woven Model
112
Role-Based Access Control
Now, we show how a security expert can use the designed AOM proﬁle to specify an
RBAC aspect needed for enforcing access control into the design models of the service
provider application (Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.8). Before illustrating the design of the
RBAC aspect, ﬁrst we give a short background on the different RBAC models. RBAC is
organized into four models:
1. Flat RBAC: It is the core model that embodies the essential concepts of RBAC:
users, roles, and permissions. It speciﬁes the assignment of users to roles and the
assignment of permissions to roles.
2. Hierarchical RBAC: It extends the Flat RBAC by supporting role hierarchies.
3. Constrained RBAC: It extends the Hierarchical RBAC by supporting separation of
duty constraints.
4. Symmetric RBAC: It extends the Constrained RBAC by adding the ability to perform
permission-role review.
In our case study, the Flat RBAC is used to enforce access control. The speciﬁcation
of the RBAC aspect is presented in Figure 6.12. In order to enforce RBAC access control
mechanisms on the different resources of the service provider application, we need to in-
troduce the RBAC components into the application using aspect adaptations. The RBAC
aspect contains two kinds of adaptations: Class Adaptation and Sequence Adaptation.
The Class Adaptation speciﬁes the necessary modiﬁcations that should be performed on
the class diagram of the service provider application (Figure 6.6). More precisely, it adds
two classes, named Role and Permission, to the service provider application by the add
adaptations AddRole and AddPermission respectively. The location where to add these
two classes is provided by the pointcut SubscriberPackagePointcut. In addition, it en-
forces the RBAC concepts, i.e., user-role assignment and role-permission assignment, by
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adding two associations: UserAssignment between the classes (User, Role) and Permis-
sionAssignment between the classes (Role, Permission). Furthermore, the class adaptation
adds two new operations, assignRole and getPermission, to assign different roles to users
and get their permissions.
The Sequence Adaptation speciﬁes the necessary modiﬁcations that should be per-
formed on the sequence diagram of the service provider application (Figure 6.8). More
precisely, it adds a check access behavior, by the adaptation AddCheckAccess, before call-
ing a sensitive method. This behavior is responsible for checking whether the user, trying
to access a given resource, has the appropriate privileges or not. The location where to
inject this behavior is speciﬁed by the pointcut SensitiveMethodPointcut, which selects all



























































Figure 6.12: Speciﬁcation of the RBAC Aspect
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In what follows, we show how the developer can use our framework to apply the
RBAC aspect to the base model of the service provider application (Figure 6.6 and Fig-
ure 6.8). This RBAC aspect is though application-independent and must be specialized
by the developer to the service provider application, as shown in Figure 6.13. In this
case, the developer maps SensitiveMethod to SubscriberManager.delete(). The same way,
the developer maps User to Client, Resource to Subscriber, and SubscriberPackage to
ServiceProviderApplication.
Figure 6.13: Security Aspects Specialization
Having the RBAC aspect specialized to actual elements from the service provider
application, each pointcut element is automatically translated into its equivalent OCL ex-
pression. For example, the pointcut SensitiveMethodPointcut, presented in Figure 6.12
with the textual expression: “Message_Call(delete) && Message_Source(Client) &&
Message_Target(SubscriberManager)”, will be tokenized by the scanner into three tokens
connected with the logical operator && as follows: (1) Message_Call(delete), (2) Mes-
sage_Source(Client), and (3) Message_Target(SubscriberManager). The pointcut parser
will parse the textual expression and will translate it into the following OCL expression:
“self.oclIsTypeOf(Message) and self.name=‘delete’ and
self.connector. end-> at(1).role.name=‘Client’ and
self.connector. end-> at(2).role.name=‘SubscriberManager”’
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This expression will then be evaluated on the elements of the service provider application
and the matched elements will be selected as join points. Figure 6.14 shows the result of
evaluating the previous OCL expression on the DeleteSubscriber sequence diagram.










Figure 6.14: Message SubscriberManager.delete() Identiﬁed as Join Point
After identifying all the existing join points, the next step is to inject the different
adaptations of the RBAC aspect at the exact locations in the base model. This is done
by executing the QVT mapping rules that correspond to the adaptation rules speciﬁed
in the RBAC aspect. These mapping rules are then interpreted by the QVT transforma-
tion engine that transforms the base model into a woven model. Figure 6.15 and Figure
6.16 show the ﬁnal result after weaving the RBAC aspect into the base models of the ser-
vice provider application. Note that the classes Role and Permission have been added to
the class diagram as well as the associations UserAssignment and PermissionAssignment
(Figure 6.15). In addition, the methods assignRole and getPermission have been added to
the class Client. As for the DeleteSubscriber sequence diagram, the CheckAccess frag-
ment, in Figure 6.12, has been added as an interaction use before sending the message
delete()(Figure 6.16).
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Figure 6.15: Woven Model of Class Diagram













Figure 6.16: Woven Model of DeleteSubscriber
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6.4.2 SIP-Communicator
SIP-Communicator4 is an open source software that provides internet-based audio/video
telephony and instant messaging services. It supports some of the most popular instant
messaging and telephony protocols, e.g., Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [150], Exten-
sible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [151], and Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
protocol [130]. It is composed of more than 1400 Java classes and 150K lines of code
based on version 1.0. In this sub-section, we use our framework to solve various issues
that are reported in SIP-Communicator issue list5. The conducted experiments can be
summarized as follows: (1) Adding authorization, (2) blocking spam in messaging ac-
counts, and (3) handling maximum size of instant messages. In the following, we detail
these experiments to show how our framework can be used to pick out speciﬁc points in
UML design models of SIP-Communicator and afterwards inject the needed solutions at
these points.
Authorization
We present, in this experiment, how to add an authorization mechanism into the design
models of SIP-Communicator to allow communication between only authorized clients.
The activity diagram, presented in Figure 6.17, depicts the speciﬁcation of sending an
instant message using SIP protocol. The action SendRequest, that invokes the method
sendRequest(), is responsible for sending a request message. This method is being called
in 32 different places inside functions implementing the operations of SIP communica-
tor, i.e., instant messaging, telephony, presence, notiﬁcation, etc. The activity diagram,
presented in Figure 6.17, is an example showing just one occurrence of this method call.
An authorization mechanism is required before any execution of the action SendRequest.
For this purpose, we catch all the actions named SendRequest in the design models and




Figure 6.17: Activity Diagram for Sending an Instant Message - Base Model
The authorization aspect, presented in Figure 6.18, speciﬁes the addition of an ac-
cess control behavior that checks client permissions based on the information contained
in a message request. This is accomplished by deﬁning the adaptation AddCheckPer-
mission that injects the authorization behavior as a structured activity node before any
sensitive method picked out by the pointcut SensitiveMethod. This aspect is application-
independent and must be specialized by the developer.
The ﬁrst step of the weaving is to specialize the authorization aspect to the base
model depicted in Figure 6.17. In this experiment, the developer maps the abstract method
SensitiveMethod to the method sendRequest as shown in Figure 6.19. After this step, the
application-dependent aspect is automatically generated and without the user interven-
tion. Its speciﬁcation is similar to the application-independent one except for the pointcut
SensitiveMethod that will have the value action(SendRequest).
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Figure 6.18: Authorization Aspect
Figure 6.19: Specialization of the Authorization Aspect
The next step of the weaving is the automatic identiﬁcation of the join points where
the check permission behavior, shown in Figure 6.18, should be injected. To achieve this,
our framework ﬁrst automatically translates the textual expression of the pointcut Sensi-
tiveMethod to OCL. The resulting OCL expression is as follows:“self.oclIsTypeOf(Action)
and self.name=‘SendRequest”’.
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The evaluation of this OCL expression by the join point matching module returns all the
actions named SendRequest as join points. The last step of the weaving is the automatic
injection of the check permission behavior into the base model at the identiﬁed join points.
This is achieved by executing the QVT mapping rule that is generated automatically from
the adaptation AddCheckPermission shown in Figure 6.18. Finally, the resulting woven
model for sending an instant message is generated as shown in Figure 6.20.
Figure 6.20: Sending an Instant Message with Authorization - Woven Model
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Blocking Spam in Messaging Accounts
In this sub-section, we address the problem of spam in instant messaging accounts. To
prevent this problem, we suggest, in this experiment, to reject any messages from people
who are not on the contact list. The activity diagram, presented in Figure 6.21, depicts the
speciﬁcation of handling an incoming message in SIP-Communicator. The action named
MessageReceived is a call operation action that is invoked each time an instant message
is received in a chat room.
Figure 6.21: Activity Diagram for Handling an Incoming Message - Base Model
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To implement the aforementioned solution, we provide an aspect as depicted in
Figure 6.22. The aspect contains an add adaptation (CheckMessageSource) that adds a
new behavior to reject any message whose sender is not in the contact list. This new
behavior should be invoked after receiving any instant message, i.e., after any call to the
method MessageReceived, picked out by the pointcut MessageReceived.
Figure 6.22: Aspect for SPAM Blocking
Since the aspect of Figure 6.22 is application-dependent, there is no need to spe-
cialize it to SIP-Communicator application. To identify the join points where the as-
pect adaptation CheckMessageSource should be performed, our framework automatically
translates the textual expression of the pointcut MessageReceived to OCL. The resulting
OCL expression is as follows:
“self.oclIsTypeOf(CallOperationAction) and self.operation.name=‘MessageReceived”’
The evaluation of this OCL expression, by the join point matching module, returns as
join points all the call operation actions that are invoking the method MessageReceived().
Finally, the last step of the weaving is the execution of the QVT mapping rule correspond-
ing to the adaptation CheckMessageSource. As a result, the new behavior CheckMessage-
Source is injected after the call action MessageReceived as shown in Figure 6.23.
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Figure 6.23: Activity Diagram for Handling an Incoming Message - Woven Model
Handling Maximum Message Size
In SIP-Communicator, various protocols are able to send messages of various sizes. In
this experiment, we handle the case where a user is trying to send messages that exceed
the maximum length allowed by the protocol. After sending a long message to someone,
we are never actually sure if it is received or not. One possible solution to this issue is
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to return an error indicating that the message exceeds the maximum size allowed. The
detailed behavior of sending an instant message in SIP-Communicator is depicted in the
activity diagram of Figure 6.24.
Figure 6.24: Activity Diagram for Sending an Instant Message - Base Model
The action named SendMessage is a call operation action that sends an instant mes-
sage. An aspect is depicted in Figure 6.25 to return an error indicating that the message
exceeds the maximum size allowed. It contains an add adaptation (CheckMessageSize)
that adds a new behavior to check the size of the message to be sent. This new behavior
should be invoked around sending any instant message, i.e., around any call to the method
SendMessage, picked out by the pointcut SendMessage.
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Figure 6.25: Aspect for Handling the Size of Instant Messages
Before weaving the aspect of Figure 6.25 into the base model of Figure 6.24, we
ﬁrst identify the join points where the aspect adaptation CheckMessageSize should be
applied. For this purpose, our framework translates automatically the textual expression
of the pointcut SendMessage to OCL. The resulting OCL expression is as follows:
“self.oclIsTypeOf(CallOperationAction) and self.operation.name=‘SendMessage”’
The evaluation of this OCL expression by the join point matching module returns as join
points all the call operation actions that are invoking the method SendMessage(). Finally,
the last step of the weaving is the execution of the QVT mapping rule corresponding to
the adaptation CheckMessageSize. As a result, the new behavior CheckMessageSize is
injected around the call action SendMessage as shown in Figure 6.26. If the message size
exceeds the maximum allowed, an error message is displayed to the user. Otherwise, the
Proceed action in the aspect of Figure 6.25 is replaced by the original join point, i.e., the
action SendMessage.
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Figure 6.26: Activity Diagram for Sending an Instant Message - Woven Model
6.4.3 Replacing Deprecated Functions in OpenSAF
OpenSAF [14] is an open source project established to develop high availability mid-
dleware that is consistent with the Service Availability Forum speciﬁcations [13]. The
OpenSAF project consists of more than 4800 ﬁles and 1.7M lines of code written in Java
and C languages based on the release 4.0.M4. We have conducted an analysis of the C
part of OpenSAF from a security point of view using a security veriﬁcation tool [164].
The analysis tool has reported more than 100 potential errors of deprecated functions.
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These functions are quite abundant in the C library. In addition, they are vulnerable to
attacks such as buffer overﬂows [12]. The usage of safe alternatives is required as a pre-
ventive measure. We present next how to use our deﬁned framework to ﬁx OpenSAF
vulnerabilities that are related to the use of deprecated functions.
We illustrate our methods on two activity diagrams describing the behavior of the
functions GetNode and GetChassisType as shown in Figure 6.27(a) and Figure 6.27(b) re-
spectively. Both activity diagrams include call operation actions that invoke a vulnerable
function sprintf(). This function uses a format string argument that enable programmers
to specify how strings should be formatted for output. This function is a deprecated func-
tion, which if not properly used, can be exploited to perform buffer overﬂows [11]. To
avoid this vulnerability, one possible solution is to use the secure function sprintf_s() in-
stead of sprintf(). Indeed, the function sprintf_s() allows checking the size of the output
buffer and the format string for valid formatting characters.
(a) Activity Diagram of GetNode (b) Activity Diagram of GetChassisType
Figure 6.27: OpenSAF - Base Models
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An aspect is depicted in Figure 6.28 to implement this solution. It contains the add
adaptation ReplaceSprintf that replaces any call to the function sprintf(), picked out by
the pointcut Deprecated, by a call to the secured function sprintf_s().
Figure 6.28: Aspect for Replacing Deprecated Functions
Since the aspect of Figure 6.28 is application-dependent, there is no need to spe-
cialize it to OpenSAF application. To identify the join points where the aspect adaptation
should be performed, we ﬁrst translate the textual expression of the pointcut Deprecated
to OCL. The resulting OCL expression is as follows:
“self.oclIsTypeOf(CallOperationAction) and self.operation.name=‘sprintf ”’
The evaluation of this OCL expression by the join point matching module returns, as join
points, all the call operation actions that are invoking the function sprintf(). Finally, the
last step of the weaving is the execution of the QVT mapping rule corresponding to the
adaptation ReplaceSprintf. As a result, all the calls to the function sprintf() are replaced
by a call to the secured function sprintf_s() as shown in Figure 6.29(a) and Figure 6.29(b).
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(a) Woven Activity Diagram of GetNode (b) Woven Activity Diagram of GetChassisType
Figure 6.29: OpenSAF - Woven Models
6.5 Conclusion
We have presented, in this chapter, the details of our prototype implementation, including
the authoring of our AOM proﬁle and the different components that make up the weaving
framework. The latter has been developed as a plug-in on top of IBM-RSA, which makes
it portable to any IDE that is based on Eclipse. In addition, the adoption of the standard
QVT language for implementing the adaptation rules extends portability of the weaver to
all tools supporting QVT language beyond current implementation in RSA. We have also
explored the viability and the relevance of our framework by using it to inject security
mechanisms into various mid-size open source projects, such as SIP communicator and
OpenSAF. Using our framework, we successfully solved different security vulnerabili-
ties in SIP communicator, replaced deprecated functions in OpenSAF, and added access
control and input validation mechanisms into a service provider application.
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Chapter 7
Static Matching and Weaving Semantics
in Activity Diagrams
7.1 Introduction
Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM) is an emerging solution for handling security concerns
at the software modeling level. In this respect, we have proposed, in Chapters 4, 5, and
6, an AOM framework for specifying and systematically integrating security aspects into
UML design models. In this chapter, we present formal speciﬁcations for aspect matching
and weaving in UML activity diagrams. In fact, most of the existing work on weaving
aspects into UML design models is presented from a practical perspective and lacks for-
mal syntax and semantics. Accordingly, there is a desideratum to put more emphasis on
the theoretical foundations that allow for rigorous deﬁnitions, establishment of theoretical
results, and consequently a better understanding of AOM.
We focus on activity diagrams typically used to model business processes and op-
erational workﬂows of systems [128]. Activity diagrams have a rich join point model,
and accordingly, it will be very useful to formalize their matching and weaving processes.
We formalize both types of adaptations, i.e., add adaptations, which add new elements to
an activity diagram before, after, or around speciﬁc join points, and remove adaptations,
131
which delete existing elements from activity diagrams. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the ﬁrst contribution in handling formal speciﬁcations of adaptation weaving speciﬁ-
cally for around adaptation with or without proceed. Regarding the join point model, its
novelty is that we consider not only executable nodes, i.e., action nodes, but also various
control nodes, i.e., initial, final, flow final, fork, join, decision, and merge
nodes. Actually, some of these join points cannot be captured at the code level, and thus,
capturing such control nodes, at the design level, allows modeling crosscutting concerns
with alternatives, loops, exceptions, and multithreaded applications.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 presents the
syntax of UML activity diagrams and aspects. In Section 7.3, we deﬁne formal semantics
for aspect matching and weaving. Afterwards, in Section 7.4, we formalize algorithms
for matching and weaving. In addition, we prove the correctness and the completeness of
these algorithms with respect to the proposed semantics.
7.2 Syntax
This section presents the syntax of UML activity diagrams and aspects. The proposed
syntax covers all the constructs that are required for the matching and the weaving se-
mantics. We need ﬁrst to introduce the notations that are used to express our semantics.
Notation
• The algorithms and notations are written with respect to OCaml [15].
• Given a record structure D= { f1 :D1; f2 :D2; . . . ; fn :Dn} and an element e of type
D, the access to the ﬁeld fi of an element e is written as e. fi.
• Given a record structure D= { f1 :D1; f2 :D2; . . . ; fn :Dn} and an element e of type
D, the update operation that produces a copy e′ of the element e with a new value v
for the ﬁeld fx, where 1≤ x ≤ n, is written as e′ = {e with fx = v}.
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• Given a type τ , we write τ-set to denote sets having elements of type τ .
• Given a type τ , we write τ-uset to denote sets having a unary element of type τ .
• Given a type τ , we write τ-list to denote lists having elements of type τ .
• The type Identiﬁer classiﬁes identiﬁers.
7.2.1 Activity Diagrams Syntax
An activity diagram, as shown in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2, consists of a set of nodes
and a set of edges. An edge is a directed connection between two nodes represented by
source and target. In addition, an edge may have a guard condition specifying if the edge
can be traversed. A node can be either an executable node (e.g., action, structured
activity) or a control node (e.g., initial, final). We consider the following nodes:
• Initial: represents an initial node, at which the activity starts executing. It has one
outgoing edge and no incoming edges.
• Final: represents a ﬁnal node that can be either: (1) an activity ﬁnal, at which the
activity execution terminates, or (2) a ﬂow ﬁnal, at which a ﬂow terminates. It has
one incoming edge and no outgoing edges.
• Fork/Decision: represents a fork or a decision node. It has one incoming edge and
multiple outgoing edges.
• Join/Merge: represents a join or a merge node. It has one outgoing edge and mul-
tiple incoming edges.
• Action: represents an action node. It has one incoming and one outgoing edge.
Moreover it has input pins and output pins represented as a list of types. The type,
as speciﬁed in [131], can be Int to classify integers, Nat to classify naturals, Bool
to classify the usual truth values true or false, String to classify a sequence of
characters, or enumeration to represent user-deﬁned data types. There are various
kinds of actions in UML 2. Among them, we consider the following:
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Activity 	 A ::= {name: Identiﬁer; (Activity)
nodes: Node-set;
edges: Edge-set}
Node 	 n ::= Initial | Final | ForkDecision (Node)
| JoinMerge | Action
| StrActivity
Initial 	 i ::= {type: initial; (Initial)
name: Identiﬁer;
outgoing: Edge-uset}
Final 	 f ::= {type: final | flowfinal; (Final )
name: Identiﬁer;
incoming: Edge-uset}








Action 	 a ::= OpaqueAction | SpeciﬁcAction (Action)














Type 	 τ ::= Int | Nat | Bool | String | Enumeration (Type)
Enumeration 	 enu ::= {name: Identiﬁer;
enuliteral: Identiﬁer-list}






Figure 7.1: Activity Diagrams Syntax - Part 1
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Edge 	 e ::= {name: Identiﬁer; (Edge)
source: Node;
target: Node;
guard: true | false}
PrNode 	 prn ::= Node | Proceed (Proceed)
Proceed 	 pr ::= {type: proceed;
incoming: Edge-uset;
outgoing: Edge-uset}






Figure 7.2: Activity Diagrams Syntax - Part 2
– Opaque action represented by action.
– Call operation action represented by call. The operation to be invoked by the
action execution is speciﬁed by the operand ﬁeld.
– Read structural feature action represented by read. The structural feature to
be read is speciﬁed by the operand ﬁeld.
– Write structural feature action represented by write. The structural feature to
be written is speciﬁed by the operand ﬁeld.
– Create object action represented by create. The object to be created is spec-
iﬁed by the operand ﬁeld.
– Destroy object action represented by destroy. The object to be destroyed is
speciﬁed by the operand ﬁeld.
• Proceed: represents a node that can be any of the previously deﬁned nodes or a
proceed node. A proceed node is a special node that is used within the around
adaptation to represent the original computation of the matched join point. A pro-
ceed node has one incoming and one outgoing edge.
• Structured Activity: represents a structured activity node, which may have in turn
its own nodes and edges. It has one incoming and one outgoing edge.
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• Proceed Structured Activity: represents a structured activity that may have pro-
ceed nodes. It has one incoming and one outgoing edge.
7.2.2 Aspect Syntax
An aspect, as depicted in Figure 7.3, includes a list of adaptations. An adaptation can be
of two kinds:
Aspect 	 s ::= Adaptation-list (Aspect)
Adaptation 	 ad ::= {kind: add; (Adaptation)
elem: Action | StrActivity;
pos: before | after;
pcd: Pcd}
| {kind: add;





Pcd 	 p ::= true (Pointcut)
| ¬p
| p ∧ p
| {kind: initial | final | flowfinal | fork| join
| decision | merge | action | call | read | write
| create | destroy | inside_activity;
name: Identifer}
Figure 7.3: Aspect Syntax
• Add adaptation: It includes the following:
– The activity element to be injected at speciﬁc locations picked out by point-
cuts. It can be either a basic element (action) or a composed element (struc-
tured activity or proceed structured activity).
– The insertion point that speciﬁes where the activity element should be in-
jected. It can have the following three values: before, after, and around.
A before- (respectively after-) position means that the new element should
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be added before (respectively after) the identiﬁed location, while an around-
position means that the existing element at the identiﬁed location should be
replaced with a new one. In the case of around, the adaptation element may
contain a proceed node that represents the computation of the matched join
point.
• Remove adaptation: It includes a pointcut that picks out the elements that should
be removed from the activity diagram.
A pointcut speciﬁes a set of join points in the activity diagram where the aspect
adaptations should be applied. We consider the following kinds of basic pointcuts: ini-
tial, final, flowfinal, fork, join, decision, merge, action, call, read, write,
create, destroy, args, and inside_activity. The pointcuts initial, final, flow-
final, fork, join, decision, merge, and action pick out the nodes initial, final,
flowfinal, fork, join, decision, merge, and action respectively. The pointcut call
picks out action nodes that perform speciﬁc operation calls. The pointcut read (respec-
tively write) picks out action nodes that read (respectively write) the values of a speciﬁc
structural feature. The pointcut create (respectively destroy) picks out action nodes
that create (respectively destroy) objects. The pointcut args picks out call actions where
the types of their input pins are instances of the speciﬁed types in the pointcut. The point-
cut inside_activity picks each join point inside a speciﬁc activity diagram. These
basic pointcuts can be combined with logical operators to produce more complex ones.
7.3 Matching and Weaving Semantics
In this section, we present the matching and the weaving semantics. The matching seman-
tics describes how to identify the join points targeted by the activity adaptations, whereas




We deﬁne the judgment A,n match pcd, which is used in the matching semantic rules,
presented in Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6, to describe that a node n belonging to the activity
A matches the pointcut pcd. A node n can be an initial node i, an activity ﬁnal node af,
a ﬂow ﬁnal node ff, a fork node f , a join node j, a decision node d, a merge node m, an
action node a, a call operation action node coa, a read structural feature action node ra,
a write structural feature action node wa, a create object action node ca, a destroy object
action node da, or either of these nodes sn. Before presenting the matching rules, we need
to explain the notation of equality of type lists presented in Figure 7.4, since it is used in
the rule Args. Two lists of types are equal if the nth item in the ﬁrst list is an instance of
the nth item in the second list.
L1 = τ1 :: L′1 L2 = τ2 :: L
′
2 τ1  τ2
L′1 ≡ L′2
L1 ≡ L2
L1 = [ ] L2 = [ ]
L1 ≡ L2
τ1 = Int τ2 = Nat
τ1  τ2
Figure 7.4: Equality of Type Lists
In the following, we explain the matching semantic rules:
Initial Describes the case where the current node is an initial node, the current point-
cut is an initial one, and the pointcut name equals the node name. In such a
case, the initial node matches the pointcut.
Final Describes the case where the current node is an activity ﬁnal node, the current
pointcut is a ﬁnal one, and the pointcut name equals the node name. In such
a case, the activity ﬁnal node matches the pointcut.
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pcd.kind = initial pcd.name = i.name
A, i match pcd (Initial)
pcd.kind = final pcd.name = af .name
A,af match pcd (Final)
pcd.kind = flowfinal pcd.name = ff .name
A, ff match pcd (FlowFinal)
pcd.kind = fork pcd.name = f .name
A, f match pcd (Fork)
pcd.kind = join pcd.name = j.name
A, j match pcd (Join)
pcd.kind = decision pcd.name = d.name
A,d match pcd (Decision)
pcd.kind = merge pcd.name = m.name
A,m match pcd (Merge)
pcd.kind = action pcd.name = a.name
A,a match pcd (Action)
pcd.kind = call pcd.name = coa.operand
A,coa match pcd (Call)
pcd.kind = read pcd.name = ra.operand
A,ra match pcd (Read)
pcd.kind = write pcd.name = wa.operand
A,wa match pcd (Write)
pcd.kind = create pcd.name = ca.operand
A,ca match pcd (Create)
pcd.kind = destroy pcd.name = da.operand
A,da match pcd (Destroy)
pcd.kind = inside_activity pcd.name =A.name
A,sn match pcd (InsideActivity)
pcd.kind = args pcd.input≡ coa.inpin
A,coa match pcd (Args)
Figure 7.5: Matching Semantics - Part 1
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A,n match pcd1 A,n match pcd2
A,n match pcd1 ∧ pcd2 (And)
A,n match pcd1
A,n match pcd1 ∨ pcd2 (Or1)
A,n match pcd2
A,n match pcd1 ∨ pcd2 (Or2)
A,n match pcd
A,n match ¬pcd (Not)
Figure 7.6: Matching Semantics - Part 2
FlowFinal Describes the case where the current node is a ﬂow ﬁnal node, the current
pointcut is a ﬂow ﬁnal one, and the pointcut name equals the node name. In
such a case, the ﬂow ﬁnal node matches the pointcut.
Fork Describes the case where the current node is a fork node, the current pointcut
is a fork one, and the pointcut name equals the node name. In such a case, the
fork node matches the pointcut.
Join Describes the case where the current node is a join node, the current pointcut
is a join one, and the pointcut name equals the node name. In such a case, the
join node matches the pointcut.
Decision Describes the case where the current node is a decision node, the current
pointcut is a decision one, and the pointcut name equals the node name. In
such a case, the decision node matches the pointcut.
Merge Describes the case where the current node is a merge node, the current point-
cut is a merge one, and the pointcut name equals the node name. In such a
case, the merge node matches the pointcut.
Action Describes the case where the current node is an action node that can be either
an opaque action, a call operation action, a read structural feature action,
a write structural feature action, a create object action, or a destroy object
action, the current pointcut is an action one, and the pointcut name equals the
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node name. In such a case, the action node matches the pointcut.
Call Describes the case where the current node is a call operation action node,
the current pointcut is a call one, the pointcut name equals the name of the
operation to be invoked. In such a case, the call operation action node matches
the pointcut.
Read Describes the case where the current node is a read structural feature action
node, the current pointcut is a read one, the pointcut name equals the name
of the structural feature to be read. In such a case, the read structural feature
action node matches the pointcut.
Write Describes the case where the current node is a write structural feature action
node, the current pointcut is a write one, the pointcut name equals the name of
the structural feature to be written. In such a case, the write structural feature
action node matches the pointcut.
Create Describes the case where the current node is a create object action node, the
current pointcut is a create one, the pointcut name equals the name of the
object to be created. In such a case, the create object action node matches the
pointcut.
Destroy Describes the case where the current node is a destroy object action node, the
current pointcut is a destroy one, the pointcut name equals the name of the
object to be destroyed. In such a case, the destroy object action node matches
the pointcut.
InsideActivity Describes the case where the current node is an sn node, i.e., initial, ﬁnal,
ﬂow ﬁnal, fork, join, decision, merge, or action node, the current pointcut is
an inside_activity one, and the pointcut name equals the name of the activity
containing the node. In such a case, the sn node matches the pointcut.
Args Describes the case where the current node is a call operation action, the cur-
rent pointcut is an args one, and the types given in the pointcut are equal to the
types given in the input pins of the action. In such a case, the call operation
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action matches the pointcut.
And, Or1, Or2, and Not Describe the cases where pointcuts are combined using logical
operators to produce more complex ones.
7.3.2 Weaving Semantics
The weaving semantics, shown in Figure 7.10, is represented by the weaving conﬁgura-
tion 〈Activity,Aspect,Node,State〉. The state State is a ﬂag that represents the stage of
the weaving process, which is either weaving or end. The ﬂag is equal to weaving when
adaptations still have to be woven, whereas it becomes end when the weaving is com-
pleted. Hence, the transformation 〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′, [ ],n′,end〉 means that the
activity diagram A′ is the result of weaving all the applicable adaptations in the adapta-
tion list s into the node n. A node whose type is proceed is denoted pr, whereas the set
{action, call, read, write, create, destroy} is called actionSet. Before presenting
the weaving rules, we need to explain the following notation:
• The axiom n deﬁnes that the node n is of type proceed or it is a structured activity




n.type = proceed_str_activity  n′ n′ ∈ n.nodes
 n
Figure 7.7: Derivation of Proceed Nodes
• The axiom  n deﬁnes that the node n is not of type proceed or it is a structured
activity node that none of its nodes is of type proceed. Derivations of no proceed
nodes are shown in Figure 7.8.
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n.type = proceed n.type = proceed_str_activity
 n
 /0
s = {n}∪ s′  n  s′
 s
n.type = proceed_str_activity  n.nodes
 n
Figure 7.8: Derivation of No Proceed Nodes
• The representation s′ = s[n1 → n2] describes that the set s′ comes out as a result
of substituting n1 by n2 wherever n1 appears in the set s, as long as the nodes in
the set s are not proceed structured activities. This is accompanied by modifying
the incoming and the outgoing edges of the node n2 together with modifying the
corresponding edges’ sources and targets. In the case that a node in the set s is a
proceed structured activity, we substitute n1 by n2 wherever n1 appears in the nodes
of this proceed structured activity. The substitution rules are shown in Figure 7.9.
n1.type = proceed_str_activity e ∈ n1.incoming e′ ∈ n1.outgoing
n′ = {n2 with incoming = e,outgoing = e′} e.target = n′ e′.source = n′
{n′}= {n1}[n1 → n2]
n.type = proceed_str_activity n = n1
{n}= {n}[n1 → n2]
s = /0
/0 = s[n1 → n2]
s = {n}∪ s′ s1 = {n}[n1 → n2] s2 = s′[n1 → n2]
s1∪ s2 = s[n1 → n2]
n.type = proceed_str_activity s = n.nodes[n1 → n2] n′ = {n with nodes = s}
{n′}= {n}[n1 → n2]
Figure 7.9: Substitution Rules
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s = ad :: s′ ad.kind = add ad.pos = before n.type = initial
A,n match ad.pcd es = n.incoming e ∈ es e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
e′ = buildEdge(ad.elem,n) n′′ = {ad.elem with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′}
n′ = {n with incoming = (es\{e})∪{e′}} no =A.nodes ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′,n′′},edges = (ed\{e})∪{e′,e′′}}
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′,s′,n′,weaving〉
(Before)
s = ad :: s′ ad.kind = add ad.pos = after n.type = final
n.type = flowfinal A,n match ad.pcd os = n.outgoing e ∈ os
next = e.target e′ = buildEdge(ad.elem,next) e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
n′ = {ad.elem with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′} es = next.incoming
n′′ = {next with incoming = (es\{e})∪{e′} no =A.nodes ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{next})∪{n′,n′′},edges = (ed\{e})∪{e′,e′′}}
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′,s′,n,weaving〉
(After)
s = ad :: s′ ad.kind = add ad.pos = around  ad.elem
n.type ∈ actionSet A,n match ad.pcd e ∈ n.incoming e′ ∈ n.outgoing
e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem} e′′′ = {e′ with source = ad.elem}
{n′′}= {ad.elem}[pr → n] n′ = {n′′ with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′′′}
no =A.nodes ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′},edges = (ed\{e,e′})∪{e′′,e′′′}}
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′,s′,n′,weaving〉
(AroundWProceed)
s = ad :: s′ ad.kind = add ad.pos = around  ad.elem
n.type ∈ actionSet A,n match ad.pcd {n′}= {n}[n→ ad.elem]
no =A.nodes A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′}}
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′,s′,n′,weaving〉
(AroundWoutProceed)
s = ad :: s′ ad.kind = remove n.type ∈ actionSet
A,n match ad.pcd e ∈ n.incoming e′ ∈ n.outgoing
next = e′.target e′′ = {e with target = next} es = next.incoming
n′ = {next with incoming = (es\{e′})∪{e′′} no =A.nodes ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n,next})∪{n′},edges = (ed\{e,e′})∪{e′′}}
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′,s′,next,weaving〉
(Remove)
s = ad :: s′ A,n match ¬ ad.pcd
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A,s′,n,weaving〉 (NoMatch)
s = [ ]
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A, [ ],n,end〉 (End)
Figure 7.10: Weaving Semantics
In the following, we explain the weaving semantic rules:
Before Describes the case where an add before adaptation matches a speciﬁc node.
This adaptation can be applied before this matched node unless it is an initial
node since this node starts the activity execution. The activity element of the
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adaptation is inserted before the matched node.
After Describes the case where an add after adaptation matches a speciﬁc node.
This adaptation can be applied after this matched node unless it is a ﬁnal
node or a ﬂow ﬁnal node since those nodes terminate the activity execution.
The activity element of the adaptation is inserted after the matched node.
AroundWProceed Describes the case where an add around adaptation matches an action
node. Additionally, the adaptation element is a structured activity having, at
least, one proceed node. The activity element of the adaptation replaces the
matched node. Moreover, every occurrence of a proceed node in the nodes
of the adaptation element is replaced by the corresponding matched node.
AroundWoutProceed Describes the case where an add around adaptation matches an
action node. Additionally, the adaptation element is an action node or a struc-
tured activity that none of its nodes is a proceed one. The activity element
of the adaptation replaces the matched node.
Remove Describes the case where a remove adaptation matches a speciﬁc node. This
adaptation can be applied just on matched action nodes. The matched node is
deleted from the activity diagram.
NoMatch Describes the case where the current adaptation pointcut does not match a
node n. In this case, the activity diagram remains the same and the weaving
process continues with the rest of the adaptations.
End Describes the case where there are no more adaptations to apply on the ac-
tivity diagram. In this case, the activity diagram remains the same and the
weaving process terminates.
7.4 Completeness and Correctness of the Weaving
In this section, we address the correctness and the completeness of the weaving in UML
activity diagrams. We ﬁrst present the algorithms that implement the matching and the
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weaving semantics reported in the rules in Figure 7.5, Figure 7.6, and Figure 7.10. Then,
we prove the correctness and the completeness of the matching and the weaving algo-
rithms with respect to the semantics rules. By correctness (or soundness), we mean
the output of the matching/weaving algorithm is predicted by its corresponding semantic
rules. By completeness, we mean the behavior, derived from a semantic rule, corresponds
to a particular execution of the corresponding algorithm.
7.4.1 Algorithms
In this sub-section, we present algorithms that implement the matching and the weaving
processes. We have four algorithms: containProceed in Figure 7.11, substitute in Figure
7.12, M in Figure 7.13, and W in Figure 7.14 and Figure 7.15. In the algorithms M and
W , actionSet is the set {action, call, read, write, create, destroy}. The algorithm
containProceed takes a node n as input. It returns true if the node n is of type proceed
or if it is a structured activity node that at least one of its nodes is of type proceed.
containProceed(n) = case n.type of
proceed ⇒ true
proceed_str_activity ⇒ containProceed(n′) and n′ ∈ n.nodes
otherwise ⇒ false
Figure 7.11: Proceed Algorithm
The algorithm substitute takes three arguments: a set s and two nodes n1 and n2.
It returns a set that comes out as a result of substituting n1 by n2 wherever n1 appears in
the set s as long as the nodes in the set s are not proceed structured activities. This is
accompanied by modifying the incoming and the outgoing edges of the node n2 together
with modifying the corresponding edges’ sources and targets. In the case that a node in
the set s is a proceed structured activity, we substitute n1 by n2 wherever n1 appears in
the nodes of this proceed structured activity.
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substitute(s,n1,n2) = case s of
/0 ⇒ /0
{n} ⇒ if n.type = proceed_str_activity and n = n1 then {n} else
if n.type = proceed_str_activity and e ∈ n.incoming and e′ ∈ n.outgoing
then





if n.type = proceed_str_activity then
let s = substitute(n.nodes,n1,n2)
n′ = {n with nodes = s}
in {n′}
{n}∪ s′ ⇒ let s1 = substitute({n},n1,n2)
s2 = substitute(s′,n1,n2)
in s1∪ s2
Figure 7.12: Substitute Algorithm
The matching algorithm M takes three arguments: A set of activity diagrams AS ,
a node n, and a pointcut pcd. It returns true if the node n in the activity diagram A,
which belongs to the set AS , matches the pointcut pcd, and returns false otherwise.
M(AS,n, pcd) = if A ∈AS and n ∈ A.nodes then case pcd.kind of
inside_activity ⇒ if n.type ∈ {initial,final,flowfinal,fork,join,
decision,merge,action,call,read,write,create,
destroy} then pcd.name =A.name
initial|final|
flowfinal|fork|
join|decision|merge ⇒ if n.type = pcd.kind then n.name = pcd.name
action ⇒ if n.type ∈ actionSet then pcd.name = n.name
call|read|write|
create|destroy ⇒ if n.type = pcd.kind then pcd.name = n.operand
args ⇒ if n.type = call then
let rec eq pcd.input n.inpin= match pcd.input n.inpin with
τ1 :: l′1,τ2 :: l
′
2 →






| [ ], [ ]→ true
Figure 7.13: Matching Algorithm
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The weaving algorithm W takes three arguments: An activity diagram A, an adap-
tation list s, and a node n. The outcome of the weaving algorithm is an activity diagram
A′ that represents the woven diagram. The function buildEdge, used in the weaving al-
gorithm, takes two nodes, as inputs, and returns an edge between these two nodes as
follows:
buildEdge : Node × Node→ Edge
buildEdge(s, t) = e where (e.source = s)∧ (e.target = t)
W(A,s,n) = case s of
ad :: s′ ⇒ if M({A},n,ad.pcd) then
case ad.kind of
add⇒ case ad.pos of
before⇒ if n.type = initial then
let es = n.incoming
e ∈ es
e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
e′ = buildEdge(ad.elem,n)
n′′ = {ad.elem with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′}
n′ = {n with incoming = (es\{e})∪{e′}}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′,n′′},
edges = (ed\{e})∪{e′,e′′}}
in W(A′,s′,n′)
after ⇒ if n.type = final and n.type = flowfinal then




e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
n′ = {ad.elem with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′}
es = next.incoming
n′′ = {next with incoming = (es\{e})∪{e′}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{next})∪{n′,n′′},
edges = (ed\{e})∪{e′,e′′}}
in W(A′,s′,n)
Figure 7.14: Weaving Algorithm - Part 1
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around⇒ if n.type ∈ actionSet and containProceed(ad.elem) then
let e ∈ n.incoming
e′ ∈ n.outgoing
e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
e′′′ = {e′ with source = ad.elem}
{n′′}= substitute({ad.elem}, pr,n)
n′ = {n′′ with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′′′}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges




if n.type ∈ actionSet and ¬containProceed(ad.elem) then
let {n′}= substitute({n},n,ad.elem)
no =A.nodes
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′}}
in W(A′,s′,n′)
remove⇒ if n.type ∈ actionSet then
let e ∈ n.incoming
e′ ∈ n.outgoing
next = e′.target
e′′ = {e with target = next}
es = next.incoming
n′ = {next with incoming = (es\{e′})∪{e′′}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n,next})∪{n′},edges = (ed\{e,e′})∪{e′′}}
in W(A′,s′,next)
else W(A,s′,n)
[ ] ⇒ A
Figure 7.15: Weaving Algorithm - Part 2
7.4.2 Completeness and Correctness
In this sub-section, we state and prove results that establish the soundness and the com-
pleteness of the algorithms containProceed in Figure 7.11, substitute in Figure 7.12, M
in Figure 7.13, and W in Figure 7.14 and Figure 7.15 with respect to the semantics re-
ported in Figure 7.7, Figure 7.9, Figure 7.5, Figure 7.6, and Figure 7.10 respectively.
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The following lemma states the soundness of the algorithm containProceed.
Lemma 7.4.1. (Soundness of containProceed). Given a node n. If containProceed then
 n.
The following lemma states the completeness of the algorithm containProceed.
Lemma 7.4.2. (Completeness of containProceed). Given a node n. If  n then contain-
Proceed .
The proofs of Lemma 7.4.1 and Lemma 7.4.2 are straightforward since the algorithm con-
tainProceed results from the rules presented in Figure 7.7.
The following lemma states the soundness of the algorithm substitute.
Lemma 7.4.3. (Soundness of substitute). Given a set s and two nodes n1 and n2. If
substitute(s,n1,n2) = s′ then s′ = s[n1 → n2].
The following lemma states the completeness of the algorithm substitute.
Lemma 7.4.4. (Completness of substitute). Given a set s and two nodes n1 and n2. If
s′ = s[n1 → n2] then substitute(s,n1,n2) = s′.
The proofs of Lemma 7.4.3 and Lemma 7.4.4 are straightforward since the algorithm sub-
stitute results from the rules presented in Figure 7.9.
The following lemma states the soundness of the matching algorithm M.
Lemma 7.4.5. (Soundness of M). Given a set of activity diagrams AS , an activity node
n, and a pointcut pcd. IfM(AS,n, pcd) whereA∈AS and n∈A.nodes thenA,nmatch
pcd.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 7.4.5 is straightforward by case analysis. Let us take as
example the following cases:
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• Case (initial):




Since n.type = initial then n is an initial node i.
By the rule (Initial) of the matching rules presented in Figure 7.5, we conclude:
A, i match pcd
• Case (call):




Since n.type = call then n is a call operation action node (coa).
By the rule (Call) of the matching rules presented in Figure 7.5, we conclude:
A,coa match pcd
• Case (read):




Since n.type = read then n is a read structural feature action node (ra).
By the rule (Read) of the matching rules presented in Figure 7.5, we conclude:
A,ra match pcd
• Case (Write):





Since n.type = write then n is a write structural feature action node (wa).
By the rule (Write) of the matching rules presented in Figure 7.5, we conclude:
A,wa match pcd
• Case (inside_activity):




Since n.type = action then n is a simple node (sn).
By the rule (InsideActivity) of the matching rules presented in Figure 7.5, we con-
clude:
A,sn match pcd
The following lemma states the completeness of the matching algorithm M.
Lemma 7.4.6. (Completeness of M). Given a set of activity diagrams AS , an activity
diagram A where A ∈AS , an activity node n where n ∈ A.nodes, and a pointcut pcd. If
A,n match pcd then M(AS,n, pcd).
Proof. The proof of Lemma 7.4.6 is straightforward by propagating the matching rules
presented in Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 from conclusion to premises. Let us take as exam-
ple the following case:
• Case (initial):




Since n is an initial node i, then n.type = initial.
Since A ∈AS and n ∈ A.nodes, by the algorithm M presented in Figure 7.13, we
conclude:
M(AS,n, pcd)
The following theorem states the soundness of the weaving algorithm W .
Theorem 7.4.1. (Soundness of W). Given an activity diagram A, an adaptation list s,
and a node n. If W(A,s,n)=A′′ then 〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉.
Proof. The proof is done by induction over the length of s.
1. Induction basis (s = [ ]):
By the algorithm W , we have:
W(A, [ ],n)=A
From the algorithm W , we conclude that s = [ ].
From the rule (End) of the semantic weaving rules presented in Figure 7.10, we
conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A, [ ],n,end〉
2. Induction step:
We assume as induction hypothesis:
If W(A,s′,n)=A′′ then 〈A,s′,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉.
Now, let us consider (s = ad :: s′). Since ad.kind can be:
• Case (add):
Since ad.pos can be:
– Subcase (before):








e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
e′ = buildEdge(ad.elem,n)
n′′ = {ad.elem with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′}
n′ = {n with incoming = (es\{e})∪{e′}}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′,n′′},
edges = (ed\{e})∪{e′,e′′}}
By the soundness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
A,n match ad.pcd
From the rule (Before) of the semantic weaving rules presented in Figure
7.10, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′,s′,n′,weaving〉
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
〈A′,s′,n′,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
By the transitivity of ↪→, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
– Subcase (after):











e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
n′ = {ad.elem with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′}
es = next.incoming
n′′ = {next with incoming = (es\{e})∪{e′}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{next})∪{n′,n′′},
edges = (ed\{e})∪{e′,e′′}}
By the soundness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
A,n match ad.pcd
From the rule (After) of the semantic weaving rules presented in Figure
7.10, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′,s′,n,weaving〉
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
〈A′,s′,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
By the transitivity of ↪→, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
– Subcase (around with proceed):









e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
e′′′ = {e′ with source = ad.elem}
{n′′}= substitute({ad.elem}, pr,n)
n′ = {n′′ with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′′′}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′},
edges = (ed\{e,e′})∪{e′′,e′′′}}
By the soundness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
A,n match ad.pcd
By the soundness of the algorithm containProceed, we conclude:
 ad.elem
By the soundness of the algorithm substitute, we conclude:
{n′′}= {ad.elem}[pr → n]
From the rule (AroundWProceed) of the semantic weaving rules pre-
sented in Figure 7.10, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′,s′,n′,weaving〉
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
〈A′,s′,n′,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
By the transitivity of ↪→, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
– Subcase (around without proceed):








A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′}}
By the soundness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
A,n match ad.pcd
By the soundness of the algorithm containProceed and the rules presented
in Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8, we conclude:
 ad.elem
By the soundness of the algorithm substitute, we conclude:
{n′}= {n}[n → ad.elem]
From the rule (AroundWoutProceed) of the semantic weaving rules pre-
sented in Figure 7.10, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′,s′,n′,weaving〉
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
〈A′,s′,n′,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
By the transitivity of ↪→, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
• Case (remove):








e′′ = {e with target = next}
es = next.incoming
n′ = {next with incoming = (es\{e′})∪{e′′}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n,next})∪{n′},edges = (ed\{e,e′})∪{e′′}}
By the soundness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
A,n match ad.pcd
From the rule (Remove) of the semantic weaving rules presented in Figure
7.10, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′,s′,next,weaving〉
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
〈A′,s′,next,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
By the transitivity of ↪→, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
• Case (no match):
By the soundness and the completeness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
A,n match ¬ ad.pcd
From the rule (NoMatch) of the semantic weaving rules presented in Figure
7.10, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A,s′,n,weaving〉
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
〈A,s′,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
By the transitivity of ↪→, we conclude:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉
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The following theorem states the completeness of the weaving algorithm W .
Theorem 7.4.2. (Completeness of W). Given an activity diagram A, an adaptation list
s, and a node n.
If 〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉 then W(A,s,n)=A′′.
Proof. The proof is done by induction over the length of s.
1. Induction basis (s = [ ]):
By the rule (End) of the semantic weaving rules presented in Figure 7.10, we have:
〈A,s,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A, [ ],n,end〉
From the rule (End) of the semantic weaving rules presented in Figure 7.10, we
conclude that s = [ ].
From the algorithm W , we conclude:
W(A, [ ],n)=A.
2. Induction step:
We assume as induction hypothesis:
If 〈A,s′,n,weaving〉 ↪→ 〈A′′, [ ],n′′,end〉 then W(A,s′,n)=A′′.
Now, let us consider (s = ad :: s′). Since ad.kind can be:
• Case (add):
Since ad.pos can be:
– Subcase (before):









e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
e′ = buildEdge(ad.elem,n)
n′′ = {ad.elem with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′}
n′ = {n with incoming = (es\{e})∪{e′}}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′,n′′},
edges = (ed\{e})∪{e′,e′′}}
By the completeness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
M({A},n,ad.pcd)
From the algorithm W , we conclude:
W(A,s,n)=W(A′,s′,n′)
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
W(A′,s′,n′) =A′′
– Subcase (after):











e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
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n′ = {ad.elem with incoming = e′′,outgoing = e′}
es = next.incoming
n′′ = {next with incoming = (es\{e})∪{e′}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{next})∪{n′,n′′},
edges = (ed\{e})∪{e′,e′′}}
By the completeness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
M({A},n,ad.pcd)
From the algorithm W , we conclude:
W(A,s,n)=W(A′,s′,n)
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
W(A′,s′,n) =A′′
– Subcase (around with proceed):
From the rule (AroundWProceed) of the semantic weaving rules presented








e′′ = {e with target = ad.elem}
e′′′ = {e′ with source = ad.elem}
{n′′}= {ad.elem}[pr → n]




A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′},
edges = (ed\{e,e′})∪{e′′,e′′′}}
By the completeness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
M({A},n,ad.pcd)
By the completeness of the algorithm containProceed, we conclude:
containProceed(ad.elem)
By the completeness of the algorithm substitute, we conclude:
{n′′}= substitute({ad.elem}, pr,n)
From the algorithm W , we conclude:
W(A,s,n)=W(A′,s′,n′)
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
W(A′,s′,n′) =A′′
– Subcase (around without proceed):
From the rule (AroundWouProceed) of the semantic weaving rules pre-






{n′}= {n}[n → ad.elem]
no =A.nodes
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n})∪{n′}}
By the completeness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
M({A},n,ad.pcd)
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By the completeness of the algorithm containProceed, we conclude:
¬containProceed(ad.elem)
By the completeness of the algorithm substitute, we conclude:
{n′}= substitute({n},n,ad.elem)
From the algorithm W , we conclude:
W(A,s,n)=W(A′,s′,n′)
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
W(A′,s′,n′) =A′′
• Case (remove):








e′′ = {e with target = next}
es = next.incoming
n′ = {next with incoming = (es\{e′})∪{e′′}
no =A.nodes
ed =A.edges
A′ = {A with nodes = (no\{n,next})∪{n′},
edges = (ed\{e,e′})∪{e′′}}
By the completeness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
M({A},n,ad.pcd)
From the algorithm W , we conclude:
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W(A,s,n)=W(A′,s′,next)
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
W(A′,s′,next) =A′′
• Case (no match):
From the the rule (NoMatch) of the semantic weaving rules presented in Figure
7.10, we conclude:
A,n match ¬ ad.pcd
By the soundness and the completeness of the algorithm M, we conclude:
notM({A},n,ad.pcd)
From the algorithm W , we conclude:
W(A,s,n)=W(A,s′,n)
By the hypothesis, we conclude:
W(A,s′,n)=A′′
7.5 Conclusion
We have presented in this chapter our contribution towards ascribing a formal seman-
tics for the proposed weaving framework. We have focused on UML activity diagrams
since they offer a rich join point model that includes various kinds of actions and control
nodes. However, a formal semantics for matching and weaving for the other diagrams,
i.e., class diagrams, state machine diagrams, and sequence diagrams, can be provided in
the same vein as for activity diagrams. In this respect, a syntax of activity diagrams to-
gether with their corresponding adaptations has been deﬁned to express the matching and
the weaving semantics. Then, we have elaborated formal speciﬁcations for the matching
and the weaving processes. We have addressed all kinds of adaptations that are supported
in our framework, namely, add before/after/around (with and without proceed), and re-
move adaptations. Afterwards, we have provided algorithms that implement the matching
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and the weaving processes and proved the correctness and the completeness of these al-
gorithms with respect to the deﬁned semantics. It is important to mention here that our
implementation of the weaving rules, presented in Chapter 5, is derived from these se-
mantic descriptions. This work on formalizing the matching and the weaving processes
in UML activity diagrams constitutes a ﬁrst contribution towards elaborating robust the-
oretical foundations for AOM. In the next chapters, we will extend this framework with




Dynamic Matching and Weaving
Semantics in λ -Calculus
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 7, we have presented a formal semantics for aspect matching and weaving
in UML activity diagrams. To get the full advantages of our AOM framework for secu-
rity hardening, we have decided to enrich it with more security-related pointcuts together
with their semantic foundations. An example of such pointcuts is the dataﬂow pointcut
(dflow) [109]. This pointcut analyzes information ﬂow in a system to detect input vali-
dation vulnerabilities, such as SQL injection and Cross-site Scripting (XSS) [72]. These
vulnerabilities, if exploited by attackers, may lead to serious security problems, such as
breaking the conﬁdentiality and the integrity of sensitive information.
In order to match this kind of pointcut, UML models should be detailed enough
to include behaviors that manipulate variables and their data values that are useful to be
analyzed in terms of dataﬂow. In addition, runtime values should be available at the time
of matching in order to track dependencies between these values. To this end, we extend
our semantic framework to support executable UML (xUML) [113] speciﬁcations and
capture the semantics of matching and weaving dynamically during the execution of the
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models. For clarity and to facilitate the understanding of the semantics, we proceed in
two steps: First, we elaborate the dynamic semantics for matching and weaving on λ -
calculus [46], since it serves as a base for many programming languages and contains
constructs that are similar to the ones of action languages. In addition, it offers a powerful
mathematical tool based on solid theoretical foundations. Afterwards, in Chapter 9, we
present the dynamic semantics for matching and weaving on xUML models.
Various research proposals have investigated formal semantics of aspect-oriented
languages [25, 41, 49, 54, 63, 74, 90, 108, 111, 167, 168]. However, the proposed semantic
models mainly deﬁne join points in an intuitive and ad-hoc manner. In many cases, aux-
iliary structures need to be maintained for representing join points and executing pieces
of advice. As a result, the semantics for the matching and the weaving processes become
difﬁcult to express, especially in the case of complex pointcut primitives. Accordingly,
there is a desideratum to put more emphasis on the theoretical foundations that capture the
deﬁnitions of aspect-oriented mechanisms in a precise and rigorous way. Such theoretical
foundations can serve both as a reference for an implementation and as a foundation to
establish theoretical properties and mathematical proofs.
The goal of this chapter is to provide a formal semantics for aspect matching and
weaving based on Continuation-Passing Style (CPS) [159]. As a ﬁrst step, we consider
a core language based on λ -calculus. More precisely, we perform advice matching and
weaving during the evaluation of λ -expressions. We choose CPS as the basis of our
semantics because, as previously demonstrated in [61], modeling aspect-oriented con-
structs, i.e., join points, pointcuts, and pieces of advice, in a frame-based continuation-
passing style provides a concise, accurate, and elegant description of these mechanisms.
Indeed, in CPS join points arise naturally as continuation frames during the evaluation
of the language expressions. In this setting, pointcuts are expressions that designate a
set of continuation frames. An advice speciﬁes actions to be performed when continua-
tion frames satisfying a particular pointcut are activated. In addition, by modeling join
points as continuation frames, matching and weaving can be described in a simpliﬁed and
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uniﬁed way for different kinds of primitives. Furthermore, CPS simpliﬁes matching ﬂow-
based pointcuts (e.g., cflow [96] and dflow [109] pointcuts), that are usually complex to
express and require additional structures to maintain the order of join points.
We start by formalizing matching and weaving semantics for basic pointcuts, such
as get, set, call, and exec pointcuts. These pointcuts are useful for injecting security
at speciﬁc points, such as, adding authorization before calling a sensitive method, adding
encryption before sending a secret message and decryption after receiving the message,
etc. In addition, we extend our semantic framework with ﬂow-based pointcuts, namely,
cflow and dflow pointcuts. These pointcuts are important from a security perspective
since they can detect and ﬁx a considerable number of vulnerabilities related to informa-
tion ﬂow, such as Cross-site Scripting (XSS) and SQL injection attacks [72].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We start in Section 8.2 by
presenting the necessary background needed to understand the semantics. Section 8.3
presents the syntax of a core language based on λ -calculus and its denotational semantics.
We transform the semantics into a frame-based CPS style in Section 8.4. Section 8.5
explores the semantics for matching and weaving based on CPS. In Section 8.6, we extend
our work by considering ﬂow-based pointcuts and present an example to illustrate the
proposed framework. We discuss related work in Section 8.7. Finally, concluding remarks
are presented in Section 8.8.
8.2 Background
This section provides the background knowledge that is needed to understand the seman-
tics presented in this chapter. We start by an overview of λ -calculus, more speciﬁcally, the
untyped λ -calculus since it is the language targeted in this chapter. Then, we introduce




λ -calculus is a theory of functions introduced by Alonzo Church in the 1930s as a foun-
dation for functional computing [46]. It provides a simple notation for deﬁning functions.
The notation consists of a set of λ -expressions, each of which denotes a function. A key
characteristic of λ -calculus is that functions are values, just like booleans and integers.
In other words, functions in λ -calculus can be passed as arguments to other functions or
returned as values from other functions. In the following, we provide details about the
syntax and the semantics of λ -expressions based on the work done in [81].
Syntax
The pure λ -calculus contains three kinds of λ -expressions, as shown in Figure 8.1:
1. Variables: represented by x, y, z, etc.
2. Function abstractions (or function deﬁnitions): represented by the expression λx. e,
where x is a variable that represents the argument and e is a λ -expression that rep-
resents the body of the function. For example, the expression λx. square x is a
function abstraction that takes a variable x and returns the square of x.
3. Function applications: represented by the expression e e′, where e and e′ are λ -
expressions. The expression e should evaluate to a function that is then applied to
the expression e′. For example, the expression (λx. square x) 3 evaluates, intu-
itively, to 9, which is the result of applying the squaring function to 3.
e ::= x variable
| λx. e abstraction
| e e′ application
Figure 8.1: Syntax of λ -Calculus
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Free and Bound Variables
An occurrence of a variable in a λ -expression is either bound or free. An occurrence of a
variable x in a λ -expression is bound if there is an enclosing λx. e, otherwise, it is free.
Example: Let us consider the following λ -expression:
e = λx. (x (λy. y z) x) y
In this expression:
• Both occurrences of the variable x are bound since they are within the scope of λx.
• The ﬁrst occurrence of the variable y is bound since it is within the scope of λy.
• The last occurrence of the variable y is free since it is outside the scope of λy.
• The variable z is free since there is no enclosing λ z.
Semantics of λ -Expressions
The meaning of a λ -expression is obtained after all its function applications are carried
out. The process of evaluating a λ -expression is called conversion (or reduction). There
are three kinds of λ -conversion: α-conversion, β -conversion, and η-conversion. In the
following, we provide a brief description of them. The notation e[e′/x] used hereafter
means substituting e′ for each free occurrence of x in e. The substitution is called valid if
no free variable in e′ becomes bound after the substitution.
α-conversion
It deals with the manipulation of bound variables by allowing their names to be changed.
More precisely, it states that any abstraction λx. e can be converted to λy. e[y/x] provided
that the substitution of y for x in e is valid. For example, the expression λx. x can be α-
converted to λy. y. However, the expression λx. λy. x cannot be α-converted to λy. λy. y




It is the most important conversion in evaluating λ -expressions. It states that any appli-
cation (λx. e1) e2 can be converted to e1[e2/x] provided that the substitution of e2 for x
in e1 is valid. This conversion is similar to the evaluation of a function call, i.e., the body
e1 of the function λx. e1 is evaluated in an environment, in which the formal parameter x
is bound to the actual parameter e2. For example, the expression (λx. (λy. x)) 2 can be
β -converted to λy. 2. However, the expression (λx. (λy. x)) y cannot be β -converted to
λy. y because the substitution (λy. x)[y/x] is not valid since y that substitutes x becomes
bound in λy. y.
There are different ways by which a β -reduction can be performed. For example, the
expression (λx. square x) ((λy. y) 3) may be β -reduced to either (λx. square x) 3 or
square ((λy. y) 3). The order in which β -reductions are performed results in different
semantics, such as, call-by-value and call-by-name semantics:
• Call-by-value: ensures that functions are only called on values, i.e., given an ap-
plication (λx. e) e′, call-by-value semantics makes sure that e′ is ﬁrst reduced to a
value before applying the function.
• Call-by-name: applies the function as soon as possible, i.e., given an application
(λx. e) e′, call-by-name semantics does not need to ensure that e′ is a value before
applying the function.
η-conversion
It expresses the property that two functions are equal if they always give the same results
when applied to the same arguments. More precisely, it states that an abstraction λx. (e x)
can be converted to e provided that x is not free in e. As we have seen, the function
λx. (e x) when applied to an argument e′ returns (e x)[e′/x]. If x is not free in e then
(e x)[e′/x] = e e′. Thus λx. (e x) and e denote the same function since both return the same
result, namely e e′, when applied to the same argument e′. For example, the expression
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λy. (f x y) can be η-converted to f x. However, the expression λx. (f x x) cannot be
converted to f x because x is free in f x.
8.2.2 Denotational Semantics
Denotational semantics is an approach proposed by Christopher Strachey and Dana Scott
in the late 1960s to provide a formal semantics of programming languages [153]. Con-
cisely, it gives programs a meaning (or denotation) by mapping the syntactic constructs of
a language to mathematical objects [153]. The important characteristic of this approach
is that it is generally compositional, i.e., the denotation of a program is built out of the
denotations of its sub-expressions. Denotational semantics is mostly used to illustrate the
essence of a language feature, without specifying how these features are actually real-
ized. Hence, the semantics is abstract and does not provide full implementation details.
In this semantics, each syntactic construct is mapped directly into its meaning by deﬁning
a semantic function [[ _ ]] and a semantic domain D, such that every syntactic construct is
mapped by [[ _ ]] to elements of D, which are abstract values such as integers, booleans,
tuples of values, and functions [114]. Therefore, for each syntactic construct, a semantic
equation is deﬁned to describe how the semantic function acts on the construct.
In denotational semantics, the context in which expressions are evaluated is called
an environment. The latter maps variables to values. Given two sets A and B, we will write
A→m B to denote the set of all mappings from A to B. A mapping m ∈ A→m B could be
deﬁned by extension as [a1 → b1, ...,an → bn] to denote the association of the elements bi’s
to ai’s. Given two mappings m and m′, we will write m†m′ to denote the overwriting of the
mapping m by the associations of the mapping m′. Figure 8.2 presents the denotational
semantics of the λ -expressions presented in Figure 8.1. Given an expression e and an
environment ε , the semantic function [[ _ ]] yields the computed value v. In the case of:
• Variables: The denotation (computed value) is the value that the variable is bound
to in the environment.
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• Function abstractions: The denotation is a closure 〈x,e,ε ′〉 capturing the function
parameter x, the function body e, and the evaluation environment ε ′, which maps
each free variable of e into its value at the time of the declaration of the function.
• Function applications: The denotation is computed in three steps: (1) The expres-
sion e′, which is the argument, is evaluated to a value v, (2) the expression e, which
is an abstraction, is evaluated to a closure 〈x,e′′,ε ′〉, (3) the expression e′′ is evalu-
ated in the environment ε ′ where the variable x is bound to the value v.
[[ x ]]ε = ε(x)
[[ λx. e ]]ε = 〈x,e,ε ′〉
[[ e e′ ]]ε = let v = [[ e′ ]]ε in
let 〈x,e′′,ε ′〉 = [[ e ]]ε in
[[ e′′ ]]ε ′ † [x → v]
end
end
Figure 8.2: Denotational Semantics of λ -Calculus
8.2.3 Continuation-Passing Style
Continuation-Passing Style (CPS) is a style of programming, in which every aspect of
control ﬂow and data ﬂow is passed explicitly in the form of a continuation [159]. Con-
tinuations were ﬁrst discovered in 1964 by Van Wijngaarden [148]. Later in the 1970s,
many researchers [102,147,160] have applied them in a wide variety of settings [148]. In
the following, we start by explaining the concept of a continuation then we provide the
main steps of a CPS transformation.
Continuations
A continuation is a function that describes the semantics of the rest of a computation.
Instead of returning a value, as in the familiar direct style, a function in CPS style takes
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another function as an additional argument, to which it will pass the current computa-
tional result. This additional function argument is the continuation. To better illustrate
the idea of continuations, let us consider the example presented in Figure 8.3, which is
taken from [29].
let prodprimes n =
if (n = 1) then 1
else if (isprime(n)) then n∗prodprimes(n−1)
else prodprimes(n−1)
Figure 8.3: Example of an OCaml Function in Direct Style
The function prodprimes computes the product of all prime numbers that are less
than or equal to a given number n. There are several points in the control ﬂow of this
program where control is returned. For example, the call to the function isprime returns
to a point κ1 with a boolean value b. The ﬁrst call to the function prodprimes (in the
then clause of the second if) returns to a point κ2 with an integer i, and the second call to
prodprimes returns to a point κ3 with an integer j. Similarly, the call to the main function
prodprimes returns to a point κ with a result r.
These return points represent continuations that express “what to do next”. In addi-
tion, each of these points can be considered as an additional argument to the corresponding
function. When the function call terminates, this additional argument will tell us where
to continue the computation. For example, the function prodprimes can be given as addi-
tional argument the return point (the continuation) κ , and when it has computed its result
r, it will continue by applying κ to r. Similarly, the function isprime can be given as addi-
tional argument the return point κ1, and when it has computed its result b, it will continue
by applying κ1 to b. The same treatment can be done to the other function calls. Figure
8.4 shows another version of the example presented above using continuations. Notice
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that all the return points mentioned above, κ , κ1, κ2, and κ3 are continuation functions.
Thus, as we can see, returning from a function in CPS style is just like a function call.
let prodprimes n κ =
if (n = 1) then κ (1)
else let κ1 b =
if (b) then
let κ2 i = κ(n∗ i) in prodprimes(n−1,κ2) end
else




Figure 8.4: Example of an Ocaml Function in CPS Style
CPS Transformation
Given a λ -expression e, it is possible to translate it into CPS. This translation is known
as CPS conversion. In the following, we provide the main steps of this conversion. An
expression e is in a tail position if it is a sub-expression of an expression e′ and when it is
evaluated, it will be returned as the result of the evaluation of e′. The keyword return is
used hereafter just to indicate that e is in a tail position.
1. Each function deﬁnition should be augmented with an additional argument; the
continuation function to which it will pass the current computational result.
let f args = e ⇒ let f args κ = e
2. A variable or a constant in a tail position should be passed as an argument to the
continuation function instead of being returned.
return e ⇒ κ e
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3. Each function call in a tail position should be augmented with the current contin-
uation. This is because in CPS, each function passes the result forward instead of
returning it.
return f args ⇒ f args κ
4. Each function call that is not in a tail position needs to be converted into a new
continuation, containing the old continuation and the rest of the computation. Here,
op represents a primitive operation, which could include an application.
op (f args) ⇒ f args (λ r. κ op r)
8.2.4 Defunctionalization
Defunctionalization is a technique by which higher-order programs, i.e., programs where
functions can represent values, are transformed into semantically equivalent ﬁrst-order
programs [147]. In a defunctionalized program, a ﬁrst-class function is represented with
a constructor, holding the values of the free variables of a function abstraction, and it is
eliminated with a case expression dispatching over the corresponding constructors [56].
More precisely, the defunctionalization process consists of two main steps:
1. Transform each function abstraction into a data structure holding the free variables
of the function abstraction and replace all function abstractions with their corre-
sponding data structures.
2. Deﬁne a second-class apply function that takes a data structure, which represent the
original function, and a value as its arguments. Basically, the apply function is a
collection of the bodies of all original functions with a case expression dispatching
over the corresponding data structures. Afterwards, replace all function applications
with a call to the apply function.
Therefore, the result of the transformation is a program that contains only ﬁrst-
order functions. However, the original higher-order structure is implicit in the program.
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For a better understanding of the defunctionalization process, let us consider the example,
shown in Figure 8.5, which was initially provided in [56]. The function aux takes a ﬁrst-
class function f as an argument, applies it to 1 and 10, and outputs the summation of the
two applications. The function main calls aux twice and outputs the multiplication of the
results.
aux : (Int→ Int)→ Int
main : Int× Int×Bool→ Int
let aux f = f 1 + f 10
let main x y b = aux(λ z. z+ x) ∗ aux(λ z. if (b) then y+ z else y− z)
Figure 8.5: Example of a Higher-Order Program
There are two function abstractions in the main function. To defunctionalize the
program, we should deﬁne data structures for these function abstractions and their cor-
responding apply function. The ﬁrst function abstraction (λ z. z+ x) contains one free
variable (x, of type integer), and therefore the ﬁrst data structure requires an integer. The
second function abstraction (λ z. if (b) then y+z else y−z) contains two free variables (y,
of type integer, and b, of type boolean), and therefore the second data structure requires
an integer and a boolean. The newly deﬁned data structures are shown in Figure 8.6 and
their corresponding apply function is presented in Figure 8.7.
type Lam = Lam1 | Lam2
type Lam1 = {id : Int}
type Lam2 = {id : Int; cond : Bool}
Figure 8.6: New Data Structures
Lastly, we rewrite the program by replacing the function abstractions with their cor-
responding data structures and their applications with the newly deﬁned apply function.
The defunctionalized program is presented in Figure 8.8.
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apply : Lam× Int→ Int
let apply l z = match l with
Lam1 l ⇒ z+ l.id
| Lam2 l ⇒ if (l.cond) then l.id+ z else l.id− z
Figure 8.7: Apply Function
aux def : Lam→ Int
main def : Int× Int×Bool→ Int
let aux def f = apply(f ,1)+apply(f ,10)
let main def x y b = aux def(Lam1(x)) ∗ aux def(Lam2(y,b))
Figure 8.8: Defunctionalized Program
8.3 Syntax and Denotational Semantics
In this section, we present the syntax of our core language and its denotational semantics.
The language is based on untyped λ -calculus. The syntax is presented in Figure 8.9. We
consider the following expressions:
• Constants and variables




• Imperative features (referencing, dereferencing, and assignment expressions). The
expression ref e allocates a new reference and initializes it with the value of e. The
expression ! e reads the value stored at the location referenced by the value of e.
The expression e := e′ writes the value of e′ to the location referenced by the value
of e.
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e ::= c constant
| x variable
| λx. e abstraction
| e e′ application
| let x = e in e′ local deﬁnition
| if e1 then e2 else e3 conditional
| e1; e2 sequence
| ref e referencing
| ! e dereferencing
| e := e′ assignment
Figure 8.9: Core Syntax
The denotational semantics of the core language is presented in Figure 8.10. It
associates a value to each expression of the language. First, we deﬁne the function and
the types that are used in the semantics:
[[ _ ]]_ _ : Exp→ Env→ Store→ Result
Result : Value×Store
Value : Int | Bool | Unit | Location | Closure
Closure : Identiﬁer×Exp×Env
Env : Identiﬁer→ Value
Store : Location→ Value
Given an expression e, a dynamic environment ε , and a store σ , the dynamic eval-
uation function [[ _ ]] yields a pair (v, σ ′), where v is the computed value and σ ′ is the
updated store. The environment ε maps identiﬁers to values. The store σ maps locations
to values. A value can be either a constant, a location, or a closure. In the case of an ab-
straction expression λx. e, the computed value is a closure 〈x,e,ε ′〉 capturing the function
parameter x, the function body e, and the evaluation environment ε ′, which maps each
free variable of e to its value at the time of the declaration of the function. The function
alloc used in the semantics allocates a new cell in the store and returns a reference to it.
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[[ c ]]ε σ = (c,σ)
[[ x ]]ε σ = (ε(x),σ)
[[ λx. e ]]ε σ = (〈x,e,ε ′〉,σ)
[[ e e′ ]]ε σ = let (v,σ ′) = [[ e′ ]]ε σ in
let (〈x,e′′,ε ′〉,σ ′′) = [[ e ]]ε σ ′ in [[ e′′ ]]ε ′ † [x → v] σ ′′ end
end
[[ let x = e in e′ ]]ε σ = let (v,σ ′) = [[ e ]]ε σ in [[ e′ ]]ε † [x → v] σ ′ end
[[ if e1 then e2 else e3 ]]ε σ = let (v,σ ′) = [[ e1 ]]ε σ in
if (v) then [[ e2 ]]ε σ ′ else [[ e3 ]]ε σ ′
end
[[ e1; e2 ]]ε σ = let (v,σ ′) = [[ e1 ]]ε σ in [[ e2 ]]ε σ ′ end
[[ ref e ]]ε σ = let (v,σ ′) = [[ e ]]ε σ in
let = alloc(σ ′) in (,σ ′ † [ → v]) end
end
[[ ! e ]]ε σ = let (,σ ′) = [[ e ]]ε σ in (σ ′(),σ ′) end
[[ e := e′ ]]ε σ = let (,σ ′) = [[ e ]]ε σ in
let (v,σ ′′) = [[ e′ ]]ε σ ′ in ((),σ ′′ † [ → v]) end
end
Figure 8.10: Denotational Semantics
8.4 Continuation-Passing Style Semantics
In this section, we transform the previously deﬁned denotational semantics into CPS style.
As we mentioned earlier, frame-based semantics allows describing AOP semantics in
a precise and uniﬁed way. To help understanding this transformation, we proceed in
two steps. First, we elaborate CPS semantics by representing continuations as functions.
Then, we provide CPS semantics by representing continuations as frames.
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8.4.1 Representation of Continuations as Functions
The CPS semantics is presented in Figure 8.11. We translate the denotational semantics
into CPS following the original formulation of the CPS transformation [70]. In essence,
we modify the evaluation function to take a continuation as an additional argument as
follows:
[[ _ ]]_ _ _ : Exp→ Env→ Store→ Cont→ Result
Cont = Result→ Result
The continuation, represented as a λ -expression, receives the result of the current evalua-
tion and provides the semantics of the rest of the computation.
[[ c ]]ε σ κ = κ(c,σ)
[[ x ]]ε σ κ = κ(ε(x),σ)
[[ λx. e ]]ε σ κ = κ(λ (v,κ ′). [[ e ]]ε † [x → v] σ κ ′)
[[ e e′ ]]ε σ κ = [[ e′ ]]ε σ (λ (v,σ ′). [[ e ]]ε σ ′ (λ f . f v κ))
[[ let x = e in e′ ]]ε σ κ = [[ e ]]ε σ (λ (v,σ ′). [[ e′ ]]ε † [x → v] σ ′ κ)
[[ if e1 then e2 else e3 ]]ε σ κ = [[ e1 ]]ε (λ (v,σ ′). if (v) then [[ e2 ]]ε σ ′ κ else [[ e3 ]]ε σ ′ κ)
[[ e1; e2 ]]ε σ κ = [[ e1 ]]ε σ (λ (v,σ ′). [[ e2 ]]ε σ ′ κ)
[[ ref e ]]ε σ κ = [[ e ]]ε σ (λ (v,σ ′). let = alloc(σ ′) in κ(,σ ′ † [ → v]) end)
[[ ! e ]]ε σ κ = [[ e ]]ε σ (λ (,σ ′). κ(σ ′(),σ ′))
[[ e := e′ ]]ε σ κ = [[ e ]]ε σ (λ (,σ ′). [[ e′ ]]ε σ ′ (λ (v,σ ′′). κ((),(σ ′′ † [ → v]))))
Figure 8.11: CPS Semantics: Continuations as Functions
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8.4.2 Representation of Continuations as Frames
Continuations, which are λ -expressions, are often represented as closures. Ager et al. [17]
have provided a systematic conversion of these closures into data structures (or frames)
and an apply function interpreting the operations of these closures. This conversion is
based on the concept of defunctionalization [147]. Each frame stores the value(s) of
the free variable(s) of the original continuation function and awaits the value(s) of the
previous computation. Following this technique, we transform the continuation functions,
obtained from the previous step, into frames as shown in Figure 8.12 and Figure 8.13.
# The GetF frame does not store any value.
# It awaits a location and a store.
type GetF = {}
# The SetF frame stores a location.
# It awaits a value and a store.
type SetF = {loc : Value}
# The CallF frame stores a function abstraction and an environment.
# It awaits the value of the function argument.
type CallF = {fun : Exp; env : Env}
# The ExecF frame stores the value of the argument.
# It awaits a closure, which is the result of the evaluation of the function
# abstraction, and a store.
type ExecF = {arg : Value}
# The LetF frame stores an identiﬁer, a body of a let expression,
# and an environment.
# It awaits the value of the identiﬁer and a store.
type LetF = {id : Identiﬁer; exp : Exp; env : Env}
# The IfF frame stores then and else expressions and an environment.
# It awaits the value of the condition and a store.
type IfF = {thenExp : Exp; elseExp : Exp; env : Env}
Figure 8.12: Frames - Part 1
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# The SeqF frame stores the next expression and an environment.
# It awaits the value of the ﬁrst expression and a store.
type SeqF = {nextExp : Exp; env : Env}
# The AllocF frame does not store any value.
# It awaits the value to be stored in the newly allocated cell and a store.
type AllocF = {}
# The RhsF frame stores the right-hand side expression of an assignment
# and an environment.
# It awaits a location and a store.
type RhsF = {exp : Exp; env : Env}
Figure 8.13: Frames - Part 2
Using frame-based semantics, the continuation κ consists of a list of frames. Before
presenting the semantics, we ﬁrst deﬁne the primitive functions that will be used. The
primitive push extends a continuation list with another frame.
push : Frame→ Cont→ Cont
let push f κ = f :: κ
The primitive apply, deﬁned in Figure 8.14, extracts the top frame from the continua-
tion list and evaluates it based on its corresponding continuation function. When the list
becomes empty, the primitive apply returns the current value and store as a result.
apply : Cont→ (Value×Store)→ (Value×Store)
let apply κ (v,σ) = match κ with
[ ] ⇒ (v,σ)
| f :: κ ′ ⇒ F [[ f ]]σ v κ ′
Figure 8.14: Apply Function
In this style, the semantics is deﬁned in two parts: (1) The expression side, shown in
Figure 8.15, provides the evaluation of the language expressions, and (2) the frame side,
shown in Figure 8.16, provides the evaluation of the frames.
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[[ c ]]ε σ κ = apply(κ,(c,σ))
[[ x ]]ε σ κ = apply(κ,(ε(x),σ))
[[ λx. e ]]ε σ κ = apply(κ,(〈x,e,ε ′〉,σ))
[[ e e′ ]]ε σ κ = [[ e′ ]]ε σ (push(CallF(e,ε), κ))
[[ let x = e in e′ ]]ε σ κ = [[ e ]]ε σ (push(LetF(x,e′,ε),κ))
[[ if e1 then e2 else e3 ]]ε σ κ = [[ e1 ]]ε σ (push(IfF(e2,e3,ε),κ))
[[ e1; e2 ]]ε σ κ = [[ e1 ]]ε σ (push(SeqF(e2,ε),κ))
[[ ref e ]]ε σ κ = [[ e ]]ε σ (push(AllocF(),κ))
[[ ! e ]]ε σ κ = [[ e ]]ε σ (push(GetF(),κ))
[[ e := e′ ]]ε σ κ = [[ e ]]ε σ (push(RhsF(e′,ε),κ))
Figure 8.15: Frame-Based CPS Semantics: Expression Side
Example: To illustrate this transformation, let us consider the following very simple
expression: e = (λx. x)(1)
By applying the CPS semantics presented in Figure 8.11, the evaluation of this
expression is as follows:
[[ e ]]ε σ κ = [[ 1 ]]ε σ (λ (v,σ ′). [[ λx. x ]]ε σ ′ (λ f . f v κ))
The defunctionalization process consists of transforming the following λ -expressions
into frames as shown below:
λ (v,σ ′). [[ λx. x ]]ε σ ′ (λ f . f v κ) transformed into CallF(λx. x, ε)
λ f . f v κ transformed into ExecF(1)
Using these frames, the evaluation of the expression e is provided as follows, by
applying the frame semantics presented in Figure 8.15 and Figure 8.16:
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F [[ _ ]]_ _ _ : Frame→ Store→ Value→ Cont→ Result
F [[ GetF f ]]σ v κ = apply(κ,(σ(v),σ))
F [[ SetF f ]]σ v κ = apply(κ ,((),σ † [f .loc → v]))
F [[ CallF f ]]σ v κ = [[ f .fun ]](f .env) σ (push(ExecF(v),κ))
F [[ ExecF f ]]σ v κ = [[ e ]]ε ′ † [x → f .arg] σ κ where v = 〈x,e,ε ′〉
F [[ LetF f ]]σ v κ = [[ f.exp ]](f .env)† [f .id → v] σ κ
F [[ IfF f ]]σ v κ = if (v) then [[ f.thenExp ]](f .env) σ κ else [[ f.elseExp ]](f .env) σ κ
F [[ SeqF f ]]σ v κ = [[ f.nextExp ]](f .env) σ κ
F [[ AllocF f ]]σ v κ = let = alloc(σ) in apply(κ ,(,σ † [ → v])) end
F [[ RhsF f ]]σ v κ = [[ f .exp ]](f .env) σ (push(SetF(v),κ))
Figure 8.16: Frame-Based CPS Semantics: Frame Side
[[ e ]]ε σ κ = [[ 1 ]]ε σ (push(CallF(λx. x,ε),κ))
= apply(κ,(1,σ))
= [[ λx. x ]]ε σ (push(ExecF(1),κ))
= apply(κ,(〈x,x,ε〉,σ))




The frames CallF and ExecF correspond respectively to the states where the func-
tion λx. x is being called and executed with an argument equal to 1. In AOP, these states
are join points where a certain advice can be applied. Thus, by transforming the deno-
tational semantics into a frame-based style, the join points automatically arise within the
semantics, which makes it an appropriate approach for deﬁning the semantics of AOP.
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8.5 Aspect Syntax and Semantics
In this section, we present our aspect extension to the core language and elaborate its
semantics. Our methodology of using CPS is based on a previous effort describing the
semantics of a ﬁrst-order procedural language (PROC) [61]. In the following, we start by
presenting the aspect syntax. Then, we elaborate the matching and the weaving semantics.
8.5.1 Aspect Syntax
An aspect, depicted in Figure 8.18, includes a list of advice. An advice speciﬁes actions to
be performed when join points satisfying a particular pointcut are reached. As in AspectJ
[96], an advice may also compute the original join point through a special expression
named proceed. Hence, as shown in Figure 8.17, we extend the core syntax with an
additional expression, proceed (e), to denote the computation of the original join point
with possibly a new argument e.
e ::= ...
| proceed (e) proceed
Figure 8.17: Proceed Expression
Syntactically, an advice contains two parts: (1) A body, which is an expression, and
(2) a pointcut, which designates a set of join points. An advice can be applied before,
after, or around a join point. However, before and after advice can be expressed as around
advice using the proceed expression [61]. Hence, we consider all kinds of advice as
around advice as this does not restrict the generality of the approach.
A pointcut is an expression that designates a set of join points. We ﬁrst consider
the following basic pointcuts: GetPC, SetPC, CallPC, and ExecPC. The pointcut GetPC
(resp. SetPC) picks out join points where the value of a variable is got from (resp. set to)
the store. The pointcut CallPC (resp. ExecPC) picks out join points where a function is
called (resp. executed).
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type Aspect = Advice list
type Advice = {body : Exp; pc : Pointcut}
type Pointcut = GetPC | SetPC | CallPC | ExecPC | NotPC | AndPC
type GetPC = {id : Identiﬁer}
type SetPC = {id : Identiﬁer; val : Value}
type CallPC = {id : Identiﬁer; arg : Identiﬁer}
type ExecPC = {id : Identiﬁer; arg : Identiﬁer}
type NotPC = {pc : Pointcut}
type AndPC = {pc1 : Pointcut; pc2 : Pointcut}
Figure 8.18: Aspect Syntax
8.5.2 Matching Semantics
Matching is a mechanism for identifying the join points targeted by an advice. In a de-
functionalized continuation-passing style, join points correspond to continuation frames
and arise naturally when a particular continuation frame receives the value that it awaits.
The matching semantics is shown in Figure 8.19.
Given a pointcut p, the current frame f, the current value v, an environment ε , a
store σ , and a continuation κ , the matching semantics examines whether f matches p.
Matching depends on three factors: the kind and the content of the frame f and the current
value v that f receives. In the case of:
• GetPC pointcut, there is a match if f is a GetF frame and the location of the identiﬁer
given in p is equal to the location that f receives.
• SetPC pointcut, there is a match if f is a SetF frame and the location of the identiﬁer
given in p is equal to the location that is stored in f.
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match pc : Pointcut→ Frame→ Value→ Store→ Env→ Cont→ Bool
let match pc p f v σ ε κ = match (p, f ) with
(GetPC p,GetF f ) ⇒ ε(p.id) = v
| (SetPC p,SetF f ) ⇒ ε(p.id) = f .loc
| (CallPC p,CallF f ) ⇒ let (v′,σ ′) = [[ f .fun ]] ε σ κ in
let (v′′,σ ′′) = [[ ε(p.id) ]]ε σ κ in v′ = v′′ end
end
| (ExecPC p,ExecF f ) ⇒ let (v′,σ ′) = [[ ε(p.id) ]] ε σ κ in v = v′ end
| (NotPC p,Frame f ) ⇒ not match pc(p.pc, f ,v,σ ,ε,κ)
| (AndPC p,Frame f ) ⇒ match pc(p.pc1, f ,v,σ ,ε,κ) and
match pc(p.pc2, f ,v,σ ,ε,κ)
| otherwise ⇒ false
Figure 8.19: Matching Semantics
• CallPC pointcut, there is a match if f is a CallF frame and it holds a function equal
to the one given in p. Notice that the pointcut p contains only the function identiﬁer
id and ε(id) gives its abstraction, assuming that in the environment identiﬁers map
to values in case of variables and function abstractions in case of functions.
• ExecPC pointcut, there is a match if f is an ExecF frame and the evaluation of the
function given in p is equal to the closure that f receives.
• NotPC pointcut, there is a match if f does not match the sub-pointcut of p.
• AndPC pointcut, there is a match if f matches both its sub-pointcuts.
Example: Let us consider the previous expression (slightly changed to deﬁne a function
f):
e = (let f = λx. x in f (1) end)
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and a pointcut p that captures any call to the function f with an argument x:
CallPC p = {id = f ; arg = x}
As shown in the previous section, the frame-based semantics of the expression e use the
frames CallF(λx. x,ε) and ExecF(1), which correspond to the states where the function
λx. x is called and executed respectively. By applying the matching semantics presented
in Figure 8.19, it is clear that the pointcut p matches the CallF frame.
8.5.3 Weaving Semantics
The weaving semantics describes how to apply the matching advice at the identiﬁed join
points. Since join points correspond to continuation frames, advice body provides a means
to modify the behavior of those continuation frames. The weaving is performed directly
in the evaluation function. To do so, we redeﬁne the apply function, as shown in Figure
8.20, to take an aspect α and an environment ε into account. Accordingly, the signatures
of the evaluation functions as well as the matching ones are also modiﬁed to take the
aspect and the environment as additional arguments.
The weaving is done in two steps. When a continuation frame is activated, we ﬁrst
check for a matching advice by calling the get matches function. If there is any applica-
ble advice, the function execute advice is called. Otherwise, the original computation is
performed. In the following, we explain these two steps.
Advice Matching
Advice matching is shown in Figure 8.21. To get an applicable advice, we go through the
aspect and check whether its enclosed pointcuts match the current frame. This is done by
using the function match pc deﬁned previously in Figure 8.19. In case there is a match,
we return a structure MatchedAD containing the advice itself and the pointcut arguments
that will pass values to the advice execution.
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apply : Cont→ (Value×Store)→ Env→ Aspect→ (Value×Store)
let apply κ (v,σ) ε α = match κ with
[ ] ⇒ (v,σ)
| f :: κ ′ ⇒ let ms = get matches(f ,v,σ ,ε,α,κ ′) in
if ms = [ ] then F [[ f ]]ε σ v α κ ′
else
let argV =match f with
SetF f ⇒ v
| CallF f ⇒ v
| ExecF f ⇒ f .arg
| otherwise ⇒ ()
in execute advice(ms, f ,argV,σ ,ε,α,κ ′)
end
end
Figure 8.20: Redeﬁned Apply Function
Advice Execution
Advice execution is shown in Figure 8.22. It starts by evaluating the body of the ﬁrst
applicable advice. The remaining applicable pieces of advice as well as the current frame
are stored in the environment by binding them to auxiliary variables, &proceed and &jp
respectively. To evaluate the advice body, we deﬁne a new continuation frame, AdvExecF,
as follows:
type AdvExecF = {matches : MatchedAD list; jp : Frame}
F [[ AdvExecF f ]]ε σ v α κ = execute advice(f .matches, f .jp,v,σ ,ε ,α ,κ)
The evaluation of the proceed expression is provided below. The value of its argument
is passed to the next advice or to the current join point if there is no further advice. To
execute the remaining pieces of advice, the AdvExecF frame is added to the list of frames.
[[ proceed (e) ]]ε σ α κ = [[ e ]]ε σ α (push(AdvExecF(ε(&proceed),ε(&jp)),κ))
When all applicable pieces of advice are executed, the original computation, i.e., the
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type MatchedAD = {arg : Identiﬁer; ad : Advice}
get matches : Frame→ Value→ Store→ Env→ Aspect→ Cont
→MatchedAD list
let get matches f v σ ε α κ = match α with
[ ] ⇒ [ ]
| ad :: α ′ ⇒ let p = ad.pc in
if match pc(p, f ,v,σ ,ε,α ,κ) then
let arg =match p with
SetPC p ⇒ p.id
| CallPC p | ExecPC p ⇒ p.arg
| otherwise ⇒ ()
in
MatchedAD(arg,ad) :: get matches( f ,v,σ ,ε,α ′,κ)
end
else
get matches( f ,v,σ ,ε,α ′,κ)
end
Figure 8.21: Advice Matching
execute advice : MatchedAD list→ Frame→ Value→ Store→ Env→ Aspect
→ Cont→ Result
let execute advice ms f v σ ε α κ = match ms with
[ ] ⇒ apply(push(MarkerF(),(push(f ,κ))),(v,σ),ε,α)
| m :: ms′ ⇒ let ad = m.ad in
[[ ad.body ]]ε † [&proceed → ms′,&jp → f ,m.arg → v] σ α κ
end
Figure 8.22: Advice Execution
current join point, is invoked. To avoid matching the currently matched frame repeatedly,
we introduce a new frame, MarkerF, which invokes the primary apply function, renamed
here as apply prim.
type MarkerF = { }
F [[ MarkerF f ]]ε σ v α κ = apply prim(κ,(v,σ))
191
Example: If we consider the previous example:
Expression: e = (let f = λx. x in f (1) end)
Pointcut: CallPC p = {id = f ; arg = x}
and we deﬁne advice a as:
Advice a = {body = proceed (2); pc = p}
As we have seen in the matching semantics, the frame CallF(λx. x,ε) is matched as
a join point. The advice a is then executed at the state when this frame is extracted from
the continuation list, i.e., when it receives the value of the argument. Since the advice
body is proceed (2), the frame CallF(λx. x,ε) will be evaluated with an argument equal
to 2 instead of 1.
8.6 Semantics of Flow-Based Pointcuts
In this section, we extend our framework to ﬂow-based pointcuts, namely, control ﬂow
(cflow) [96] and dataﬂow (dflow) [109] pointcuts. These pointcuts are useful from a
security perspective since they can detect a considerable number of vulnerabilities related
to information ﬂow, such as Cross-site Scripting (XSS) and SQL injection attacks [72].
First, we extend the aspect syntax with these two pointcuts, as shown in Figure 8.23, and
then we provide their semantics in the following subsections.
type Pointcut = ... | CFlowPC | DFlowPC
type CFlowPC = {pc : Pointcut}
type DFlowPC = {pc : Pointcut; tag : Identiﬁer}
Figure 8.23: Syntax of cflow and dflow Pointcuts
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8.6.1 Control Flow Pointcut
The control ﬂow pointcut, cflow(p), picks out each join point in the control ﬂow of the
join points picked out by the pointcut p [96]. One of the techniques that are used to
implement cflow is the stack-based approach [59, 111]. The latter maintains a stack of
join points. The algorithm for matching cflow pointcut starts from the top of the stack and
matches each join point against p. If there is a match then the current join point satisﬁes
the cflow pointcut [111]. Implementing the cflow pointcut by adopting this approach
in our framework is straightforward as the stack of join points corresponds to the list of
continuation frames in our model. Figure 8.24 shows the cflow matching semantics.
type JpF = GetF | SetF | CallF | ExecF
let match pc p f v σ ε α κ = match (p, f ) with
...
| (CFlowPC p,JpF f ) ⇒ let b1 =match pc(p.pc, f ,v,σ ,ε,α,κ) in
if (b1) then




Figure 8.24: Matching Semantics of the cflow Pointcut
When a frame matches the sub-pointcut p of a cflow pointcut, a special marker
frame, CFlowF, is pushed into the continuation list. The purpose of using this marker
frame is to detect exit points of join points that match p. For example, if p is a call
pointcut, the marker frame is pushed into the continuation list if the top frame matches p.
Then, the marker frame will be extracted from the continuation list when the evaluation
of the function call terminates. The CFlowF is deﬁned as follows:
type CFlowF = {pc : Pointcut}
F [[ CFlowF f ]]ε σ v α κ = apply(κ,(v,σ),ε,α)
In summary, a join point frame f matches a cflow pointcut that contains a pointcut
193
p if: (1) The frame f matches the sub-pointcut p, or (2) a CFlowF marker frame that con-
tains p exists in the continuation list. The primitive function exists used in the matching
semantics is deﬁned in Figure 8.25. This function takes a frame f and a continuation list
κ and checks whether f exists in the list or not.
exists : Frame→ Cont→ Bool
let exists f κ = match κ with
[ ] ⇒ false
| f ′ :: κ ′ ⇒ let b =match f ′ with
CﬂowF f ′ ⇒ f ′.pc = f .pc
| otherwise ⇒ false
in
b or exists(f ,κ ′)
end
Figure 8.25: Exists Function
8.6.2 Dataﬂow Pointcut
The dataﬂow pointcut, as deﬁned in [109], picks out join points based on the origins of
values, i.e., dflow[x, x′](p) matches a join point if the value of x originates from the value
of x′. Variable x should be bound to a value in the current join point whereas variable x′
should be bound to a value in a past join point matched by p. Therefore, dflow must be
used in conjunction with some other pointcut that binds x to a value in the current join
point [109]. To match a dflow pointcut, tags are used to discriminate dflow pointcuts
and track dependencies between values [109]. This pointcut is useful where information
ﬂow is important, such as to detect input validation vulnerabilities in Web applications.
As deﬁned in Figure 8.23, the dflow pointcut has a sub-pointcut pc and a unique
tag that discriminates this dflow pointcut from other dflow pointcuts. In order to track
dependencies between values, we use a tagging environment γ that maps values to tags.
As shown in Figures 8.26 and 8.27, tag propagation is performed dynamically at the same
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time we evaluate each expression. Thus, we augment the signatures of the evaluation
functions as well as the apply function with the tagging environment as follows:
[[ _ ]]_ _ _ _ _ : Exp→ Env→ Tag Env→ Store→ Aspect→ Cont→ Result
F [[ _ ]]_ _ _ _ _ _ : Frame→ Env→ Tag Env→ Store→ Value→ Aspect
→ Cont→ Result
apply : Cont→ (Value×Store)→ Env→ Tag Env→ Aspect
→ (Value×Store)
[[ c ]]ε γ σ α κ = apply(κ,(c,σ),ε,γ † [c → { }],α)
[[ x ]]ε γ σ α κ = apply(κ,(ε(x),σ),ε,γ ,α)
[[ λx. e ]]ε γ σ α κ = apply(κ ,(〈x,e,ε ′,γ ′〉,σ),ε,γ,α)
[[ e e′ ]]ε γ σ α κ = [[ e′ ]]ε γ σ α (push(CallF(e,ε), κ))
[[ let x = e in e′ ]]ε γ σ α κ = [[ e ]]ε γ σ α (push(LetF(x,e′,ε),κ))
[[ if e1 then e2 else e3 ]]ε γ σ α κ = [[ e1 ]]ε γ σ α (push(IfF(e2,e3,ε),κ))
[[ e1; e2 ]]ε γ σ α κ = [[ e1 ]]ε γ σ α (push(SeqF(e2,ε),κ))
[[ ref e ]]ε γ σ α κ = [[ e ]]ε γ σ α (push(AllocF(),κ))
[[ ! e ]]ε γ σ α κ = [[ e ]]ε γ σ α (push(GetF(),κ))
[[ e := e′ ]]ε γ σ α κ = [[ e ]]ε γ σ α (push(RhsF(e′,ε),κ))
[[ proceed (e) ]]ε γ σ α κ = [[ e ]]ε γ σ α (push(AdvExecF(ε(&proceed),ε(&jp)),κ))
Figure 8.26: Frame-Based CPS Semantics with the dflow Pointcut: Expression Side
Notice that the deﬁnition of the apply function does not change, only the tagging
environment is passed to the matching function. Notice also that in the case of an abstrac-
tion expression, the closure 〈x,e,ε ′〉 is extended with a tagging environment γ ′ to capture
the tags generated during the function execution. In addition, we deﬁne a marker frame
195
F [[ GetF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = apply(κ,(σ(v),σ),ε,γ † [σ(v) → γ(v)],α)
F [[ SetF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = apply(κ ,((),σ † [f .loc → v]),ε,γ † [f .loc → γ(v)],α)
F [[ CallF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = [[ f .fun ]](f .env) γ σ α (push(ExecF(v),κ))
F [[ ExecF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = [[ e ]](ε ′ † [x → f .arg])(γ ′ † [ε(x) → γ( f .arg)]) σ α (push(DﬂowF(γ),κ))
where v = 〈x,e,ε ′,γ ′〉
F [[ LetF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = [[ f.exp ]](f .env† [f .id → v])(γ † [ε(f .id) → γ(v)]) σ κ
F [[ IfF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = if (v) then [[ f.thenExp ]](f .env) γ σ α κ else [[ f.elseExp ]](f .env) γ σ α κ
F [[ SeqF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = [[ f.nextExp ]](f .env) γ σ α κ
F [[ AllocF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = let = alloc(σ) in apply(κ ,(,σ † [ → v]),ε,γ † [ → γ(v)],α) end
F [[ RhsF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = [[ f .exp ]](f .env) γ σ α (push(SetF(v),κ))
F [[ AdvExecF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = execute advice(f .matches, f .jp,v,σ ,ε,γ,α ,κ)
F [[ MarkerF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = apply prim(κ,(v,σ))
F [[ CFlowF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = apply(κ ,(v,σ),ε,γ ,α)
F [[ DFlowF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = apply(κ ,(v,σ),ε, f .tag_env† [v → getTags(γ)],α)
Figure 8.27: Frame-Based CPS Semantics with the dflow Pointcut: Frame Side
DﬂowF that is used for tag propagation in the case of an application expression. This
frame stores a tagging environment before entering a function call and awaits the result
of the call.
type DﬂowF = {tag_env : Env}
In the following, we explain the tag propagation rules for the affected expressions:
• The value of a constant is associated with an empty set.
• In the case of an application expression (λx. e) e′, the tags of the value of the
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argument e′ propagate to the value of the variable x. This is performed during the
evaluation of the ExecF frame as shown in Figure 8.27. In addition, the tags of the
argument as well as the tags that are generated during the execution of the function
body propagate to the result of the function call. For this reason, we use a DﬂowF
frame to access the result of the function call and restore the tagging environment
after returning from the call. The function getTags(γ) is used to retrieve all the tags
stored in the tagging environment γ .
• In the case of a let expression (let x = e in e′), the tags of the value of the
expression e propagate to the value of x. This is performed during the evaluation of
the LetF frame as shown in Figure 8.27.
• In the case of a referencing expression ref e, the tags of the value of the expression
e propagate to the value of the expression ref e. This is performed during the
evaluation of the AllocF frame as shown in Figure 8.27.
• In the case of a dereferencing expression !e, the tags of the value of the reference
e propagate to the value stored at that reference. This is performed during the
evaluation of the GetF frame as shown in Figure 8.27.
• In the case of an assignment expression e := e′, the tags of the value of the expres-
sion e′ propagate to the value of the expression e. This is performed during the
evaluation of the SetF frame as shown in Figure 8.27.
The matching semantics of the dflow pointcut is presented in Figure 8.28. A join
point frame f matches a dflow pointcut that contains a pointcut pc and a tag t if: (1) The
frame f matches the pointcut pc of the dflow pointcut, or (2) the set of tags of the value
that the frame f awaits (captured by the variable val′) contains the tag t. In case a frame f
matches the pointcut pc of the dflow pointcut, the tag t propagates to the value associated
with the frame f (captured by the variable val).
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let match pc p f v σ ε γ α κ = match (p, f ) with
...
| (DFlowPC p,JpF f ) ⇒ let (b,γ ′) =match pc(p.pc, f ,v,σ ,ε,γ ,α ,κ) in
let val =match f with
GetF f ⇒ v
SetF f ⇒ v
CallF f ⇒ let p = p.pc in




ExecF f ⇒ v
in
if (b) then (true,γ ′ † [val → γ ′(val)∪{p.tag}])
else let val′ =match f with
CallF f ⇒ v
otherwise ⇒ val
in




Figure 8.28: Matching Semantics of the dflow Pointcut
8.6.3 Example
To illustrate the semantics of the dflow pointcut, let us consider the following example:
Expression:
let userId = 1 in
let getInput = λx. e1 in # getInput : gets a user input







The presented example is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks [72] since an
untrusted input received from a user has not been sanitized before being placed into the
contents of a web page. Therefore, it enables an attacker to inject malicious scripts into
a web page and reveal conﬁdential information. The dflow pointcut can be remarkably
used to address XSS ﬂaws as shown in [109]. Below, we provide a sanitizing aspect to ﬁx
the discussed vulnerability.
Aspect (Pointcuts and Advice):
CallPC p1 = {id = getInput; arg = x}
DFlowPC p2 = {pc = p1; tag = t}
CallPC p3 = {id = write; arg = y}
AndPC p = {pc1 = p2; pc2 = p3}
Advice a = {body = let sanitize = λ r. e3 in proceed (sanitize(y)); pc = p}
The pointcut p1 is a call pointcut that captures all calls to the getInput function. Like-
wise, the pointcut p3 captures all calls to the write function. The pointcut p2 is a dflow
pointcut that captures all join points that depend on the join points captured by the point-
cut p1. Finally, the pointcut p picks out all calls to the write function that are dependent on
the results of invoking the function getInput. The advice a ﬁrst sanitizes the arguments of
the join points captured by p, and then invokes the original join points with the sanitized
arguments. More precisely, advice a picks out all calls to write(z) that depend on the
result of getInput and replaces them with write(sanitize(z)) by the following justiﬁcation:
• The call to getInput(userId) matches the pointcut p2, and consequently, the tag t is
added to the tagging environment of the function and is given to the result of the
function evaluation.
• According to the tag propagation rule for assignment expressions, the value of the
variable z gets the tag t.
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• Subsequently, the call to write(z) matches the pointcut p since it matches both sub-
pointcuts of p. More precisely, it matches the pointcut p3 as it is a call to the write
function, and matches the pointcut p2 as the value of the argument z has the tag t.
Therefore, the advice a will be woven at this point and the function write will be
called with the sanitized input, which is the result of calling sanitize(z).
8.7 Related Work on AOP Semantics
There are many research contributions that have addressed AOP semantics [25,26,41,49,
54,61,63,74,90,108,111,167,168]. Among these contributions, we explore those that are
more relevant to our work, mainly contributions that are based on CPS or those handling
ﬂow-based pointcuts. Dutchyn [61] has presented a formal model of dynamic join points,
pointcuts, and advice using a ﬁrst-order procedural language called PROC [61]. The
proposed semantic model is based on defunctionalization and continuation-passing style.
The author has demonstrated that modeling AOP concepts in this style provides a natural
and precise way of describing these mechanisms. The proposed model supports get, set,
call, and exec pointcuts. The author has also provided some hints for implementing
the cflow pointcut but did not provide the matching algorithm. Compared to [61], our
contribution provides a clear presentation allowing a better view of this style of semantics.
In addition, we extend the aspect layer with ﬂow-based pointcuts.
Masuhara et al. [108] have proposed the point-in-time join point model, where they
redeﬁne join points as the states at the beginning and the end of certain events. Based
on this new model, the authors have designed a small AOP language and deﬁned its for-
mal semantics in CPS. Moreover, they have demonstrated that this approach is useful to
model advanced pointcuts, such as exception handling and control ﬂow. The idea of this
work is similar to ours in using continuations to model matching and weaving semantics.
However, the main difference is that our semantics is based on frames, while in [108]
the semantics follows the style of Danvy and Filinski [55] that represent continuations as
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λ -functions. As we have seen, presenting continuations as frames is a better approach
since join points arise naturally within this semantics.
Wand et al. [168] have proposed semantics for AOP that handles dynamic join
points and recursive procedures. They have provided a denotational semantics for a mini-
language that embodies the key features of dynamic join points, pointcuts, and advice.
Three kinds of join points were supported, namely pcall, pexecution, and aexecu-
tion. The proposed model is implemented as part of Aspect Sandbox (ASB) [62], which
is a framework for modeling AOP systems. This model is based on a direct denotational
semantics. Consequently, separate data-structures are required for maintaining the dy-
namic join points, while in our semantics the join points arise from the continuation list.
Djoko et al. [59] have deﬁned an operational semantics for the main features of As-
pectJ including cflow. The semantics of the cflow pointcut presented in this approach
is slightly different from AspectJ as they restricted the sub-pointcut to the call pointcut.
Comparing to this approach, our semantics of the cflow pointcut is more general as we
support all kinds of pointcuts. In addition, this approach requires additional structures
to maintain the join points. By adopting operational semantics and partial evaluation ap-
proaches, Masuhara et al. [111] have provided a compilation framework for a simple AOP
language named AJD. They have also provided two methods for implementing the cflow
pointcut, namely, stack-based and state-based implementations. However, no formal se-
mantics is given for the deﬁned pointcut.
The dflow pointcut was initially proposed by Masuhara and Kawauchi [109]. The
authors have argued about the usefulness of this pointcut in the ﬁeld of security through
an example of a Web-based application. They have also provided the design of the dflow
pointcut and its matching rules based on the origins of values. The dflow pointcut has
been implemented as an extension to Aspect Sandbox (ASB) [62]. However, no formal
semantics has been provided for this pointcut.
Alhadidi et al. [26] have presented the ﬁrst formal framework for the dflow point-
cut based on λ -calculus. In this work, dataﬂow tags are propagated statically to track
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data dependencies between λ -expressions. Compared to our framework, [26] makes use
of the effect-based type system for propagating dataﬂow tags, matching pointcuts, and
weaving advice. Though a static approach can help in reducing the runtime overhead,
expressions in this approach need to be typed since matching depends primarily on types.
The authors have also provided dynamic semantics and proved that it is consistent with
the static semantics. The pointcut enclosed in a dflow pointcut is restricted to call and
get pointcuts in this approach, while we consider the general case in our framework, i.e.,
the sub-pointcut of the dflow pointcut can be any pointcut.
8.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have provided formal semantics for aspect matching and weaving in
λ -calculus. We chose CPS as the basis of our semantics because it provides a concise,
accurate, and elegant description of aspect-oriented mechanisms. Using this style of se-
mantics, one can easily notice that CPS and defunctionalization make join points explicit
and facilitate the aspect matching and weaving mechanisms. For instance, we did not need
to use any additional structure; the join points correspond exactly to continuation frames.
We have addressed basic pointcuts, i.e., get, set, call, and exec pointcuts. These point-
cuts are useful from a security perspective since they can pick out important points, where
security mechanisms such as authorization, encryption, and decryption, may be added be-
fore, after, or around these points. In addition, we have extended our semantic framework
with ﬂow-based pointcuts, namely, cflow and dflow pointcuts, since they are widely
used to detect and ﬁx vulnerabilities related to information ﬂow. The contribution pre-
sented in this chapter is a ﬁrst step towards establishing a dynamic semantics for aspect
matching and weaving based on CPS and defunctionalization. In the next chapter, we will
apply the results of this work to our AOM framework to elaborate semantics for matching
and weaving on executable UML models.
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Chapter 9
Dynamic Matching and Weaving
Semantics in Executable UML
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we elaborate dynamic semantics for aspect matching and weaving in Exe-
cutable UML (xUML) [113]. More precisely, we specify xUML models using the Action
Language for Foundational UML (Alf) [132] proposed by OMG. In addition of being a
standard, Alf is highly expressive. Moreover, Alf provides precise semantics for spec-
ifying detailed and executable behaviors within a UML model, such as creating class
instances, establishing links between these instances, performing operations on variables
and attributes, etc. Therefore, more security checks can be performed at the modeling
phase and numerous ﬂaws can get resolved before entering the implementation phase.
This, in turn, signiﬁcantly reduces costs and leads to more trustworthy software.
Existing AOM approaches that handle xUML models [77, 89, 176] mainly focus
on providing a framework for executing the woven model for the purposes of simulation
and veriﬁcation. Moreover, these approaches are presented from a practical perspective;
to date we are not aware of any work that explores the semantic foundations for aspect
matching and weaving in xUML. It is our aim, in this chapter, to deﬁne such a semantics,
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particularly on executable activity diagrams. We elaborate the semantics in a frame-based
CPS style by applying the results, presented in Chapter 8, on xUML models. As we have
seen in Chapter 8, a semantics, based on CPS and defunctionalization, provides a precise
and elegant description of aspect-oriented mechanisms. Furthermore, by expressing exe-
cutable models in a frame-based representation, matching and weaving can be described
in a simpliﬁed and uniﬁed way for both UML elements and action language constructs.
As we did in Chapter 8, we start by formalizing the matching and the weaving
processes for basic pointcuts, i.e., get, set, call, and exec pointcuts. Then, we elaborate
the semantics for the dataﬂow pointcut. Notice here that we match these pointcuts on
both activity diagram elements and Alf expressions. For example, an operation call can
be performed as a call operation action, which is an activity element, and as a function
call inside Alf code. Consequently, our framework should be able to capture both points.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 introduces a
motivating example. The syntax of activity diagrams and Alf is presented in Section 9.3,
followed by their denotational semantics in Section 9.4. We transform the semantics into
CPS in Section 9.5. Afterwards, Section 9.6 explores the semantics for matching and
weaving. In section 9.7, we extend the semantics with the dataﬂow pointcut. We discuss
related work in Section 9.8. Finally, concluding remarks are represented in Section 9.9.
9.2 Example
To clarify our motivation, let us consider a simple example of a caching process as shown
in Figure 9.1. The caching executable activity diagram starts by executing the action Get-
DataRequest. This action is a UML accept action that awaits a data request. When a
request is received, it checks whether the requested data is already cached or not. If yes,
then the action ReturnData, which is a call operation action, is called and the requested
data is returned. Otherwise, the action Caching&ReturningData is activated. This ac-
tion is an opaque action whose behavior is speciﬁed using Alf action language. In this
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case, ﬁrst the data is fetched and the cache is updated accordingly. Then the operation











Figure 9.1: Caching Example
Let us assume that our goal is to insert logging before calling the operation Return-
Data. As it is highlighted in the example, this operation is called in two ways: as a call
operation action and as an Alf expression. Therefore, the matching semantics should be
able to capture both points. To do so, we provide a frame-based representation for both
activity elements and Alf expressions and perform matching and weaving on frames.
9.3 Syntax
In this section, we present the syntax of activity diagrams and Alf language. An activ-
ity diagram starts with an initial node (•) that is connected to the subsequent nodes (n)
through an edge (→). A node can be either an executable node or a control node. For the
sake of illustration, we choose a small subset of nodes that captures the essence of activity
diagrams and omit complex features, such as concurrency and exception handling. The
proposed syntax is shown in Figure 9.2. The purpose of using labels is to uniquely refer
to already deﬁned nodes. In the following, we explain the activity constructs:
• The notation • → n denotes an activity diagram, where • is the initial node and n
is the subsequent ﬂow of nodes.
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ad ::= • → n activity
n ::= a action
| l : decision (e, n1, n2) decision
| l : merge→ n merge
| l :  activity ﬁnal
| a → n node sequence
| l label
a ::= l : opaque (e) opaque action
| l : callOp (f) call operation
| l : read (x) read variable
| l : write (x) write variable
Figure 9.2: Syntax of Activity Diagrams
• a is an action node, that can be either:
– l : opaque (e), a labeled opaque action, where e is an Alf expression specifying
the behavior of the action.
– l : callOp (f), a labeled call operation action that invokes a function f.
– l : read (x), a labeled read variable action that reads the value of x.
– l : write (x), a labeled write variable action that updates the value of x.
• l : decision (e, n1, n2) denotes a labeled decision node having two alternative ﬂows
n1 and n2.
• l : merge→ n denotes a labeled merge node that is followed by a ﬂow of nodes n.
• l :  denotes a labeled activity ﬁnal node.
• a → n denotes an action that is followed by the subsequent ﬂow of nodes n.
• l denotes a label that uniquely refers to a node.
Figure 9.3 presents the syntax of Alf language. To keep the presentation simple and
readable, we choose the main constructs of Alf and omit the object-oriented characteristic
of the language. We consider the following expressions:
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• Imperative features (referencing, dereferencing, and assignments). The expression
new e allocates a new reference and initializes it with the value of e. The expression
! e reads the value stored at the location referenced by e.
e ::= c constant
| x variable
| f (x) = e operation def.
| f (e) operation call
| if e1 then e2 else e3 conditional exp.
| e1; e2 exp. sequence
| new e referencing
| ! e dereferencing
| x := e assignment
Figure 9.3: Syntax of Alf Language
9.4 Denotational Semantics
This section presents the denotational semantics of activity diagrams and Alf expressions.
The functions and the types used in the semantics are deﬁned in Figure 9.4.
A[[ _ ]]_ _ : Activity→ Env→ Store→ Result
η [[ _ ]]_ _ _ _ : Node→ Env→ Store→ Token→ Value→ Result
ξ [[ _ ]]_ _ : Exp→ Env→ Store→ Result
Result : Value×Store
Env : Identiﬁer→ Value
Store : Location→ Value
Value : Boolean | Natural | String | Unit | Location | Closure
Figure 9.4: Semantic Functions and Types
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9.4.1 Denotational Semantics of Activity Diagrams
The denotational semantics of activity diagrams is presented in Figure 9.5. Given an
activity diagram ad, a dynamic environment ε , and a store σ , the functionA[[ _ ]] yields the
computed value v and the updated store σ ′ after the termination of the activity execution.
When an activity starts executing, a control token t is created and placed on the initial
node. This token then propagates along the edges to the subsequent nodes. A node starts
executing when it gets the required tokens and data values. Thus, the evaluation function
for nodes η [[ _ ]] takes a token t and a value v as inputs, in addition to the environment
ε and the store σ . When the execution of a node terminates, it returns a value and the
updated store that will be passed to the subsequent nodes.
A[[ • → n ]]ε σ = let t = createToken() in η [[ n ]]ε σ t () end
η [[ l : opaque (e) ]]ε σ t v = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ
η [[ l : callOp (f) ]]ε σ t v = let (〈x,e,ε ′〉,σ ′) = ξ [[ ε(f) ]]ε σ in
ξ [[ e ]]ε ′ † [x → v] σ ′
end
η [[ l : read (x) ]]ε σ t v = let (,σ ′) = ξ [[ x ]]ε σ in (σ ′(),σ ′) end
η [[ l : write (x) ]]ε σ t v = let (,σ ′) = ξ [[ x ]]ε σ in ((),σ ′ † [ → v]) end
η [[ l : decision (e, n1, n2) ]]ε σ t v = let (v′,σ ′) = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ in
if (v′) then η [[ n1 ]]ε σ ′ t v
else η [[ n2 ]]ε σ ′ t v
end
η [[ l : merge→ n ]]ε σ t v = η [[ n ]]ε σ t v
η [[ l :  ]]ε σ t v = let b = destroyAllTokens() in (v,σ) end
η [[ a → n ]]ε σ t v = let (v′,σ ′) = η [[ a ]]ε σ t v in η [[ n ]]ε σ ′ t v′ end
η [[ l ]]ε σ t v = η [[ ε(l) ]]ε σ t v
Figure 9.5: Denotational Semantics of Activity Diagrams
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In the following, we explain the semantics of each activity construct. The semantics
of an opaque action, l : opaque (e), depends on the semantics of its Alf expression e. A
call operation action, l : callOp (f), invokes the function f with the argument value v that it
receives from its input. A read variable action, l : read (x), reads the value of the variable
x from the store. A write variable action, l : write (x), updates the value of the variable x
with the value v that it receives from its input. A decision node, l : decision (e, n1, n2),
guides the ﬂow depending on the value of the condition e. If e evaluates to true, the node
n1 is executed, otherwise the node n2 is executed. A merge node, l : merge→ n, passes the
token and the data that it receives to its subsequent node n. A ﬁnal node, l : , terminates
the activity execution. Accordingly, all tokens in the activity are destroyed. Finally, the
semantics of a label l depends on the semantics of the referenced node. Notice that the
semantics of an edge is to transfer tokens and data values from the source node to the
target node. In our syntax, a node is explicitly connected to its subsequent nodes (e.g., a
→ n). Therefore, there is no need to separately deﬁne the semantics of an edge since it is
taken care of during the evaluation of the nodes.
9.4.2 Denotational Semantics of Alf Language
The denotational semantics of Alf language is presented in Figure 9.6. Given an expres-
sion e, a dynamic environment ε , and a store σ , the dynamic evaluation function ξ [[ _ ]]
yields the computed value v and the updated store σ ′. Notice that in the case of a function
deﬁnition f (x) = e, the computed value is a closure 〈x,e,ε ′〉 capturing the function pa-
rameter x, the function body e, and the evaluation environment ε ′, which maps each free
variable of e to its value at the time of the function declaration. The function alloc used
in the semantics allocates a new cell in the store and returns a reference to it.
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ξ [[ c ]]ε σ = (c,σ)
ξ [[ x ]]ε σ = (ε(x),σ)
ξ [[ f (x) = e ]]ε σ = (〈x,e,ε ′〉,σ)
ξ [[ f (e) ]]ε σ = let (v,σ ′) = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ in
let (〈x,e′,ε ′〉,σ ′′) = ξ [[ ε(f ) ]]ε σ ′ in ξ [[ e′ ]]ε ′ † [x → v] σ ′′ end
end
ξ [[ if e1 then e2 else e3 ]]ε σ = let (v,σ ′) = ξ [[ e1 ]]ε σ in
if (v) then ξ [[ e2 ]]ε σ ′ else ξ [[ e3 ]]ε σ ′
end
ξ [[ e1; e2 ]]ε σ = let (v,σ ′) = ξ [[ e1 ]]ε σ in ξ [[ e2 ]]ε σ ′ end
ξ [[ new e ]]ε σ = let (v,σ ′) = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ in
let = alloc(σ ′) in (,σ ′ † [ → v]) end
end
ξ [[ ! e ]]ε σ = let (,σ ′) = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ in (σ ′(),σ ′) end
ξ [[ x := e ]]ε σ = let (v,σ ′) = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ in
let (,σ ′′) = ξ [[ x ]]ε σ ′ in ((),σ ′′ † [ → v]) end
end
Figure 9.6: Denotational Semantics of Alf Language
9.5 Continuation-Passing Style Semantics
In this section, we transform the previously deﬁned denotational semantics into CPS. As
we mentioned earlier, frame-based semantics allows describing matching and weaving
processes in activity diagrams and Alf language in a precise and uniﬁed way. To help
understanding this transformation, we proceed in two steps. First, we elaborate a CPS
semantics by representing continuations as functions. Then, we provide a CPS semantics
by representing continuations as frames.
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9.5.1 Representation of Continuations as Functions
As we did in the previous chapter, we translate the denotational semantics into CPS fol-
lowing the original formulation of the CPS transformation [70]. The CPS semantics of
activity diagrams is presented in Figure 9.8 and the CPS semantics of Alf is presented in
Figure 9.9. First, we modify the evaluation functions to take a continuation as an addi-
tional argument as shown in Figure 9.7.
A[[ _ ]]_ _ _ : Activity→ Env→ Store→ Cont→ Result
η [[ _ ]]_ _ _ _ _ : Node→ Env→ Store→ Token→ Value→ Cont→ Result
ξ [[ _ ]]_ _ _ : Exp→ Env→ Store→ Cont→ Result
Cont : Result→ Result
Result : Value×Store
Figure 9.7: Redeﬁned Semantic Functions and Types
A[[ • → n ]]ε σ κ = let t = createToken() in η [[ n ]]ε σ t () κ end
η [[ l : opaque (e) ]]ε σ t v κ = ξ [[ e ]] ε σ κ
η [[ l : callOp (f) ]]ε σ t v κ = ξ [[ ε(f) ]]ε σ (λ (v′,σ ′). ξ [[ e ]]ε ′ † [x → v] σ ′ κ)
where v′ = 〈x,e,ε ′〉
η [[ l : read (x) ]]ε σ t v κ = ξ [[ x ]]ε σ (λ (,σ ′). κ(σ ′(),σ ′))
η [[ l : write (x) ]]ε σ t v κ = ξ [[ x ]]ε σ (λ (,σ ′). κ((),σ ′ † [ → v]))
η [[ l : decision (e, n1, n2) ]]ε σ t v κ =
ξ [[ e ]]ε σ (λ (v′,σ ′). if (v′) then η [[ n1 ]]ε σ ′ t v κ else η [[ n2 ]]ε σ ′ t v κ)
η [[ l : merge→ n ]]ε σ t v κ = η [[ n ]]ε σ t v κ
η [[ l :  ]]ε σ t v κ = let b = destroyAllTokens() in κ(v,σ) end
η [[ a → n ]]ε σ t v κ = η [[ a ]]ε σ t v (λ (v′,σ ′). η [[ n ]]ε σ ′ t v′κ)
η [[ l ]]ε σ t v κ = η [[ ε(l) ]]ε σ t v κ
Figure 9.8: CPS Semantics of Activity Diagrams: Continuations as Functions
211
ξ [[ c ]]ε σ κ = κ(c,σ)
ξ [[ x ]]ε σ κ = κ(ε(x),σ)
ξ [[ f (x) = e ]]ε σ κ = κ(λ (v,κ ′). [[ e ]]ε † [x → v] σ κ ′)
ξ [[ f (e) ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ (λ (v,σ ′). ξ [[ ε(f ) ]]ε σ ′ (λ (v′,σ ′′). ξ [[ e′ ]]ε ′ † [x → v]σ ′′ κ))
where v′ = 〈x,e′,ε ′〉
ξ [[ if e1 then e2 else e3 ]]ε σ κ =
ξ [[ e1 ]]ε σ (λ (v,σ ′). if (v) then ξ [[ e2 ]]ε σ ′ κ else ξ [[ e3 ]]ε σ ′ κ)
ξ [[ e1; e2 ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e1 ]]ε σ (λ (v,σ ′). ξ [[ e2 ]]ε σ ′ κ)
ξ [[ new e ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ (λ (v,σ ′). let = alloc(σ ′) in κ(,σ ′ † [ → v])) end
ξ [[ ! e ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ (λ (,σ ′). κ(σ ′(),σ ′))
ξ [[ x := e ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ (λ (v,σ ′). ξ [[ x ]]ε σ ′ (λ (,σ ′′). κ((),σ ′′ † [ → v])))
Figure 9.9: CPS Semantics of Alf Language: Continuations as Functions
9.5.2 Representation of Continuations as Frames
Using the defunctionalization technique [147], we transform the continuation functions,
obtained from the previous step, into frames as shown in Figure 9.10. In the following,
we provide details about each frame:
• GetF does not store any value. It awaits a location and a store.
• SetF stores a value. It awaits a location and a store.
• CallF stores a function identiﬁer and an environment. It awaits the value of the
function argument.
• ExecF stores the value of the argument. It awaits a closure, which is the result of
the evaluation of the function deﬁnition, and a store.
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• IfF stores then and else expressions and an environment. It awaits the value of the
condition and a store.
• DecisionF stores then and else nodes, an environment, a control token, and a value.
It awaits the value of the condition and a store.
• ExpSeqF stores the next expression and an environment. It awaits the value of the
ﬁrst expression and a store.
• NodeSeqF stores the next node, an environment, and a control token. It awaits the
output value of the ﬁrst node and a store.
• AllocF does not store any value. It awaits the value to be stored in the newly allo-
cated cell and a store.
• RhsF stores an identiﬁer and an environment. It awaits a location and a store.
type GetF = {}
type SetF = {val : Value}
type CallF = {fun : Identiﬁer; env : Env}
type ExecF = {arg : Value}
type IfF = {thenExp : Exp; elseExp : Exp; env : Env}
type DecisionF = {thenNode : Node; elseNode : Node; env : Env;
token : Token; val : Value}
type ExpSeqF = {nextExp : Exp; env : Env}
type NodeSeqF = {nextNode : Node; env : Env; token : Token}
type AllocF = {}
type RhsF = {id : Identiﬁer; env : Env}
Figure 9.10: Frames
The frame-based semantics of activity diagrams is presented in Figure 9.11 and
the frame-based semantics of Alf is presented in Figure 9.12. Figure 9.13 shows the
evaluation of the frames that are needed for computations. The primitive functions used
in the semantics are the same as deﬁned in the previous chapter.
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A[[ • → n ]]ε σ κ = let t = createToken() in η [[ n ]]ε σ t () κ end
η [[ l : opaque (e) ]]ε σ t v κ = ξ [[ e ]] ε σ κ
η [[ l : callOp (f) ]]ε σ t v κ = apply(push(CallF(f ,ε),κ),(v,σ))
η [[ l : read (x) ]]ε σ t v κ = ξ [[ x ]]ε σ (push(GetF(),κ))
η [[ l : write (x) ]]ε σ t v κ = ξ [[ x ]]ε σ (push(SetF(v),κ))
η [[ l : decision (e, n1, n2) ]]ε σ t v κ = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ(push(DecisionF(n1,n2,ε, t,v),κ))
η [[ l : merge → n ]]ε σ t v κ = η [[ n ]]ε σ t v κ
η [[ l :  ]]ε σ t v κ = let b = destroyAllTokens() in κ(v,σ) end
η [[ a → n ]]ε σ t v κ = η [[ a ]]ε σ t v (push(NodeSeqF(n,ε, t),κ))
η [[ l ]]ε σ t v κ = η [[ ε(l) ]]ε σ t v κ
Figure 9.11: Frame-Based Semantics of Activity Diagrams
ξ [[ c ]]ε σ κ = apply(κ ,(c,σ))
ξ [[ x ]]ε σ κ = apply(κ ,(ε(x),σ))
ξ [[ f (x) = e ]]ε σ κ = apply(κ,(〈x,e,ε ′〉,σ))
ξ [[ f (e) ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ (push(CallF(f ,ε), κ))
ξ [[ if e1 then e2 else e3 ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e1 ]]ε σ (push(IfF(e2,e3,ε),κ))
ξ [[ e1; e2 ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e1 ]]ε σ (push(ExpSeqF(e2,ε),κ))
ξ [[ new e ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ (push(AllocF(),κ))
ξ [[ ! e ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ (push(GetF(),κ))
ξ [[ x := e ]]ε σ κ = ξ [[ e ]]ε σ (push(RhsF(x,ε),κ))
Figure 9.12: Frame-Based Semantics of Alf Language
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F [[ GetF f ]]σ v κ = apply(κ,(σ(v),σ))
F [[ SetF f ]]σ v κ = apply(κ ,((),σ † [v → f .val]))
F [[ CallF f ]]σ v κ = ξ [[ (f .env)(f .fun) ]](f .env) σ (push(ExecF(v),κ))
F [[ ExecF f ]]σ v κ = ξ [[ e ]]ε ′ † [x → f .arg] σ κ where v = 〈x,e,ε ′〉
F [[ IfF f ]]σ v κ = if (v) then ξ [[ f.thenExp ]](f .env) σ κ
else ξ [[ f.elseExp ]](f .env) σ κ
F [[ DecisionF f ]]σ v κ = if (v) then η [[ f.thenNode ]](f .env) σ (f .token) (f .val) κ
else η [[ f.elseNode ]](f .env) σ (f .token) (f .val) κ
F [[ ExpSeqF f ]]σ v κ = ξ [[ f.nextExp ]](f .env) σ κ
F [[ NodeSeqF f ]]σ v κ = η [[ f.nextNode ]](f .env) σ (f .token) v κ
F [[ AllocF f ]]σ v κ = let = alloc(σ) in apply(κ,(,σ † [ → v])) end
F [[ RhsF f ]]σ v κ = ξ [[ f .id ]](f .env) σ (push(SetF(v),κ))
Figure 9.13: Semantics of Frames
9.6 Aspect Syntax and Semantics
In this section, we present our aspect extension to executable activity diagrams and elab-
orate its frame-based semantics. We start by presenting the aspect syntax. Then, we
elaborate the matching and the weaving semantics.
9.6.1 Aspect Syntax
An aspect, as shown in Figure 9.15, includes a list of advice. An advice speciﬁes actions
to be performed when join points satisfying a particular pointcut are reached. An advice
may also compute the original join point through a special expression named proceed.
Hence, as shown in Figure 9.14, we extend Alf syntax with an additional expression to
denote the computation of the original join point with possibly a new argument e.
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e ::= ...
| proceed (e) proceed
Figure 9.14: Proceed Expression
type Aspect = Advice list
type Advice = {body : Exp; pc : Pointcut}
type Pointcut = GetPC | SetPC | CallPC | ExecPC | NotPC | AndPC
type GetPC = {id : Identiﬁer}
type SetPC = {id : Identiﬁer; val : Value}
type CallPC = {id : Identiﬁer; arg : Identiﬁer}
type ExecPC = {id : Identiﬁer; arg : Identiﬁer}
type NotPC = {pc : Pointcut}
type AndPC = {pc1 : Pointcut; pc2 : Pointcut}
Figure 9.15: Aspect Syntax
Syntactically, an advice contains two parts: (1) A body, which is an Alf expression,
and (2) a pointcut, which designates a set of join points. An advice can be applied before,
after, or around a join point. However, before and after advice can be expressed as around
advice using the proceed expression. Hence, we consider all kinds of advice as around
advice as this does not restrict the generality of the approach. We ﬁrst consider basic
pointcuts: GetPC, SetPC, CallPC, and ExecPC. The pointcut GetPC (respectively SetPC)
picks out join points where the value of a variable is got from (respectively set to) the
store. The pointcut CallPC (respectively ExecPC) picks out join points where a function
is called (respectively executed).
9.6.2 Matching Semantics
Matching is a mechanism for identifying the join points targeted by the advice. In our ap-
proach, join points correspond to speciﬁc points in the execution of both activity diagrams
and Alf expressions. However, since the semantics is in a frame-based style, both kinds
of join points are continuation frames and arise naturally within the semantics. Therefore,
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our matching semantics examines whether a continuation frame satisﬁes a given pointcut
or not, as shown in Figure 9.16. In the following, we explain the matching rules.
match_pc : Pointcut→ Frame→ Value→ Store→ Env→ Cont→ Boolean
let match_pc p f v σ ε κ = match (p, f ) with
(GetPC p,GetF f ) ⇒ ε(p.id) = v
| (SetPC p,SetF f ) ⇒ ε(p.id) = v
| (CallPC p,CallF f ) ⇒ p.id = f .fun
| (ExecPC p,ExecF f ) ⇒ let (v′,σ ′) = ξ [[ ε(p.id) ]] ε σ κ in v = v′ end
| (NotPC p,Frame f ) ⇒ not match_pc(p.pc, f ,v,σ ,ε,κ)
| (AndPC p,Frame f ) ⇒ match_pc(p.pc1, f ,v,σ ,ε,κ) and
match_pc(p.pc2, f ,v,σ ,ε,κ)
| otherwise ⇒ false
Figure 9.16: Matching Semantics
Given a pointcut p, the current frame f, the current value v, a store σ , an environment
ε , and a continuation κ , the matching semantics examines whether f matches p. Matching
depends on three factors: the kind and the content of the frame f and the current value v
that f receives. In the case of:
• GetPC, there is a match if f is a GetF frame and the location of the identiﬁer given
in p is equal to the location that f receives.
• SetPC, there is a match if f is a SetF frame and the location of the identiﬁer given
in p is equal to the location that f receives.
• CallPC, there is a match if f is a CallF frame and it holds a function identiﬁer that
is equal to the one given in p.
• ExecPC, there is a match if f is an ExecF frame and the evaluation of the function
given in p is equal to the closure that f receives.
• NotPC, there is a match if f does not match the sub-pointcut of p.
• AndPC, there is a match if f matches both sub-pointcuts of p.
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9.6.3 Weaving Semantics
The weaving semantics describes how to apply the matching advice at the identiﬁed join
points. Since join points correspond to frames, advice body provides a means to modify
the behavior of those frames. The weaving is performed automatically during the execu-
tion. Therefore, we redeﬁne the apply function, as shown in Figure 9.17, to take an aspect
α and an environment ε into account. The weaving is done in two steps. When a frame
is activated, we ﬁrst check for a matching advice by calling the function get_matches. If
there is any applicable advice then the function execute_advice, deﬁned in Figure 9.19, is
called. Otherwise, the original computation is performed. In the following, we explain
these two steps.
apply : Cont→ (Value×Store)→ Env→ Aspect→ (Value×Store)
let apply κ (v,σ) ε α = match κ with
[ ] ⇒ (v,σ)
| f :: κ ′ ⇒ let ms = get_matches(f ,v,σ ,ε,α ,κ ′) in
if ms = [ ] then F [[ f ]]ε σ v α κ ′
else let argV =match f with
SetF f ⇒ f .val
| CallF f ⇒ v
| ExecF f ⇒ f .arg
| otherwise ⇒ ()
in execute_advice(ms, f ,argV,σ ,ε,α,κ ′)
end
end
Figure 9.17: Redeﬁned Apply Function
Advice Matching
To get an applicable advice, we go through the aspect and check whether its enclosed
pointcuts match the current frame (Figure 9.18). This is done by calling the function
match_pc deﬁned previously in Figure 9.16. In case there is a match, we return a structure
MatchedAD containing the advice itself and the pointcut arguments that will pass values
to the advice.
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type MatchedAD = {arg : Identiﬁer; ad : Advice}
get_matches : Frame→ Value→ Store→ Env→ Aspect→ Cont
→MatchedAD list
let get_matches f v σ ε α κ = match α with
[ ] ⇒ [ ]
|ad :: α ′ ⇒ let p = ad.pc in
if match_pc(p, f ,v,σ ,ε,α ,κ) then
let arg =match p with
SetPC p ⇒ p.id
| CallPC p | ExecPC p ⇒ p.arg
| otherwise ⇒ ()
in MatchedAD(arg,ad) :: get_matches( f ,v,σ ,ε ,α ′,κ)
end
else get_matches( f ,v,σ ,ε,α ′,κ)
end
Figure 9.18: Advice Matching
Advice Execution
Advice execution is shown in Figure 9.19. It starts by evaluating the ﬁrst applicable
advice. The remaining pieces of advice as well as the current frame are stored in the
environment by binding them to auxiliary variables &proceed and &jp respectively. To
evaluate the advice body, we deﬁne a new frame, AdvExecF, as follows:
type AdvExecF = {matches : MatchedAD list; jp : Frame}
F [[ AdvExecF f ]]ε σ v α κ = execute_advice(f .matches, f .jp,v,σ ,ε,α,κ)
execute_advice : MatchedAD list→ Frame→ Value→ Store→ Env→ Aspect
→ Cont→ Result
let execute_advice ms f v σ ε α κ = match ms with
[ ] ⇒ apply(push(MarkerF(),(push(f ,κ))),(v,σ),ε,α)
|m :: ms′ ⇒ let ad = m.ad in
ξ [[ ad.body ]]ε † [&proceed → ms′, &jp → f ,m.arg → v] σ α κ
end
Figure 9.19: Advice Execution
The evaluation of the proceed expression is provided below. The value of its argument
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is passed to the next advice or to the current join point if there is no further advice. To
execute the remaining pieces of advice, the frame AdvExecF is added to the frame list.
[[ proceed (e) ]]ε σ α κ = [[ e ]]ε σ α (push(AdvExecF(ε(&proceed),ε(&jp)),κ))
When all the applicable pieces of advice are executed, the original computation, i.e., the
current frame is invoked. To avoid matching the currently matched frame repeatedly, we
introduce a new frame, MarkerF, which invokes the primary apply function (apply_prim).
type MarkerF= { }
F [[ MarkerF f ]]ε σ v α κ = apply_prim(κ,(v,σ))
9.7 Semantics of the Dataﬂow Pointcut
In this section, we explore the semantics of the dflow pointcut in xUML. As mentioned in
the previous chapter, this pointcut is useful from a security perspective since it can detect
a considerable number of vulnerabilities related to information ﬂow, such as Cross-site
Scripting (XSS) and SQL injection [72]. As deﬁned below, the dflow pointcut has a
sub-pointcut pc and a unique tag that discriminates it from other dflow pointcuts.
type DFlowPC = {pc : Pointcut; tag : Identiﬁer}
In order to track dependencies between values, we use a tagging environment γ
that maps values to tags. Tag propagation is performed dynamically during the execution
of the activity diagram and Alf expressions. In particular, this is done at the frames
side (Figure 9.20). Notice that the functions now take the tagging environment γ as an
additional argument. Notice also that in the case of an ExecF frame, the closure 〈x,e,ε ′,γ ′〉
is extended with a tagging environment γ ′ to capture the tags generated during the function
execution. In addition, we deﬁne a marker frame DﬂowF that is used for tag propagation
in the case of a function call. The DﬂowF frame stores a tagging environment before
entering a function call and awaits the result of the call.
type DﬂowF = {tag_env : Env}
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F [[ GetF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = apply(κ,(σ(v),σ),ε,γ † [σ(v) → γ(v)],α)
F [[ SetF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = apply(κ ,((),σ † [v → f .val]),ε,γ † [v → γ(f .val)],α)
F [[ CallF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = ξ [[ (f .env)(f .fun) ]](f .env) γ σ α (push(ExecF(v),κ))
F [[ ExecF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = ξ [[ e ]](ε ′ † [x → f .arg]) (γ ′ † [ε(x) → γ( f .arg)]) σ α (push(DﬂowF(γ),κ))
where v = 〈x,e,ε ′,γ ′〉
F [[ IfF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = if (v) then ξ [[ f.thenExp ]](f .env) γ σ α κ else ξ [[ f.elseExp ]](f .env) γ σ α κ
F [[ DecisionF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = if (v) then η [[ f.thenNode ]](f .env) γ σ (f .token) (f .val) α κ
else η [[ f.elseNode ]](f .env) γ σ (f .token) (f .val) α κ
F [[ ExpSeqF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = ξ [[ f.nextExp ]](f .env) γ σ α κ
F [[ NodeSeqF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = η [[ f.nextNode ]](f .env) γ σ (f .token) v α κ
F [[ AllocF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = let = alloc(σ) in apply(κ,(,σ † [ → v]),ε,γ † [ → γ(v)],α) end
F [[ RhsF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = ξ [[ f .id ]](f .env) γ σ α (push(SetF(v),κ))
F [[ AdvExecF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = execute_advice(f .matches, f .jp,v,σ ,ε,γ,α,κ)
F [[ MarkerF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = apply_prim(κ ,(v,σ))
F [[ DFlowF f ]]ε γ σ v α κ = apply(κ ,(v,σ),ε, f .tag_env† [v → getTags(γ)],α)
Figure 9.20: Semantics of Frames with the dflow Pointcut
In the following, we explain the tag propagation rules for the affected frames:
• In the case of a GetF frame, the tags of the location v propagate to the value stored
at that location.
• In the case of a SetF frame, the tags of the value of the right-hand side of an assign-
ment propagate to the location of the assignment identiﬁer.
• In the case of an ExecF frame, the tags of the argument value f .arg propagate to the
value of the variable x. In addition, the tags of the argument and the tags that are
221
generated during the function execution propagate to the result of the function. For
this reason, we use a DﬂowF frame to access the result of the function call and re-
store the tagging environment after returning from the call. The function getTags(γ)
used in F [[ DFlowF f ]] retrieves all the tags stored in the tagging environment γ .
• In the case of an AllocF frame, the tags of v propagate to the created location .
The matching semantics of the dflow pointcut is presented in Figure 9.21. A join
point frame f matches a dflow pointcut that contains a pointcut pc and a tag t if: (1) The
frame f matches the pointcut pc of the dflow pointcut, or (2) the set of tags of the value
that the frame f awaits (captured by the variable val′) contains the tag t. In case a frame f
matches the pointcut pc of the dflow pointcut, the tag t propagates to the value associated
with the frame f (captured by the variable val).
type JpF = GetF | SetF | CallF | ExecF
let match_pc p f v σ ε γ α κ = match (p, f ) with
...
| (DFlowPC p,JpF f ) ⇒ let (b,γ ′) = match_pc(p.pc, f ,v,σ ,ε,γ,α ,κ) in
let val =match f with
GetF f ⇒ v
SetF f ⇒ f .val
CallF f ⇒ let (v′,σ ′) = ξ [[ ε(f .fun) ]]ε γ σ α κ in
v′
end
ExecF f ⇒ v
in
if (b)
then (true,γ ′ † [val → γ ′(val)∪{p.tag}])
else let val′ =match f with
CallF f ⇒ v
otherwise ⇒ val




Figure 9.21: Matching Semantics of the dflow Pointcut
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Example: To illustrate the dflow pointcut in xUML, let us consider the SearchPage ac-
tivity diagram presented in Figure 9.22. The activity starts by accepting a search request.
Then, the searched phrase is extracted by the action GetQuery. If the requested phrase is
empty, an error message is generated. Otherwise, the action Search is executed and the
result message, containing both the requested phrase and the search result, is generated.
Finally, the generated message is printed on the web page.
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Figure 9.22: Search Page Activity Diagram
The presented example is vulnerable to XSS attacks since the untrusted input, re-
ceived from the user, has not been sanitized before being placed into the contents of the
web page. Therefore, it enables an attacker to inject malicious scripts into the web page
and reveal conﬁdential information. To ﬁx this vulnerability, we need to sanitize the
untrusted input and all the data that originated from it before printing them on the web
page. The dflow pointcut can be remarkably used to address this problem. Indeed, the
dflow pointcut, dflow(p), picks out all points in the activity execution where values are
dependent on the join points that are previously picked out by p. Therefore, by deﬁning
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pointcut p as CallPC(GetQuery), the pointcut dflow(p) picks all join points that are orig-
inated from the search phrase, which is the user input. Below, we provide a sanitizing
aspect for ﬁxing the discussed vulnerability.
Aspect (Pointcuts and Advice):
CallPC p1 = {id = GetQuery; arg = x}
DFlowPC p2 = {pc = p1; tag = t}
CallPC p3 = {id = Print; arg = y}
AndPC p4 = {pc1 = p2; pc2 = p3}
Advice a = {body = proceed (Sanitize(y)); pc = p4}
Brieﬂy, the aspect captures points where the function Print is called with an argu-
ment that is originated from the user input. The aspect ﬁrst sanitizes the argument by
calling the function Sanitize and then calls the function Print with the sanitized argument.
The join points targeted by this aspect are matched based on the following:
• The call to the function GetQuery (Figure 9.22) matches the pointcut p2 since it
matches the sub-pointcut p1. Consequently, the tag t of the dflow pointcut (p2)
is added to the tagging environment of the function GetQuery, and is given to the
result of the function evaluation.
• Then, if the search phrase is not empty then the action Search and its enclosing Alf
code are executed. According to the tag propagation rules for assignment and call
operation expressions, the values of the variables result and resultMessage, used in
the Alf expressions, get the tag t.
• Subsequently, the call to the function Print matches p4 since it matches both sub-
pointcuts of p4 (p2 and p3). More precisely, the call to the function Print matches
the pointcut p3 as p3 is a call to the function Print. In addition, the call to the
function Print matches the pointcut p2 as the value of its argument (resultMessage)
has the tag t. Therefore, the sanitizing advice will be woven at this point.
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9.8 Related Work on Aspect Semantics in xUML
Existing AOM approaches that handle xUML models are presented from a practical per-
spective [77, 89, 176]. In addition, they mainly focus on providing a framework for exe-
cuting the woven model for the purposes of simulation and veriﬁcation. In the following,
we provide an overview of these approaches.
Fuentes and Sánchez [77] have proposed a dynamic weaver for aspect-oriented ex-
ecutable UML models. A UML proﬁle, called AOEM, is elaborated to support aspect-
oriented concepts. Advice pieces are modeled as activity diagrams and injected into the
base model as structured activities. Pointcuts, that intercept message sending and receiv-
ing, are speciﬁed using sequence diagrams. The weaving process is deﬁned as a chain
of model transformations. However, no model transformation language is used. Instead,
Java and standards, like XSLT and XPath, are used to directly manipulate the XMI repre-
sentation of the models. In addition, this approach does not support action languages.
Zhang et al. [176] have presented Motorola WEAVR, a tool for weaving aspects
into executable UML state machines. Motorola WEAVR is one of the stable weavers
that is developed in an industrial environment. In addition, it concentrates on executable
modeling, and therefore it is more suited to detailed design. Motorola WEAVR supports
two types of join points that are action and transition. Aspect interference is handled
by allowing precedence relationships to be speciﬁed at the modeling level. However,
this weaver is based on the Telelogic TAU G2 [9] implementation. Therefore, it is tool-
dependent and not portable. In addition, the graphical representation of the woven models
is not supported by the tool; the woven models cannot be manually inspected.
Jackson et al. [89] have introduced an approach for specifying and weaving exe-
cutable class diagrams and sequence diagrams. This weaver is based on Kermeta action
language [121] for deﬁning precise behaviors and providing executability. However, it
only supports weaving of executable class diagrams, as all behavioral diagrams, such as
sequence diagrams, are deﬁned as methods. Furthermore, Kermeta has been designed for
specifying meta-model behaviors and it is not as expressive as UML action languages.
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9.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a formal semantics for aspect matching and weaving in
xUML models expressed using the standard Alf language. We have elaborated frame-
based CPS semantics since this style of semantics allows formalizing aspect-oriented
mechanisms in a precise and elegant way. In fact, one can easily notice that CPS and
defunctionalization make join points explicit and facilitate aspect matching and weav-
ing. In addition, by expressing the semantics of activity diagrams and Alf constructs in a
frame-based representation, the matching and the weaving processes are performed in a
uniﬁed way for both activity diagrams and Alf constructs.
We have addressed useful pointcuts from a security perspective that pick out join
points where functions are called and executed, and where variables are get and set. These
pointcuts are useful since they detect important points, where security mechanisms, such
as, authorization, encryption, and decryption, may be added before, after, or around these
points. In addition, we have elaborated semantics for the dataﬂow pointcut. This pointcut
identiﬁes join points based on data dependencies between values, and therefore allowing
the detection of vulnerabilities related to information ﬂow.
This contribution is very useful in the ﬁeld of software security hardening since it
targets matching and weaving on precise and detailed speciﬁcations that are, at the same
time, high-level and independent of any programming language. Such a semantics allows
capturing more join points that cannot be easily identiﬁed on high-level and abstract UML
models. Therefore, numerous ﬂaws can get resolved before entering the implementation
phase, which signiﬁcantly reduces costs and leads to more trustworthy software. The
proposed semantics is a ﬁrst step towards a complete semantic framework, where more




With the increasing complexity and pervasiveness of today’s software systems, security
should be integrated to software since the ﬁrst stages of the development life cycle. In this
context, model-driven engineering is a promising approach to early software hardening.
This approach aims at alleviating the complexity of software development by shifting the
development efforts from the code level to the modeling level, where models are ﬁrst-
class entities and are considered in every step of the software development life cycle.
Moreover, because of the pervasive nature of security concerns and the lack of security
knowledge among developers, there is a clear need for a systematic way to integrate those
concerns into the software development process. In this respect, aspect-oriented modeling
is the most appropriate paradigm. Indeed, by separating security concerns from the main
functionalities, software developers can make use of the expertise of security specialists
and systematically integrate security solutions into design models. In this setting, we
have elaborated an AOM framework for specifying and systematically integrating security
hardening solutions into UML design models.
For the speciﬁcation of security aspects, we have devised, in Chapter 4, a UML
proﬁle allowing the speciﬁcation of common aspect-oriented primitives and covering the
main UML diagrams, i.e., class diagrams, state machine diagrams, sequence diagrams,
and activity diagrams. The proposed proﬁle allows speciﬁcation of security solutions for
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high-level security requirements, such as, conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication, access
control, etc. It supports adaptations, which add new elements before, after, or around
join points, and remove existing elements. In addition, we have deﬁned a UML-speciﬁc
pointcut language that provides high-level and user-friendly primitives to designate UML
join points. Regarding the join point model, in activity diagrams, we consider not only
executable nodes but also various control nodes to allow modeling crosscutting concerns
that are needed with alternatives, loops, exceptions, and multi-threaded applications. In
state machine diagrams, we consider not only static states, but also we capture states that
dynamically depend on the triggered transitions. For purposes of reuse, the aspects can
be designed as generic solutions, then specialized to a particular application.
Furthermore, we have designed and implemented, in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, a
weaving framework to specialize the security aspects and automatically inject them into
base models. The weaver covers all the diagrams that are supported in our approach. In
addition, it supports all kinds of adaptations that can be speciﬁed using our AOM proﬁle
presented in Chapter 4. The adoption of a model-to-model transformation to implement
the weaving process helped in generating the weaving rules in an automatic way without
having to manipulate the internal representation of UML models. Moreover, the adop-
tion of the standard OCL language for evaluating the pointcuts allowed us to match a
wide set of join points belonging to various UML diagrams. Besides, the adoption of the
standard QVT language for implementing the adaptation rules extends portability of the
designed weaver to all tools supporting QVT language. To get the full advantages of this
comprehensive and portable framework, we have developed it as a plug-in to IBM-RSA
tool. To demonstrate the viability and the relevance of our framework, we have used it to
experiment adding various security mechanisms in mid-size open source projects such as
SIP communicator and OpenSAF. The supported security mechanisms are those related
to high-level security requirements such as access control, authentication, authorization,
etc. Finally, to validate the correctness of our weaving methods, we can provide the wo-
ven model, together with the needed security properties, to veriﬁcation and validation
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tools [57, 105], that will verify the woven model against the speciﬁed security properties.
From a theoretical point of view, our contribution is two fold: First, we have elab-
orated formal speciﬁcations, in an operational style, for matching and weaving in UML
activity diagrams. The purpose of elaborating this semantics is to derive algorithms for
implementing our weaving adaptations presented in Chapter 5. In this respect, a syntax
of activity diagrams together with their corresponding adaptations have been deﬁned to
express the matching and the weaving semantic rules. Afterwards, we have derived al-
gorithms for matching and weaving and proved the correctness and the completeness of
these algorithms with respect to the deﬁned semantic rules. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the ﬁrst contribution in handling formal speciﬁcations for adaptation weav-
ing, speciﬁcally for around adaptations with or without proceed. We have elaborated the
semantics for activity diagrams mainly because of their richness in terms of actions and
control nodes that can be captured as join points. However, a formal semantics for match-
ing and weaving for the other diagrams, i.e., class diagrams, state machine diagrams, and
sequence diagrams, can be provided in the same vein as for activity diagrams.
Second, to be able to address advanced security concerns such as information-ﬂow
vulnerabilities, we have extended our weaving framework to include xUML models ex-
pressed using the standard Alf language. Indeed, xUML allows to specify detailed and
precise behaviors that include variables, assignments, operation calls, etc. We have elabo-
rated a semantics for matching and weaving in xUML following a CPS/frame-based style
because this style of semantics provides a concise, accurate, and elegant description of
aspect-oriented mechanisms. Indeed, CPS and defunctionalization make join points ex-
plicit, and therefore allow the aspect matching and weaving in a straightforward manner.
In addition, by expressing the semantics of activity diagrams and Alf language in a frame-
based representation, the matching and the weaving processes are performed in a uniﬁed
way for both activity diagram elements and Alf expressions. We have addressed useful
pointcuts from a security perspective that pick out join points where functions are called
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and executed, and where variables are get and set. In addition, we have elaborated seman-
tics for ﬂow-based pointcuts, which are useful to detect and ﬁx vulnerabilities related to
information ﬂow. Using a CPS/frame-based style simpliﬁed greatly the speciﬁcation of
the matching and the weaving semantics for this kind of pointcuts, which is an advantage
compared to expressing them in an operation style, where lots of implementation details
need to be speciﬁed. Regarding the implementation of the matching and the weaving in
xUML, it is not addressed in this thesis mainly because of the lack of tools that support
the execution of Alf expressions.
In the following, we evaluate our framework from different perspectives as follows:
• User Friendliness: To facilitate the use of our framework, we have proposed a
pointcut language in a textual representation to designate join points in a user-
friendly way. It is important to mention here that the process of translating the
textual pointcuts into OCL is completely automatic and without any user inter-
vention. On the other hand, the added or the replaced-by elements, speciﬁed by
adaptations, are graphically represented using the concrete syntax of the modeling
language. The use of the concrete syntax makes our framework broadly applicable
because no experience with meta-modeling is required from developers. This facili-
tates using the framework by modelers who are unlikely to have enough knowledge
about UML abstract syntax. Moreover, the framework allows visualizing the woven
model easily.
• Formality: We have explored two styles of semantics for the formalization of the
matching and the weaving processes. First, we used a structured operational style,
in which our semantics is deﬁned using deductive proof systems. Second, we used
a denotational style, in which our semantics is deﬁned using CPS and defunction-
alization. Our main target is the activity diagram. However, the formal deﬁnitions
for the other diagrams can be provided in the same vein that we provide them for
activity diagrams. Klein et al. [101] have proposed formal deﬁnitions for matching
and weaving. However, their approach is limited to the detection of join points for
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basic or combined sequence diagrams. Generic AOM approaches based on graph
transformation [116, 169] have a formal underpinning, but this is an advantage of
using graph transformations.
• Expressiveness: Our framework is more expressive than previous ones, in the sense
that it supports a large set of modiﬁcations of UML models since it views model
weaving as simply as model transformation. Moreover, the elements allowed as
join points are more than in many previous approaches. However, the approaches
that are based on graph transformation, such as MATA [169] and GeKo [116], are
considered more expressive because they allow any modeling element to be a join
point. Another point to mention is that MATA supports sequence pointcuts, that is,
an aspect may match against a sequence of messages or a sequence of transitions.
We do not address this pointcut in this thesis. However, this can be achieved in the
future by instrumenting OCL to identify speciﬁc sequences of model elements.
• Extensibility and Portability: In our framework, aspect adaptations are speciﬁed
using a UML proﬁle. This mechanism allows extending UML meta-model ele-
ments, by means of stereotypes, without changing UML meta-model. Therefore,
new AOM extensions for security hardening can be easily added to our framework
by extending our AOM proﬁle with the needed stereotypes and their associated
tagged values. In addition, since proﬁles are standard UML extensions, almost any
UML modeling framework can store and manipulate them. Moreover, the deﬁned
architecture for the weaving framework facilitates the extension of the transforma-
tion tool to support a wider range of UML diagrams. Indeed, new transformations
can be easily plugged-in without going through the hassle of modifying and alter-
ing the existing architecture. Additionally, since QVT mapping rules are deﬁned
based on UML meta-elements, our framework is portable to any UML modeling
framework and to other tools supporting QVT language [3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10].
• Reusability: In our framework, security aspects can be designed as generic tem-
plates independently of the application speciﬁcities. Generic aspects are important
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to deﬁne libraries of reusable aspects for special purposes such as security harden-
ing. Since generic pointcuts, as part of generic aspects, have no concrete speciﬁ-
cation, an aspect needs to be specialized to a speciﬁc application before it can be
woven into base models. To this end, we have provided a weaving interface that
exposes the generic pointcuts to the developer. After mapping all the generic point-
cuts to their corresponding elements in the base model, the application-dependent
aspect is automatically generated by the deﬁned framework. It is important to men-
tion here that aspects in our framework can be generic and speciﬁc as well. The
modeler chooses the kind of aspects that fulﬁls his/her needs.
The work presented in this thesis can be further pursued by identifying and elaborat-
ing new AOM extensions, i.e., pointcut and advice primitives, together with their semantic
foundations, for security hardening. An example of such extensions is tracematches [27].
Tracematches support matching a sequence of consecutive events rather than individual
join points. At the modeling level, this pointcut can help in capturing, for instance, a
sequence of messages in sequence diagrams or a sequence of transitions in state machine
diagrams. Tracematches are important from a security perspective because some vul-
nerabilities involve a sequence of events, such as transactions and race conditions [36].
Once new primitives have been identiﬁed, our AOM framework will be extended with
the newly-deﬁned pointcuts and advices. This means extending our AOM proﬁle with
the needed stereotypes along with their associated tagged values, as well as extending
our weaving framework with the needed transformation rules. It is also important to ex-
plore the deﬁnition of AOM security primitives for executable models, and in particular,
in UML action languages. Furthermore, the work that we did on UML can be extended
to other modeling languages, such as Systems Modeling Language (SysML) [123], to ad-
dress security hardening in systems engineering.
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From a theoretical perspective, our framework can be extended by elaborating the
matching and the weaving semantics in other UML diagrams, such as, class diagrams, se-
quence diagrams, and state machine diagrams. In addition, we have seen that CPS/frame-
based style is an elegant and interesting venue for the formalization of aspect-oriented
constructs. Therefore, it is important to investigate the formalization of other security
primitives using this style of semantics. Another interesting work is to explore the equiv-
alence between CPS/frame-based semantics and the practical techniques that are used to
implement matching and weaving, such as the shadow concept in AOP [83].
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